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Innovation Through Intimidation: 
An Empirical Account of 
Defamation Litigation in China 
 
Benjamin L. Liebman* 
Introduction 
Consider two recent defamation cases in Chinese courts. In 2004, Zhang 
Xide, a former county-level Communist Party boss, sued the authors of a 
best selling book, An Investigation into China’s Peasants. The book exposed 
ofªcial malfeasance on Zhang’s watch and the resultant peasant hardships. 
Zhang demanded an apology from the book’s authors and publisher, excision 
of the offending chapter, 200,000 yuan (approximately U.S.$25,000)1 for 
emotional damages, and a share of proªts from sales of the book. Zhang sued 
in a local court on which, not coincidentally, his son sat as a judge.2 
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1. During the period covered by this Article, the exchange rate between the Chinese renminbi, or 
yuan, and the U.S. dollar was US$1 = 8.3 yuan. 
2. See infra Appendix B, Case 180; Philip Pan, In China, Turning the Law into the People’s Protector, 
Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 2004, at A1. Zhang’s request that the authors cease publication was unnecessary: 
In March 2004, while the case was underway, the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department banned 
the book. The Propaganda Department also banned media coverage of the case, although reports and 
discussion continued on the Internet, and a few media outlets covered the court hearings. As of August 
2005, the ªrst-instance court had yet to decide the case. See infra Appendix B, Case 180. In a statement 
submitted to the intermediate court on July 11, 2005, the defendants’ lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, criticized the court 
for violating procedural requirements in its handling of the case, argued that the delay in resolving the 
case demonstrated that external forces were inºuencing the court’s handling of the dispute, and ques-
tioned the pressure being placed on defendants by the court to settle the case. Id.; see also Bentai Dujia 
Huode “Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha” An Bianhu Lüshi Pu Zhiqiang Zhi Shenpanzhang Yi Xin [Exclusive: Letter 
to the Chief Judge from Pu Zhiqiang, Lawyer for the Defendants in the “Investigation into China’s Peasants” Case], Ra-
dio Free Asia, July 11, 2005, http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shenrubaodao/2005/07/11/ puzhiqiang/. 
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In 2000, Song Dianwen, a peasant, sued the Heilongjiang Daily, the ofªcial 
paper of the Communist Party, in his home province for defamation after it 
published an article reporting that, during a village disturbance, Song had 
lit a ªre that killed two people. He won a judgment from a local court, afªrmed 
on appeal, for 3,500 yuan (approximately U.S.$430) in emotional damages.3 
The cases exemplify two different tracks of defamation litigation in pre-
sent-day China. Track-one cases, like Zhang’s, are brought by local public ofª-
cials, government and Communist Party entities, or corporations to punish 
and control the increasingly aggressive Chinese media. In these cases, courts 
serve as state institutions at the local, as opposed to central, level to restrict 
and retaliate against the media and to block central oversight. On the second 
track, persons without power or Party-state ties sue the media, which, de-
spite widespread commercialization, virtually all continue to be linked to the 
Chinese Party-state. Many such cases are brought by ordinary persons against 
Communist Party mouthpiece newspapers. Track-two cases thus represent a 
deployment of the courts by ordinary citizens against state entities. Empiri-
cal evidence from 223 defamation cases studied in this Article indicates that 
the media lose the overwhelming majority of cases on both tracks.4 
The conventional wisdom, taking track-one powerful plaintiff suits as the 
paradigm, perceives defamation litigation in local Chinese courts as yet an-
other lever of state control over the increasingly autonomous Chinese media.5 
Track-one developments in China correspond to experiences in other con-
temporary single-party states,6 where libel laws often serve to restrict individual 
rights, and to the use of defamation law to preserve state authority in West-
ern legal history. By neglecting track-two cases, however, this popular view 
shortchanges the extent to which defamation litigation in China also serves a 
countervailing function: the use of courts by ordinary persons to challenge 
state authority. The conventional wisdom also overlooks the degree to which 
defamation litigation reºects growing use of the formal legal system by local 
authorities to resist central Party-state control. 
The development of defamation litigation, on both tracks, illustrates the 
complex and evolving roles of courts, media, and civil litigation in China. 
Analysis of the claims and outcomes in 223 defamation cases suggests that 
 
                                                                                                                      
3. The court found that the report was false. See infra Appendix B, Case 68. 
4. The empirical evidence is set out in full in the Appendices to this Article. Appendix A, infra, de-
tails the parties and other relevant information for each case analyzed for this Article. Appendix B, infra, 
includes citations to the sources relied on for each case. 
5. See, e.g., Committee to Protect Journalists, China (including Hong Kong), in Attacks on the Press 
in 2004 101, 103 (Bill Sweeney ed., Committee to Protect Journalists 2005) (noting the use of libel suits 
in China “to bring [journalists] to heel”); H. L. Fu & Richard Cullen, Defamation Law in the People’s Repub-
lic of China, 11 Transnat’l Law. 1, 20 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he use of the civil law of defamation by 
citizens is encouraged by the authorities to help tighten media control, thus supplementing the existing 
criminal, administrative, bureaucratic and political control systems”); cf. Freedom House, China, in 
Freedom of the Press 2005: A Global Survey of Media Independence 57, 57 (2005) (noting the 
tight control of the Chinese media by Communist Party authorities). 
6. See infra note 384. 
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use of defamation litigation by track-one plaintiffs for repressive purposes is 
encouraging both ordinary persons to use such cases to protect their own inter-
ests and courts to become increasingly important arbiters of individual rights. 
Through these processes, instrumental use of the courts to protect local interests 
is legitimizing the role of courts in Chinese society. Defamation litigation serves 
to intimidate and restrain the Chinese media, but in a system in which the 
media are not free of state control, such cases may also increase state account-
ability. This story is not as simple as commonly believed, but, better under-
stood, it adds signiªcant insight into the nature of legal innovation and in-
stitutional development both in China and in other developing legal systems. 
In prior work I have shown how close Party-state ties give the media ex-
tensive power both to inºuence the courts and to resolve disputes, power that 
has increased even as the media have become increasingly commercialized 
and have begun to assert new autonomy.7 A high rate of media defeats in 
defamation cases does not alter that conclusion. The fundamental fact is that 
the media often have far more real authority and power in the Chinese legal 
system than the courts. China’s courts remain institutionally weak and sub-
ject to extensive external inºuence, particularly from the local Party-state.8 
The media continue to exert inºuence across a range of cases, and the total 
number of defamation cases brought against the media is relatively small when 
compared to the total volume of civil litigation in China. 
Still, defamation cases are worthy of independent study. These cases repre-
sent an area in which the media frequently are a weak party, in particular 
when sued by courts, judges, and other local ofªcials and state entities. Such 
cases suggest that courts are increasingly able to challenge the media’s broader 
authority and inºuence. Understanding the media’s strong position in the 
Chinese system helps explain why courts and other local ofªcials and state 
entities have turned to litigation to combat media oversight: They possess 
few other tools to challenge media verdicts. Yet defamation cases also show 
that courts are not always swayed by the relative power of litigants before 
them. In cases brought by ordinary persons, court verdicts in favor of plain-
tiffs often reºect judicial willingness to rule against powerful entities. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets out the methodology of the 
study, the legal framework governing defamation law, and the early devel-
opment of plaintiff-favoring defamation cases in the 1980s and 1990s. Part 
II analyzes 223 defamation cases brought in China in the past decade, with 
particular attention to who sues and is sued, the nature of defamation claims, 
and plaintiffs’ goals. Part III places the empirical ªndings from Part II in a 
larger context, showing that although defamation law has become a signiªcant 
tool by which to control the newly commercialized Chinese media, defama-
tion litigation cannot be understood solely in terms of restraints on the press. 
 
                                                                                                                      
7. See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2005). 
8. Id. at 67–68. 
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Cases by ordinary and famous persons reºect the increased willingness of those 
without Party-state ties to challenge the Party-state. The courts’ growing 
role in resolving defamation disputes may have the effect of encouraging both 
greater use of the courts and greater innovation by the courts. 
I. Background 
A. Methodology 
This Article analyzes 223 defamation cases brought in China’s courts be-
tween 1995 and 2004.9 Information on cases derives primarily from Chinese 
media reports, although in some cases details were obtained from court opin-
ions, academic articles, Internet postings, and interviews.10 The overwhelm-
ing majority of reports were from media not directly involved in the cases; how-
ever, in eighteen cases reports on cases ran in the newspaper or magazine that 
was the target of the lawsuit.11 
Materials were collected through Internet searches conducted at various 
times between 2002 and 2004.12 Searches yielded different results depend-
ing upon when they were carried out, reºecting the fact that much news on 
Chinese websites is available for only a limited period. Although repeat search-
ing did not ensure that all available reports were obtained, it did permit devel-
opment of a larger case sample than would have been collected by searching 
at only one moment.13 This Article also relies on more than 100 interviews 
 
                                                                                                                      
9. The 223 cases include cases from each year between 1995 and 2004, with the largest number of 
cases appearing after 2000. The total number of cases for each year was: 1995–8; 1996–5; 1997–5; 
1998–8; 1999–27; 2000–31; 2001–40; 2002–40; 2003–31; and 2004–24. In four cases the year was 
unclear. The larger number of cases beginning in 1999 most likely reºects the growth of the Internet 
from the late 1990s, rather than an overall increase in the number of defamation cases. The drop in cases 
in 2004 reºects the fact that searching for cases was concluded in the summer of 2004. 
Because of my reliance on media sources for most case information, the speciªc date of a case ªling or 
judgment was often unclear. I rely on the date of ªrst-instance judgment, when available. When not 
available, I rely on dates of case ªlings or of media reports concerning cases to estimate the year in which 
the case was heard. The relatively small number of cases in the early years of the survey and uncertainty 
regarding speciªc dates on which cases were decided mean that attempts to analyze case trends within the 
ten-year timeframe of this Article would be unreliable. I thus do not attempt to do so. 
10. Most of the cases came from online media, generally news reports reprinted from traditional me-
dia. In addition, twenty-ªve cases came from academic articles available online or in online databases; see 
infra Appendix B, Cases 1, 28, 30, 39, 41, 42, 43, 60, 61, 67, 70, 82, 102, 105, 113, 115, 148, 150, 
157, 159, 169, 170, 215, 216, 222; seventeen cases came from summaries of cases on court websites; see 
infra Appendix B, Cases 9, 10, 34, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, 94, 96, 97, 155, 189, 190, 197, 202, 203; sixteen 
came from actual court options located online (generally not at court websites); see infra Appendix B, 
Cases 12, 22, 23, 47, 62, 66, 68, 72, 90, 93, 118, 121, 179, 195, 209, 217; and one case came from what 
appeared to be the personal website of a party to the case; see infra Appendix B, Case 89. 
11. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 14, 29, 31, 32, 45, 55, 97, 105, 108, 123, 141, 146, 161, 162, 
183, 201, 206, 212. In one case information came from a plaintiff’s report. 
12. A total of 230 defamation cases were collected. Seven of these cases dated from before 1995 and 
thus were omitted from the analysis in this Article and the accompanying appendices. Earlier drafts of 
this Article analyzed 228 cases, and thus Chinese media reports on my ªndings, see infra note 15, refer to 
228 cases. 
13. Later searches were run from August to October 2005 to conªrm and update case information in 
the originally selected cases. As a result, it was discovered that one case classiªed as a 2004 case (based on 
2006 / Innovation Through Intimidation 37 
with legal and media studies academics, journalists, judges, and lawyers about 
the development of defamation litigation in China14 and on Chinese academic 
writings by media studies and legal scholars.15 
Reliance on media reports of cases presents obvious problems. The media 
are more likely to report on cases they view as egregious than on cases in which 
the media use their own power to affect outcomes. The media are also likely 
to highlight the most extreme or sensational cases. Some media avoid cover-
ing cases in which they are defendants. Others highlight cases involving their 
commercial rivals or attempt to use coverage of defamation litigation in 
which they are defendants to affect outcomes.16 Not all newspapers and maga-
zines are available online, and online searches thus yield reports from only 
selected Chinese media. Those available online, in particular in the late 1990s, 
tend to be concentrated in the more developed cities of eastern China. Media 
available online also are more commercialized, and perhaps more innovative, 
than those not so available. Although relying on Internet searches may risk 
overlooking some media reports, one beneªt of the proliferation of news web-
sites in China is that they facilitate obtaining information about develop-
ments nationwide, as many sites include reports from media from across China. 
The sample included cases from twenty-eight of mainland China’s thirty-one 
provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level municipalities, as well 
as ªve or more cases from eighteen different provinces or provincial-level 
regions.17 
In addition, many defamation cases are not newsworthy. Thus, the sample 
of cases may inform more about the types of cases that interest the media 
than the types of cases that are actually brought. Media reports may also be 
 
                                                                                                                      
ªling date) was actually decided in 2005. 
14. The interviews on which I rely were conducted as part of my ongoing research into the role of the 
media in the Chinese legal system. All interviewees were promised anonymity. In some cases, interview-
ees requested that the date and location of the interview, as well as the name of their employer, not be 
disclosed. Such concerns reºect the sensitive nature of research into the Chinese media. In order to guar-
antee conªdentiality, I cite only to the year in which interviews took place and to an interview number. 
In all cases I rely on interviewees in areas in which they have speciªc expertise or experience. 
15. This Article has attracted signiªcant coverage in the Chinese media, with two of China’s leading 
legal newspapers carrying reports on my ªndings. See Jiang Anjie, Zhongguo Chuanmei Yu Sifa: Yu Yiwei 
Waiguo Faxue Xuezhe De Duihua [Chinese Media and Judiciary: Dialogue with a Foreign Legal Scholar], Fazhi 
Wang [Legal Daily Website], July 30, 2005, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2005-07/30/content_ 
175408.htm; Liu Hui, 228 Li Meiti Mingyu Qinquan An Jieshi Le Shenme? [What Do 228 Media Defamation 
Cases Reveal?], Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], July 25, 2005, available at http:// ww.jcrb. 
com/n1/jcrb840/ca396658.htm. 
16. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004). In only four of the cases analyzed in this Article, however, did 
reports run in media that appeared to be direct rivals of a defendant. 
17. The largest number of cases was from Beijing, which had forty-seven cases, more than three times 
the number of cases in Shanghai, which, with ªfteen cases, had the second most. The total number of 
cases in each province, provincial-level municipality, or autonomous region was as follows: Anhui–8; 
Beijing–47; Chongqing–8; Fujian–4; Gansu–3; Guangdong–12; Guangxi–9; Guizhou–2; Hainan–6; 
Hebei–5; Heilongjiang–5; Henan–9; Hubei–7; Hunan–10; Inner Mongolia–2; Jiangsu–15; Jilin–3; 
Liaoning–2; Ningxia–1; Qinghai–2; Shaanxi–5; Shandong–8; Shanghai–15; Shanxi–2; Sichuan–11; 
Xinjiang–4; Yunnan–6; Zhejiang–7. In ªve cases the location of the case was unclear. See infra Appendi-
ces A, B. 
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inaccurate. There appear to be few general restrictions on the media’s ability 
to report on defamation cases, but in a small number of sensitive cases, cen-
tral or local Communist Party Propaganda Departments may ban reporting. 
The cases this Article examines thus cannot be assumed to be representa-
tive of defamation cases nationwide. Nonetheless, reliance on media reports 
yields insights not available through other sources. Chinese court opinions 
are generally not publicly available except to parties or to persons with con-
nections to particular courts. There is no comprehensive—or even moder-
ately comprehensive—database of Chinese court options. Reliance on media 
reports allows examination of decisions from a range of courts—data that 
otherwise would be unobtainable. 
Collecting a sample of court opinions in defamation cases from a single 
court or small number of courts might be possible, but it would not be rep-
resentative of cases nationwide, and it might reºect court and regional bi-
ases. For example, review of defamation cases heard in the Dongcheng Dis-
trict Court—a ªrst-instance court in Beijing—between February 2002 and 
August 2004 shows defendants prevailing in thirty-three out of forty-ªve 
cases.18 The media success rate in such cases is strikingly higher than that in 
my sample, where the media lost sixty-eight percent of all cases.19 The cases 
from Dongcheng District, however, are not representative of cases nationwide: 
The district has a high concentration of media outlets, and the court is known 
as having well-trained judges with expertise in defamation litigation.20 
Reliance on diverse sources for case information permits an understanding 
of the development of defamation litigation broader than would be possible 
through the examination of an individual court’s docket. Many media reports 
contain details of parties’ arguments in court, information that is sometimes, 
but not always, included in opinions. More importantly, as scholars of Chinese 
law have long observed, court opinions themselves may give little indication 
of the actual reasons that cases have been decided in a particular way.21 
Given the challenges that confront most attempts at empirical research into 
the Chinese legal system, looking to a broad range of traditional and non-
traditional sources may provide insights not otherwise available.22 There has 
been a small number of recent attempts by both Chinese and Western schol-
 
                                                                                                                      
18. The Dongcheng cases are not included in the 223 cases in my sample unless they were reported on 
in the media. The cases are on ªle with the Harvard International Law Journal. 
19. See infra Table Two. 
20. The outcomes in the Dongcheng cases are, however, consistent with what the analysis of the larger 
sample would predict: Media defendants fare much better when sued in their home jurisdiction. See infra 
Part II. 
21. See, e.g., Fu Liqing, Fayuan Panjueshu: Ni Weishenme Bu Shuoli? [Court Opinions: Why Don’t You Spec-
ify Your Reasons?], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], Feb. 18, 2001, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/ 
shehui/46/20010218/398299.html. 
22. For a discussion of the challenges facing those seeking to engage in empirical study of the Chinese 
legal system, see generally Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in Beyond 
Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law 164, 164–92 (Erik G. Jensen & 
Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). 
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ars at broadening empirical understandings of the Chinese legal system.23 
These studies have made signiªcant contributions to our understanding of 
developments in China. Yet most such studies face constraints: small sample 
sizes, reliance on opinions either published by courts or selected by courts, 
or reliance on parties to cases for materials. The relative paucity of empirical 
work on the Chinese legal system reºects the difªculty of obtaining data that 
can withstand rigorous scrutiny. The difªculties faced by those seeking to en-
gage in empirical scholarship, however, also suggest the need for Chinese and 
Western scholars to consider alternative sources of data and to reconsider the 
types of conclusions that can be drawn from data that are available. 
The data in this Article do not permit broad conclusions regarding the like-
lihood of plaintiff or defendant success in defamation cases or the percentage 
of plaintiffs who are government ofªcials or ordinary persons, nor do the data 
prove that defamation litigation is primarily a tool for constraining media 
freedom or for asserting individual rights. The data also do not inform as to 
how widespread knowledge of defamation cases is in China: Despite a large 
volume of cases and extensive attention to such cases by the media, assessing 
the level of awareness or concern with defamation litigation more generally 
is difªcult. Yet the data, combined with interviews and a review of Chinese 
literature on defamation law, do suggest trends in the development of defa-
mation litigation, including the use of defamation litigation by ofªcials in re-
sponse to critical coverage, the willingness of ordinary plaintiffs to challenge 
the ofªcial Party press, and the importance of jurisdiction in determining case 
outcomes. Understanding those trends, including the parties likely to be sued, 
the types of cases brought, plaintiffs’ goals in such cases, and the media’s ability 
to resist such claims, provides insights into the uses and meaning of defamation 
litigation that transcend the simple numerical data on outcomes. 
The ªndings in this Article thus add to the emerging empirical literature 
on the Chinese legal system. The ªndings also contribute to empirical litera-
ture on the use of defamation litigation outside the United States. Although 
there is a signiªcant volume of empirical literature on defamation litigation 
in the United States24 and in England,25 English-language empirical scholar-
ship on defamation litigation elsewhere is rare.26 
 
                                                                                                                      
23. See, e.g., Margaret Y. K. Woo & Yaxing Wang, Civil Justice in China: An Empirical Study of Courts in 
Three Provinces, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. (forthcoming 2006); Randle Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An 
Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 249 (2001). 
24. For examples, see Randall P. Bezanson et al., Libel Law and the Press (1987), and Mark 
Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 455 
(1980). 
25. For empirical studies of defamation law in England, see David Hooper, Reputations Under 
Fire 484–523 (Little, Brown and Company 2000) (listing studies of damage awards in England). 
26. For an example, see Michael Newcity, The Sociology of Defamation in Australia and the United States, 
26 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1 (1991). 
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B. Legal Framework 
The legal framework governing defamation claims in China rests on three 
primary documents. The 1987 General Principles of the Civil Law (“General 
Principles”) provides the initial authorization for defamation claims.27 Arti-
cle 101 of the General Principles provides that citizens and legal persons 
have the right to reputation, that respect for the personal dignity of indi-
viduals shall be protected, and that insult or slander that harms citizens or 
legal persons is prohibited.28 Article 120 provides that in cases in which 
reputation is harmed, citizens may demand the cessation of the tort, restora-
tion of reputation, elimination of defamatory effects, apology, and compen-
sation.29 
Two subsequent interpretive documents by the Supreme People’s Court 
(“SPC”) have added detail to the framework that the General Principles estab-
lished. In a 1993 Explanation, the court set forth three general circumstances 
under which defamation will be found: (1) where the content of news reports 
is “seriously mistaken” or, in the case of critical news reports, where the “ba-
sic content” of such reports is incorrect, and such mistakes or inaccuracies 
result in harm to reputation, (2) where insulting or slanderous language re-
sults in harm to reputation, or (3) where unauthorized revelation of personal 
details causes harm to reputation.30 The Explanation thus suggested that, al-
though the truth of a media report may be a defense to a claim of harm to 
reputation, truth is not a defense where the alleged defamation results from 
insulting words or from revelation of personal details. The court also stated 
that close relatives could bring defamation litigation on behalf of deceased 
persons.31 
 
                                                                                                                      
27. Minfa Tongze [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Sixth Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Fourth Session, Apr. 12, 1986, effective July 1, 1987) 2002 General Principles of the 
Civil Law 134. 
28. Id. art. 101. 
29. Id. art. 120. The Supreme People’s Court’s (“SPC”) 1988 Interpretation of the General Principles 
included one article on defamation law. The provision clariªed that defamation could result from oral or 
written statements that reveal private details or cause insult or slander. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Guanyu Guanche Zhixing “Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minfa Tongze” Ruogan Wenti De Yijian 
[Views of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Some Questions in the Implementation of “The General 
Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China”], art. 140 (Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 26, 
1988). China’s 1982 Constitution also includes provisions regarding reputation. Article 38 states that 
“[t]he personal dignity of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false 
charge or frame-up directed against citizens by any means is prohibited.” Xianfa [Constitution] art. 
38, § 2 (1982). China’s Criminal Law provides for criminal punishment in serious cases of slander or 
insult. See Xingfa [Criminal Law] art. 246 (promulgated by the Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 
1979, effective Oct. 1, 1997) 1997 Criminal Law 61. Regulations also permit the police to detain per-
sons for up to ªfteen days for insulting or slandering another person. Zhian Guanli Chufa Tiaoli [Admin-
istrative Regulations on Penalties for Public Security] art. 22 (promulgated by the Standing Committee 
of the Sixth Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 1986, effective May 12, 1994). 
30. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Mingyuquan Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Jieda [Explanation 
of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Some Questions in the Trial of Cases Concerning the Right of 
Reputation], arts. 7, 8 (Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 7, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Explanation] (on ªle with the 
Harvard International Law Journal). 
31. Id. art. 5. 
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The 1993 Explanation made clear that cases could be brought either in 
the jurisdiction in which the tort arose (including both where the action oc-
curred and where the results were felt) or in the home jurisdiction of the defen-
dant.32 On remedies, the court stated that courts could order defendants to 
restore a plaintiff’s reputation, eliminate the effects of defamatory conduct, 
apologize, and pay compensation, including both economic and emotional 
damages.33 
In 1998 the SPC issued an Interpretation (“1998 Interpretation”) in re-
sponse to issues arising in lower courts’ handling of defamation cases.34 The 
1998 Interpretation clariªed that the location of the “result of the tort” in-
cluded the plaintiff’s domicile, thus explicitly authorizing defamation cases 
to be brought in a plaintiff’s home jurisdiction. Reºecting the media’s spe-
cial role in China, the court also stated that courts should not accept cases alleg-
ing defamation in conªdential internal reports or other materials prepared 
for “leadership departments,”35 and that persons who (actively or knowingly) 
provide materials to the media that result in defamation may be liable. The 
court clariªed that the media cannot be held liable for reporting on news 
included in public ofªcial documents and functional acts of state, provided 
that the media’s reports on such matters are objective and accurate.36 
The 1998 Interpretation added that release of information that an indi-
vidual is suffering from gonorrhea, syphilis, leprosy, AIDS, or other diseases 
by employees of public health authorities acting “on their own” can be the 
basis of a defamation lawsuit, but that courts should not accept cases result-
ing from the release of such information by health authorities to a patient or 
family members.37 The court declared that criticism and commentary by 
 
                                                                                                                      
32. Id. art. 4. 
33. Restoration of reputation, elimination of effects, and apology can be made through oral or written 
statements, which are subject to the approval of the court handling the case. In cases where the defendant 
refuses to comply, courts may publish announcements containing the content of the opinion and may 
order the defendant to pay related costs. Id. arts. 10, 11. 
34. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Mingyuquan Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi [Interpreta-
tion of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Some Questions in the Adjudication of Cases Involving 
the Right to Reputation] (Sup. People’s Ct., Sept. 15, 1998) (on ªle with the Harvard International Law 
Journal) [hereinafter 1998 Interpretation]. 
35. In contrast, the court stated that courts could accept cases alleging defamation in internal materi-
als intended for circulation within government departments, social organizations, academic entities, and 
enterprises. The internal reports, intended for higher-ups, are more likely to carry sensitive information 
and are thus immunized, while general-circulation internal reports are not. For further discussion of the 
forms of internal reports in the Chinese system, see Liebman, supra note 7, at 21–23, 97–102. 
36. 1998 Interpretation, supra note 34, art. 6. The media may be held liable if government authorities 
have corrected inaccuracies in such documents but the media refuse to note such correction. Id. Cases 
involving the use of ofªcial documents and internal reports are thus the only areas in which the media 
enjoy immunity from defamation litigation. 
37. Id. art. 2. The 1998 Interpretation also clariªed that the media may be held liable for reprinting 
articles that originally ran elsewhere; that courts should not accept cases claiming defamation resulting 
from decisions of government departments, social organizations, or enterprises regarding persons under 
their “management,” including punishment decisions; and that accusations made to government depart-
ments may not be the basis of defamation lawsuits unless the accusations were incorrect and insulting or 
libelous. Id. arts. 3–5. 
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consumers on products or services cannot alone provide the basis for a suit 
alleging harm to reputation, but libelous or slanderous criticism that results 
in harm should be found to be defamatory.38 Similarly, media commentary on 
and criticism of products and services that are basically correct and that do 
not include insulting comments should not be deemed defamatory, while inac-
curate or insulting criticism that causes harm may be the basis of a defama-
tion action.39 
The three documents provide a framework for defamation cases but leave 
courts signiªcant discretion. Despite the detail that the Interpretation and 
the Explanation added to the provisions of the General Principles, many in 
the media argue that existing legal standards are excessively vague. In par-
ticular, the provision in the 1993 Explanation stating that the media shall 
not be liable for critical reports that are “basically correct” has permitted courts 
both to overlook signiªcant errors in reporting and to base liability on mi-
nor errors.40 Journalists criticize the SPC provisions authorizing litigation in 
a plaintiff’s domicile for encouraging local protectionism, and argue that provi-
sions stating that the media should not be liable when they base their re-
ports on ofªcial government documents are not sufªciently clear.41 In addi-
tion, journalists complain that courts generally place the burden of proof on 
the media, forcing them to attempt to prove that even small details in their 
reports were correct.42 
 
                                                                                                                      
38. Id. art. 9. 
39. Id. The 1998 Interpretation stated that in cases in which defamation is found, based on criticism 
of products and services, harm may be measured based on such factors as returned products and cancelled 
product orders. Id. art. 10. 
40. See Zhang Ya, Meiti Jiandu Xianru Falü Kunjing [Media Oversight Encounters Legal Difªculties], 
Shangwu Zhoukan [Business Watch], July 17, 2004, available at http://www.businesswatch.com.cn/ 
ArticleShow.asp?ArticleID=443 (arguing that it is very easy for media to be sued by ofªcials, famous 
persons and corporations, and that the media are often found liable for slight errors); Conªdential Inter-
view 17 (2003) (stating that Chinese journalists cannot make any mistake or else they will be sued); 
Conªdential Interview 46 (2003) (complaining that the media will lose if their articles include “any 
mistakes”). 
41. Wei Yongzheng, Xunqiu Xinwen Yu Falü De Gongshi [Seeking Consensus Between News and Law], 
Zhongguo Jizhe [China Reporter], June 1999, available at http://www.zjonline.com.cn/node2/ 
node26108/node30205/node30212/node30213/userobject7ai1691.html; Conªdential Interview 49 (2003). 
42. Many in China compare Chinese defamation law to that in the United States. But China is not 
alone in placing the burden of proof on defendants. See, e.g., Hooper, supra note 25, at 4–5 (noting that 
plaintiffs often choose to sue in English courts to take advantage of libel laws where they do “not have to 
prove actual damage . . . and [where] the burden of proving that what is said is true . . . rests . . . on the 
defendant”). 
Some in the media also complain that the cost of bringing suit is extremely low. Filing fees for defama-
tion cases range from ªfty yuan to one hundred yuan for cases not involving claims for ªnancial damages. 
Renmin Fayuan Susong Shoufei Banfa [People’s Court Measures for the Collection of Court Filing Fees] 
art. 5 (Sup. People’s Ct., Sept. 1, 1989) (on ªle with the Harvard International Law Journal). The Meas-
ures are ambiguous as to the appropriate fees in cases involving ªnancial claims. On one reading of the 
Measures, the ªfty to one hundred yuan fee applies in defamation cases regardless of the amount in con-
troversy. On another reading of the Measures, fees in cases involving ªnancial claims would proceed 
according to the standards for ªnancial claims, where fees are a percentage of the amount sought, ranging 
from four percent for cases involving 1,000 yuan to 50,000 yuan to one-half percent for cases involving 
more than one million yuan. Id. In practice, some courts apply the ªfty to one hundred yuan standard, 
while others charge a percentage of the amount in controversy. Susong Fei Buneng “Sui Hang Jiu Shi” [Court 
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Other regulations also impose obligations on the media to report truth-
fully and to correct mistakes. Regulations governing the print media state 
that if publications include content that is incorrect or unfair and that causes 
harm to legal rights of citizens or legal persons, the media are obligated pub-
licly to correct such mistakes, eliminate their effects, and assume civil liabil-
ity.43 In the case of inaccuracies or unfair reports in newspapers or magazines, 
parties who are harmed have the right to request that the offending publica-
tion publish a correction or a reply from the harmed party.44 Regulations 
governing the broadcast media, by contrast, require reports to be true and 
fair, but do not impose a corresponding obligation to correct such reports or 
grant a right of reply.45 
There have been efforts to draft new provisions regarding reputation rights as 
part of China’s development of a comprehensive civil code. For example, a 
draft Tort Law prepared by scholars included defamation provisions, but those 
provisions were removed from the draft under consideration by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress.46 Provisions regarding defa-
mation have proven to be sensitive, reºecting unease regarding provisions 
touching on freedom of speech and over whether legislation should provide 
explicit protection for media criticism of ofªcials. Of particular concern have 
been proposals that would distinguish between ordinary persons and well-
known, or “public,” persons.47 
C. Evolution of Defamation Litigation 
China’s ªrst civil defamation cases were brought prior to the adoption of 
the General Principles. Suits for libel were ªled against People’s Daily as early 
as 1982, and against the ofªcial Democracy and Law magazine in 1985.48 
 
                                                                                                                      
Fee Should Not Float with the Market], Shichang Bao [Market News], Feb. 27, 2002, available at 
http://www.sztj.com/pub/sztjpublic/tjkw/tjyxx/scwj/t20020801_0512.html (criticizing courts for charg-
ing fees based on the amount in controversy instead of the ªfty to one hundred yuan standard set by the 
Measures); Conªdential Interview 36 (2003) (criticizing courts for only charging ªfty to one hundred 
yuan in defamation cases). 
43. Order No. 343, Chuban Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations Regarding the Management of Publications] 
art. 28 (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002) (on ªle with the Har-
vard International Law Journal); see also Baokan Kanzai Xujia Shishi Baodao Chuli Banfa [Provisions 
Regarding the Handling of Publications that Publish False or Inaccurate Reports] arts. 2, 3 (promul-
gated by the General Administration of Press and Publications, July 8, 1999, effective July 8, 1999), 
available at http://www.people.com.cn/zcxx/1999/08/082756.html (providing for a right to request a 
correction or reply) [hereinafter Shishi Baodao Chuli Banfa]. 
44. Chuban Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 43, art. 28; see also Shishi Baodao Chuli Banfa, supra note 43, 
art. 3. The right of reply has rarely, if ever, been exercised. Conªdential Interview 72 (2004). 
45. Order No. 228, Guangbo Dianshi Guanli Tiaoli [Regulations Regarding the Management of 
Broadcasting and Television] art. 34 (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 11, 1997, effective Sept. 1, 
1997) (on ªle with the Harvard International Law Journal). 
46. Conªdential Interview 6 (2003); Conªdential Interview 18 (2003). 
47. Conªdential Interview 49 (2003); see also infra Part III.C (discussing recent cases in which Chinese 
courts have appeared to adopt a public person standard). 
48. Wei Yongzheng, Yulun Jiandu He “Gongzhong Renwu” [Media Oversight and “Public Figures”], Ji-
ancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], Jan. 9, 2001, available at http://www.jcrb.com.cn/ournews/asp/ 
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Even in the early days of defamation litigation, some in the media complained 
that such cases discouraged the media from reporting critically.49 Defama-
tion cases of any type were nonetheless rare, and not until the General Prin-
ciples became effective in 1987 did plaintiffs begin to bring signiªcant num-
bers of cases.50 Since 1987, defamation cases against the media have fallen 
into roughly four categories, which Xu Xun, one of China’s leading observ-
ers of the relationship between the media and the courts, has referred to as 
the “four waves” of defamation litigation.51 
Most cases against the media in the 1980s were brought by ordinary peo-
ple suing the Party-state media for mistakes or insults—the ªrst wave.52 In 
the early 1990s, the growth of China’s commercialized press was accompa-
nied by a “second wave” of cases brought by celebrities against commercial-
ized, often tabloid-style, newspapers.53 Success by plaintiffs in such cases was 
followed in turn by a “third wave” of cases: those brought by commercial legal 
persons, often in response to negative or critical coverage of businesses.54 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a “fourth wave” of defamation litigation be-
gan in China: suits by public ofªcials or government entities against the media. 
As Xu Xun has argued, these cases were distinct from their predecessors 
because they involved suits not only for alleged inaccuracies in factual news 
accounts but also for alleged defamatory content in editorials, commentaries, 
letters from readers, and live broadcasts. In many such cases, plaintiffs sued 
after having been sanctioned by legal or Party authorities for wrongdoing.55 
China’s courts heard a total of 5596 defamation cases in 2003.56 As Table 
One shows, the number of cases was nearly double the 3138 defamation cases 
courts heard in 1993, the ªrst year for which such statistics are available.57 
Although the number of cases generally increased each year during the dec-
ade, the number peaked in 2001 at 7182 before dropping modestly in 2002 
 
                                                                                                                      
readNews.asp?id=19299 (unavailable as of Nov. 9, 2005) (on ªle with the Harvard International Law 
Journal); Conªdential Interview 49 (2003). 
49. Liu Weidong, Tamen De Ti’an: Yu Yulun Jiandu Youguan [Their Draft Proposals: Related to Popular 
Opinion Supervision], available at http://www.jc.gov.cn/personal/ysxs/fzhm/fzhm171.htm (unavailable as of 
Nov. 9, 2005) (on ªle with the Harvard International Law Journal). 
50. Sun Xuepei, An Orchestra of Voices 103–04 (2001); Fu & Cullen, supra note 5, at 7. 
51. Xu Xun, Zhongguo Xinwen Qinquan Jiufen Disici Langchao [The Fourth Wave of 
China’s News Tort Disputes] (2002) [hereinafter Xu, Fourth Wave]; Xu Xun, Xinwen Qinquan 
Jiufen De Disi Ci Gaofeng Qi [The Fourth Wave of News Torts Disputes], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China 
Youth Daily], Feb. 11, 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Xu, Youth Daily]; see also Hilary K. Josephs, Defama-
tion, Invasion of Privacy, and the Press in the People’s Republic of China, 11 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 191, 193–
94 (1993) (arguing that libel litigation in the late 1980s and early 1990s developed as a means of con-
straining the media). 
52. Xu, Youth Daily, supra note 51. Numerous cases were also brought by ordinary persons against 
non-media defendants. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 5, at 8. 
53. Xu, Youth Daily, supra note 51. 
54. Id. A small number of defamation cases were also ªled in the early 1990s by dissidents in response 
to political attacks by the Party press. See William P. Alford, Double-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and 
Legitimacy in the People’s Republic of China, 122 Daedalus 2, 45, 48–49, 51 (2003). 
55. Xu, Youth Daily, supra note 51. 
56. 2004 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 123. 
57. 1994 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 99. 
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and again in 2003.58 The seventy-eight percent increase in defamation cases 
between 1993 and 2003 was signiªcantly above the forty-eight percent in-
crease in the total number of civil cases in China during the same period.59 
Table One 
Defamation Cases 1993–200360 
Year Total Number of 
Defamation Cases 
Accepted 
Growth Percentage from 
Prior Year 
1993 3138  
1994 3543 12.91 
1995 3843  8.46 
1996 4418 14.96 
1997 4652  5.30 
1998 5040  8.34 
1999 5936 17.78 
2000 6665 12.28 
2001 7182  7.76 
2002 6693  –6.8161 
2003 5596     –16.39 
 
In both 1993 and 2003, defamation cases constituted a tiny percentage of 
the total number of civil cases: 0.11 % of all civil cases in 1993, and 0.13 % 
in 2003. Based on interviews conducted for this Article, judges report that 
 
                                                                                                                      
58. For 2001 data, see 2002 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 149. For 2002 data, see 
Wang Wei, 2002 Nian Shenpan Gongzuo [Judicial Report of 2002], available at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/ 
zhuanti/fzbg/577958.htm. For data on 2003, see 2004 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 
123. 
59. The total number of civil cases—including economic cases—increased from 2,983,667 in 1993 to 
4,410,236 in 2003. 1994 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 1028; 2004 Zhongguo Fa 
Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 1054. The 1993 ªgure includes cases from both the economic and the 
civil divisions of China’s courts, as, at the time, such cases were classiªed separately. The economic and 
civil divisions were later merged, and the economic division abolished, and thus the 2003 ªgure of cases 
heard by the civil division likewise includes both economic and other civil cases. 
60. Data in this table are taken from the annual China Law Yearbooks from 1994 to 2004. 1994–2004 
Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China]. 
61. The 2003 volume of the China Law Yearbook does not include detailed statistics on defamation 
cases; the total number of cases for 2002 is taken from an ofªcial news report. Wang, supra note 58. With 
the exception of the data on defamation cases, which was omitted from the Yearbook, the statistics in the 
news report are identical to those in the Yearbook for 2003, strongly suggesting that the data are from the 
same source. 
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defamation cases constitute a small portion of their civil dockets. For exam-
ple, a judge in a district court in a major coastal city that handles thousands 
of civil cases each year estimated that the court hears only six or seven defa-
mation cases against the media annually.62 Judges elsewhere likewise report 
that their courts hear only a small number of defamation cases each year.63 
Viewed comparatively, however, the number of defamation cases in China is 
signiªcant. The more than 5000 cases brought in China in 2003 appears large 
when viewed in the light of studies that have found very small numbers of 
defamation cases in the United States,64 Korea, and Japan.65 
The growth in defamation litigation reºects the recent development of the 
Chinese news media. The Chinese media have undergone rapid commerciali-
zation over the past ªfteen years, with the number of publications increasing 
dramatically.66 As a result, news in China is much more widely disseminated 
than it was in the early 1990s, and many in the media are engaged in ªerce 
competition. The media, however, remain closely linked to the Party-state, with 
virtually all commercialized media being offshoots or subsidiaries of tradi-
tional Party media. Traditional Party media continue not only to issue pub-
lic reports but also to write internal reports, or neican, which are circulated 
to leadership at each level of the Party-state, and which include material not 
deemed appropriate for public dissemination.67 
 
                                                                                                                      
62. Conªdential Interview 61 (2004). 
63. The number of cases brought is higher in areas with a high concentration of media outlets, most 
notably in certain districts in Beijing. Conªdential Interview 26 (2003); Conªdential Interview 73 
(2003); Conªdential Interview 154 (2003). 
64. See Bezanson, supra note 24, at 96 (ªnding a total of only 712 published defamation cases tried 
in the United States between 1974 and 1984); Media Law Resource Center, Bulletin No. 3, 2004 
Report on Trials and Damages 4 (Feb. 2004) (reporting that 503 libel cases proceeded to trial in the 
United States between 1980 and 2003). Even accounting for the fact that most libel cases in the United 
States do not proceed to trial, the number of cases in China appears signiªcant. A Media Law Resource 
Center study that examined all published decisions available in the Media Law Reporter on Westlaw 
found 661 cases involving motions to dismiss in the U.S. courts between 1983 and 2003. 2004 MLRC 
Motion to Dismiss Study, 2004 MLRC Bulletin No. 3 (Oct. 2004); see also Media Law Resource Cen-
ter, Bulletin No. 3, 2001 Summary Judgment Survey 32–83 (Aug. 2001) (examining 296 reported 
defamation cases against the media resolved at summary judgment between 1997 and 2000); David A. 
Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reºections on Current Data on Libel Litigation, 87 Va. L. Rev. 503, 519 
(2001) (noting that libel actions in the United States are “very rare”). 
65. See Masao Horibe & John Middleton, Japan, in International Media Liability: Civil Liabil-
ity in the Information Age 6.18–6.19 (Christian Campbell ed., 1997) (noting that defamation liti-
gation in Japan has been “comparatively rare”—with nineteen defamation judgments in 1991 and sixty-
two in 1993—but that the number of cases increased signiªcantly during the 1990s); Jeffrey A. Ourvan, 
Note, Damage Control: Why Japanese Courts Should Adopt a Regime of Larger Libel Awards, 21 N.Y.L. Sch. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 307 (2002) (reporting only nineteen defamation judgments in 1990 in Japan, and 
sixty-two in 1993); Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press: South Korea and Japan Reexamined, 
8 B.U. Int’l L.J. 53, 78 (1990) [hereinafter Youm, Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press] (noting that one 
study found that there were only thirty-ªve libel cases in total over a thirty-year period from the 1950s to 
the 1980s in Korea, and that only one-third of such cases “were related to the Korean press”); id. at 80 
(discussing the rarity of libel litigation in Japan). 
66. See Liebman, supra note 7, at 23–28. 
67. For a discussion of the continuing importance of internal reports, see id. at 21–23, 97–102. 
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Commercialized offshoots of ofªcial Party publications enjoy greater auton-
omy over content than do their parent publications and, accordingly, are at 
times more willing to stretch the boundaries of permissible content. Yet these 
offshoots remain subject to Communist Party Propaganda Department over-
sight. These links to the Party-state, however, also provide a level of protec-
tion and inºuence to the media: The Chinese media’s traditional role as the 
mouthpiece and the “eyes and ears” of the Party also means that the media 
are often as powerful as, or more powerful than, the institutions or individu-
als that they cover.68 
The rise in defamation cases has paralleled this expansion of the commer-
cialized media. The growth in cases brought by celebrities, for example, tracked 
the increased coverage—often sensational—of sports and the arts in the early 
1990s as the media began to commercialize. The growth in cases brought by 
legal persons, ofªcials, and government entities in the middle to late 1990s 
followed the growth of critical reporting, in particular by newspapers, dur-
ing the same period. Finally, although the ability of the media to engage in 
critical reporting has expanded dramatically over the past ªfteen years, over 
the past two years the Central Propaganda Department has acted to rein in 
critical reporting. Some journalists argue that the recent crackdown has re-
sulted in a decreased volume of defamation litigation over the past one to two 
years: With fewer critical reports there are fewer potential plaintiffs.69 The 
growth in conºicts between the media and the targets of reports may also reºect 
increased competition among the media, in particular newspapers: In a ªercely 
competitive market, newspapers appear more likely to publish a broader range 
of news and to do so without verifying their reports.70 
The increase in the number of defamation cases has also mirrored the ex-
pansion of civil litigation more generally in China over the past decade. China’s 
courts accepted 4.3 million ªrst-instance civil cases in 2004,71 an increase of 
thirty percent from 1994, when courts accepted 3.4 million cases.72 Much of 
this growth has resulted from an increase in contract disputes. But courts have 
also heard a range of new cases, from environmental disputes to securities fraud 
claims. Courts have likewise come to play more important roles in resolving 
labor and property disputes.73 
The growth of litigation reºects the evolution of China’s courts on an in-
stitutional level. Courts have taken signiªcant steps toward reform over the 
past ªfteen years including strengthening training of judges and replacing 
older judges not trained in law with younger legally trained judges. Courts have 
 
                                                                                                                      
68. Id. at 118–21. 
69. Conªdential Interview 39 (2005); Conªdential Interview 57 (2004); Conªdential Interview 72 (2004). 
70. See Xu, Fourth Wave, supra note 51, at 36. 
71. Xiao Yang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Work Report of the Supreme People’s 
Court] (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.court.gov.cn/work/200503180013.htm. 
72. 1995 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 1064. 
73. See generally Xiao Yang, supra note 71; Xiao Yang, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao [Work 
Report of the Supreme People’s Court] (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.court.gov.cn/work/200403220012.htm. 
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also cracked down on corruption and have tried to discourage judges from 
contact with those outside the courts. Along with hearing more cases and in-
creasing the quality of the judiciary, courts have become more assertive and 
innovative.74 
Despite these efforts, courts continue to be subject to extensive external over-
sight and interference. Courts remain linked to local governments, with lo-
cal Party-state ofªcials controlling court appointments and ªnances. Party 
intervention in cases persists, both formally and informally, often with the 
goal of protecting the ªnancial interests of local authorities or elites.75 Simi-
larly, local courts continue to refer potentially controversial or sensitive cases 
to higher-level courts or to Party ofªcials prior to issuing decisions.76 As a 
result, local courts often ªnd it difªcult to issue decisions against the inter-
ests of the Party-state or inºuential persons.77 
Courts have also come under increased scrutiny from the news media in 
recent years. Media compete to provide details on high-proªle cases—often 
with sensational coverage. Media, in particular the print media, often expose 
cases of perceived injustice and frequently criticize courts that act unfairly. 
Despite these trends, however, most reports about the courts remain posi-
tive.78 
II. Empirical Analysis 
A. Overall Trends: Plaintiffs, Protectionism, and Power 
Observers in China and the West have emphasized that the Chinese media 
lose a large majority of cases brought against them.79 The results from the 
223 cases reviewed for this Article are fully consistent with this claim. As 
 
                                                                                                                      
74. Liebman, supra note 7, at 66, 132–36, 153. 
75. Liebman, supra note 7, at 67–69; Qiang Shigong & Zhao Xiaoli, Shuangchong Jiegouhua Xia De 
Falü Jieshi—Dui Shiming Zhongguo Faguan De Diaocha [The Legal Interpretation Under Dual Structures—An 
Investigation into 10 Chinese Judges], in Falü Jieshi Wenti [On Legal Interpretation] (Liang Zhiping 
ed., 1998), available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=1690; see also Wang Xu, Lun 
Sifaquan De Zhongyanghua [Discussing Centralization of Judicial Authority], Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strat-
egy and Management], May 2001, at 28.  
76. Liebman, supra note 7, at 67–69; Qiang & Zhao, supra note 75. 
77. See generally Liebman, supra note 7, at 66–69 (discussing problems and progress in China’s judici-
ary). 
78. Conªdential Interview 111 (2003); see also Liebman, supra note 7, at 113–18 (discussing court ef-
forts to ensure positive coverage). 
79. See, e.g., Chen Zhiwu, Meiti Yanlun De Falü Kunjing [The Legal Difªculties for Media Speech], 
Zhongguo Falü Ren [The Chinese Lawyer], Oct. 2004, at 41, 44 (ªnding in a review of 210 cases 
from a sixteen-year period that the media lost sixty-three percent of all defamation cases against them in 
the ªrst-instance); Yang Ziyun, Shichang Meiti Zenyang He Falü Tiaowu [How Marketplace Media Dance 
with the Law], Zhongguo Falü Ren [The Chinese Lawyer], Oct. 2004, at 67, 68 (arguing that if 
legal and procedural standards governing defamation are not changed, China’s media will not be able to 
cope); see also Xu Xiaoying, Dang Xiucai Yudao Guan: Guanyuan Mingyu Quan Yu Meiti Jiandu Quan De 
Boyi [When Intellectuals Meet Ofªcials: Ofªcials’ Reputation Rights vs. the Media’s Right to Supervise], Shangwu 
Zhoukan [Business Watch], Jan. 21, 2005, available at http://media.163.com/05/0121/18/ 
1AL0CKQB00141818.html (reporting that the media won only one of ªfteen defamation cases in the 
Beijing First Intermediate Court in 2004). 
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Table Two shows, plaintiffs prevailed in 133 of the 197 cases in which a ªrst-
instance winner was identiªed—a success rate of sixty-eight percent.80 The 
results from the cases also show two additional important trends: The juris-
diction in which a case is brought often determines the outcome, and the 
relative power or inºuence of the parties is an important determinant of who 
prevails. 
Plaintiffs in each of four categories—ofªcials and state entities, businesses 
and corporations, ordinary persons, and famous persons—prevailed in more 
than sixty percent of the cases, with ofªcial and corporate plaintiffs most likely 
to succeed.81 Comments from Chinese judges, lawyers, and journalists support 
the impression that the media lose most defamation cases. In Beijing’s Haidian 
district, judges estimate that the media lose more than half of all defamation 
cases.82 In Shenzhen, a judge estimated that the media lose seventy percent 
of cases.83 Journalists and lawyers for the media argue that they lose more 
than half of all cases brought against them.84 Regardless of the actual ªgure, 
the media generally argue that their rate of defeat is far too high.85 
 
                                                                                                                      
80. Plaintiff victories include both court judgments in favor of plaintiffs and settlements pursuant to 
which defendants agreed to pay damages to plaintiffs or apologize. Cases are classiªed as plaintiff victo-
ries where the plaintiff received a verdict against at least one of the defendants. Cases are classiªed as 
defendant victories when the court issued a ruling of no liability, where the court dismissed the case, or 
where the court refused to accept the case. No information on the outcome was available in twenty-ªve 
cases. In one case the parties settled with no clear winner: The parties agreed “not to stir up further trou-
ble.” See infra Appendices A, B, Case 149. 
Cases where information on outcomes was not available may reºect cases where the media carried ini-
tial reports on a case but then did not report on the outcome (or where any such reports are not available 
online). But they may also reºect cases that are simply not resolved: One journalist interviewed noted a 
growing trend of cases being brought but never decided. See Conªdential Interview 38 (2005). 
81. See infra Table Two. 
82. Conªdential Interview 156 (2003). 
83. See Conªdential Interview 61 (2004). 
84. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 71 (2004) (stating that Legal Daily loses approximately ªfty per-
cent of defamation cases); Conªdential Interview 76 (2004) (arguing that the media lose sixty percent of 
cases); Conªdential Interview 22 (2003) (stating that journalists lose more than half of all cases against 
them). 
85. See Conªdential Interview 76 (2004). Many of those unhappy with the high rate of media defeats 
contrast the experience of the Chinese media with that of the media in the United States, noting that the 
media prevail in the overwhelming majority of defamation cases in the United States. Cf. Bezanson, 
supra note 24 (ªnding, in a study conducted in the 1980s, that plaintiffs succeed in thirteen percent of all 
defamation cases in the United States). Few commentators compare China to other countries, such as 
England, where defamation law is less favorable to the media. 
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Table Two 
































































Total Cases 62 52 57 52 223 
Plaintiff First-
Instance Victories 
33 34 34 32 133 
Defendant First-
Instance Victories 
15 12 20 17  64 
Settled, 
No Clear Victor 
 1  0  0  0   1 
Outcome 
Unknown 




69% 74% 63% 65% 68% 
 
As interviews conducted for this Article evidence, others involved in defama-
tion cases contest such claims, arguing that media success rates are far higher 
than either comments by journalists or reports in the media suggest. Law-
yers say that media reports often overstate the number of cases the media 
lose. Indeed, in many cases where the media prevail, in particular in cases 
with little “social impact,” the media do not report case outcomes.87 Defa-
mation cases on which the media do report may be cases where the media or 
individual lawyers are seeking to use such coverage to affect the outcomes.88 
In some unreported cases the courts may be biased in favor of the media—in 
particular in cases brought against the media in the media’s own jurisdic-
tion.89 Thus, for example, one Shanghai lawyer estimated that the Shanghai 
media win seventy-ªve percent of all cases against them.90 Likewise, in Bei-
jing’s Dongcheng district, home to numerous prominent media outlets, de-
 
                                                                                                                      
86. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
87. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004); Conªdential Interview 111 (2003). 
88. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004). 
89. Id.  
90. Conªdential Interview 74 (2004). High success rates for the Shanghai media reºect both the fact 
that many plaintiffs in cases against the Shanghai media are ordinary persons, and that critical reports by 
the Shanghai media are relatively scarce. Conªdential Interview 75 (2004). 
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fendants prevailed in thirty-three of forty-ªve defamation cases brought against 
them between February 2002 and August 2004. Defendants were ordered to 
pay money damages in just two cases; in the remaining ten cases, they were 
ordered either to only apologize or to apologize and pay court fees. In addi-
tion, it may be difªcult even to ªle suit against some particularly inºuential 
media outlets: Courts may be reluctant to accept cases against powerful 
ofªcial, and especially central, media.91 
Success rates also overlook high settlement rates, which might affect the 
degree to which defamation cases impose signiªcant burdens on the media. The 
media settle many defamation cases.92 In Shanghai, for example, one lawyer 
estimated that the media settle half the defamation claims against them.93 
Other cases are resolved through mediation by Party propaganda departments.94 
Behind-the-scenes activity also may inºuence court decisions. In some cases 
results are dictated by higher-up Party ofªcials—sometimes in favor of plain-
tiffs, but in other cases in favor of the media.95 A journalist at a leading 
Shanghai paper noted that when ordinary individuals sue the paper, the pa-
per will virtually always win—in part because “we have the Party behind us.”96 
Although data from the sample, as shown in Table Three, do not permit 
clear conclusions regarding likelihood of plaintiff success in defamation cases, 
the data do demonstrate that extreme statements on both sides of the argu-
ment are invalid. Focusing solely on outcomes also risks overlooking other 
noteworthy trends. Understanding the types of suits, the characteristics of 
plaintiffs, and the varied goals plaintiffs pursue through defamation litiga-
tion yields greater insight into the role of defamation litigation in China than 
does analysis of overall success rates. 
Despite uncertainty over success rates, two conclusions emerge regarding 
general trends in defamation litigation. First, the relationship of the jurisdiction 
in which a case is brought to the parties often determines the outcome.97 In 
 
                                                                                                                      
91. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004).  
92. Conªdential Interview 69 (2004); Conªdential Interview 72 (2004); Conªdential Interview 74 
(2004); Conªdential Interview 75 (2004); Conªdential Interview 22 (2003); Conªdential Interview 39 
(2003); Conªdential Interview 46 (2003); Conªdential Interview 93 (2003). High settlement rates in 
China are not unique to defamation litigation. See, e.g., Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative 
Litigation in China, China Q., Dec. 1997, at 832 (discussing settlement rates in administrative litiga-
tion). 
93. Conªdential Interview 74 (2004). 
94. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004); Conªdential Interview 77 (2004); Conªdential Interview 39 (2003). 
95. Guo Daohui, Shixing Sifa Duli Yu Ezhi Sifa Fubai [Implementing Judicial Independence and Controlling 
Judicial Corruption], Falü Kexue [Legal Science], Jan. 1999, at 5, 5–15; cf. Conªdential Interview 67 
(2004). 
96. Conªdential Interview 84 (2004). 
97. Lawyers representing the media say they are increasingly challenging courts’ jurisdiction in cases 
brought in plaintiffs’ home jurisdictions. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 69 (2004); Conªdential Inter-
view 74 (2004). Although the SPC’s 1998 Interpretation makes clear that such cases may be brought in 
plaintiffs’ domicile, see 1998 Interpretation, art. 1, and 1993 Explanation, art. 4, media lawyers state 
that, in many cases, plaintiffs do not challenge efforts to move the case to the media’s locale. In cases in 
which plaintiffs do object, raising a jurisdictional challenge at a minimum results in the case being de-
layed. Conªdential Interview 69 (2004); Conªdential Interview 75 (2004); see also Conªdential Interview 
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cases involving local plaintiffs and non-local media, local plaintiffs will have 
an advantage.98 In cases brought by non-local plaintiffs in the media’s juris-
diction, the media will be in the stronger position.99 In the 223 cases, plain-
tiffs prevailed in eighty-two percent of cases brought in their home jurisdic-
tion, compared to only ªfty-one percent of cases brought in the defendant’s 
home jurisdiction and ªfty-ªve percent of cases brought in a jurisdiction 
that was home to both parties.100 Evidence from individual newspapers sup-
ports such ªndings. For example, the Beijing Youth Daily prevails in about 
eighty percent of the cases it faces—most of which are brought in Beijing.101 
When, on the other hand, the paper is sued outside of Beijing, it always 
loses.102 The paper sometimes does not bother to send lawyers to represent it 
in suits brought outside of Beijing, knowing that doing so will be of little 
use.103 Given the importance of jurisdiction, one might wonder why any non-
local plaintiff would bother to sue a media defendant in the defendant’s home 
jurisdiction.104 
 
                                                                                                                      
74 (2004) (stating that lawyers will also challenge the jurisdiction of a local court in order to send a message to 
the court that they have doubts about its fairness). 
98. Conªdential Interview 111 (2003). 
99. Conªdential Interview 75 (2004); Conªdential Interview 93 (2003); Conªdential Interview 111 (2003). 
100. See infra Table Three. 
101. Conªdential Interview 101 (2003). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. It is possible that such non-local plaintiffs may do so hoping that it will be easier to enforce a 
judgment or simply because they do not realize they can sue in their home jurisdiction. Plaintiffs may 
also believe that they will obtain larger damage awards by suing in defendants’ jurisdiction, as courts in 
major cities may award larger verdicts than those in rural or less-developed areas. Conªdential Interview 
27 (2005). A SPC Interpretation explicitly states that the living standard in the locale of the court in 
which the case is heard is one factor courts can consider in awarding emotional damages. Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen Sunhai Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi 
[Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Some Questions in Fixing Liability for Emo-
tional Damages for Civil Torts] art. 10 (Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 10, 2001) (on ªle with Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal). Thus, awards may tend to be higher in areas with higher living standards. 
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74 18 26 15 133 
Defendant First-
Instance Victories 




82% 51% 55% 60% 68% 
 
Data from the cases reviewed, however, also show that statements regard-
ing either the impossibility of the media winning a non-local case, or the 
difªculty ordinary persons face suing local media,107 are overstated. There are 
examples where courts rule for either non-local plaintiffs or non-local media 
defendants.108 The fact that such outcomes exist suggests that understanding 
defamation litigation solely as a manifestation of local protectionism is mis-
guided. 
Moreover, even if judges favor local parties—be they powerful plaintiffs or 
media defendants—judges may seek to minimize the impact of their decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                      
105. Determining the relationship of the court to the parties is difªcult, due to a lack of information 
in many of the case reports. Nevertheless, an assessment of jurisdiction was possible in 199 of the 223. See 
infra Appendices A, B. In cases involving parties not from the same municipality, a court is considered to 
be the home court of one party if it is in the same municipality as that party, including, in a small num-
ber of cases, where the party resides in a different district or county from the court. In cases in which a 
plaintiff and defendant are from the same municipality, a court is considered to be local only if it is in the 
same district or county as the plaintiff. A case is also considered to be local to a plaintiff or defendant if it 
is clear that the case is in the party’s home jurisdiction but the relationship of the jurisdiction to the 
other party is not apparent. I make such classiªcations so as to attempt to obtain a rough measure of the 
inºuence of jurisdiction. For example, in the case of a powerful plaintiff suing media from outside the 
plaintiff’s home municipality, the powerful plaintiff is likely to have inºuence throughout its home 
municipality. 
106. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
107. One lawyer who has handled numerous defamation cases commented that when ordinary people 
sue the media, the media win ninety percent of cases; when stars sue the media, the media lose eighty 
percent of cases; and when ofªcials and powerful enterprises bring suit, the media lose one hundred per-
cent of cases. Conªdential Interview 49 (2003). 
108. See infra Appendices A, B. 
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Courts may have little option but to rule for a local plaintiff, but they often 
issue awards that are largely symbolic and only a fraction of the amount de-
manded by plaintiffs.109 Local protectionism also is not equally problematic 
across all jurisdictions: Some in the media comment that they are far less 
concerned about being sued in major cities, even in other provinces, than they 
are about being sued in rural county courts.110 
Second, observers generally agree that understanding the power dynamics 
behind defamation litigation is crucial to explaining outcomes.111 Despite 
the Chinese media’s role since 1949 as an arm of the Party-state—responsible 
both for disseminating propaganda and for collecting information for Party-
state leaders—the media often ªnd themselves in a weak position when they 
are sued in local courts by ofªcials, government entities, or corporations. In 
contrast, the media have signiªcant advantages when facing suits by persons 
without strong Party-state links, be they ordinary persons or celebrities. View-
ing defamation litigation in the context of such power dynamics helps illu-
minate the twin tracks along which defamation litigation is developing. 
Evidence from the cases reviewed for this Article supports the argument 
that power dynamics are important determinants of outcomes. Although the 
media lost the majority of cases brought by ofªcials, corporations, ordinary 
people, and famous persons, defendants were most likely to lose when sued by 
ofªcials or Party-state entities or corporations. Likewise, in cases involving 
all four categories of plaintiffs, the media were most likely to lose when they 
were sued in plaintiffs’ home jurisdictions. Media victories occurred pre-
dominately when cases were brought in defendants’ jurisdictions or in juris-
dictions common to plaintiffs and defendants. 
To be sure, not all outcomes comport with such trends. Variance in out-
comes, in particular a signiªcant number of victories by ordinary persons in 
cases brought against the ofªcial media, demonstrates that defamation liti-
gation in China cannot be understood solely in terms of attempts to restrict 
media freedom or in terms of the power and inºuence of the media when com-
pared to ordinary persons. Defamation litigation, like the legal system more 
generally, is developing on twin tracks, in which the media face new re-
straints and in which individuals are increasingly able to pursue their griev-
ances through law. 
B. Defendants 
Virtually all media outlets in China, from the ofªcial Xinhua News Agency 
to racy local tabloids, have been sued at some point for defamation.112 A hi-
 
                                                                                                                      
109. Conªdential Interview 98 (2003); see infra Part II.E.3. 
110. See Conªdential Interview 71 (2004). 
111. Conªdential Interview 73 (2004); Conªdential Interview 76 (2004); see also Zhang Xinbao & 
Kang Changqing, Mingyuquan Anjian Shenli De Qingkuang, Wenti Ji Duice [The Situation, Problems and 
Strategies for Trying Defamation Cases], Xiandai Faxue [Modern Law], Mar. 1997, at 4. 
112. Conªdential Interview 49 (2003); Conªdential Interview 103 (2003). 
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erarchy of defendants exists, however, with suits against commercialized sub-
sidiaries of the ofªcial Party press, in particular commercialized local news-
papers, being more common than suits against ofªcial Party mouthpiece 
newspapers or television stations.113 The higher-ranking the paper, the more 
likely it is that the paper will be able to use its ties to the Party-state to af-
fect outcomes. Moreover, given the powerful position of ofªcial Party papers, 
many plaintiffs choose to avoid suing such media, instead focusing their 
efforts on less-inºuential commercialized papers.114 At the Communist Party’s 
ºagship paper, People’s Daily, for example, reporters and editors state that only 
two suits have ever been brought against the paper, because potential plain-
tiffs know that doing so will likely be futile.115 
Table Four details the targets of defamation lawsuits and the outcomes of 
such suits based on defendant type or rank.116 Evidence from both the sam-
ple and from interviews reveals ªve trends in the targets of libel suits. First, 
defamation cases are overwhelmingly brought against the print media. Of 
the 223 cases, 188 were suits against magazines or newspapers.117 In com-
parison, only six of the cases were suits against television stations,118 and only 
two were suits against a radio station.119 
 
                                                                                                                      
113. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004); Conªdential Interview 87 (2003); Conªdential Interview 93 (2003). 
114. Virtually all commercialized media in China are subsidiaries of ofªcial media or belong to the 
same corporate group as an ofªcial Party paper. Most ofªcial Party papers have numerous commercialized 
subsidiaries that subsidize their ofªcial parent publications, meaning that the total number of commer-
cialized papers exceeds the number of ofªcial papers. Despite links between the commercial media and 
their ofªcial parents, most commercial media are far less inºuential than their parent publications, as the 
Party-state continues to rely on traditional Party media to disseminate propaganda and inform leadership 
of local developments. See Liebman, supra note 7, at 23–41 (discussing commercialization of the Chinese 
media and the development of critical reporting). 
115. Conªdential Interview 67 (2003). People’s Daily won one of the two cases and lost the other. Id. 
Likewise, suits against Xinhua are relatively rare. Conªdential Interview 103 (2003); see also Conªdential 
Interview 69 (2004) (stating that courts generally will not accept a case against Xinhua); Conªdential 
Interview 72 (2004) (stating that plaintiffs know that suing powerful central media such as Xinhua will 
be futile and thus do not bring such suits); Conªdential Interview 73 (2004) (stating that it is rare for 
plaintiffs to sue major central media). 
116. All media in China have an ofªcial rank, which corresponds to the rank of the government or 
Party entity to which they are attached. See Liebman, supra note 7, at 20–21. Suits against commercial-
ized newspapers and magazines could also be differentiated based on the rank of their parent publica-
tions. Commercialized newspapers generally have far less inºuence than their parent publications, and 
thus the impact of the rank of the commercialized press is less signiªcant than it is for ofªcial Party 
papers. 
117. See infra Appendices A, B. 
118. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 34, 83, 165, 167, 169, 200. 
119. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 78, 157. 
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76% 69% 47% 71% 40% 75% 67% 71% 83% 75% 68% 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
120. Cases with multiple defendants are classiªed according to the status of the highest-ranking de-
fendant. One case brought against both a television station and a number of newspapers and websites, see 
infra Appendices A, B, Case 83, for example, is classiªed as a suit against a television station, as televi-
sion stations are generally more inºuential than are newspapers of equal rank. Defendants are classiªed 
according to the newspaper in which the allegedly defamatory article appeared; in many cases parent 
publishers or Party or government departments or entities are in fact the named defendants in lawsuits. I 
measure cases as plaintiff victories where they prevailed against any one of the defendants. In ªve cases, 
plaintiffs’ claims against newspapers failed, but plaintiffs prevailed against other defendants. In order to 
preserve consistency among the tables in this Article, such cases are counted as plaintiff victories. 
121. “Unclear rank” refers to cases in which the rank of the defendant could not be ascertained, gener-
ally because case reports did not name the particular outlet that was sued. 
122. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
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Newspaper reports are likely to focus on lawsuits against the print media, 
and thus the sample may overstate the prevalence of such suits. Similarly, the 
media are unlikely to report on routine defamation cases brought against 
individuals.123 The ªnding that the print media are more likely than others 
to be litigation targets is, however, consistent with comments by journalists 
and lawyers, who note that newspapers are much more likely to be sued than 
are the broadcast media.124 Suits against television stations and programs are 
infrequent, reºecting more direct state links and control, and the corresponding 
greater authority of the broadcast media.125 Plaintiffs are unlikely to sue China 
Central Television, for example, because they know that success in such a case is 
unlikely.126 
Second, within the print media, commercialized newspapers and maga-
zines are the most likely targets of defamation actions. As Table Four shows, 
the largest number of cases—seventy-four—were brought against commercial-
ized newspapers. An additional twenty-nine cases were brought against maga-
zines.127 Although some magazines in China serve traditional mouthpiece roles, 
most have commercialized and are thus less closely linked to the Party-state 
than are ofªcial newspapers. The ªnding that the commercialized media are 
most likely to be sued is consistent with evidence from journalists.128 Com-
mercialized papers and magazines that are well known for aggressive, critical 
reports have been particularly prone to lawsuits, sometimes facing large dam-
ages awards. Southern Weekend, for example, long regarded as China’s most dar-
ing newspaper, has been a frequent target of lawsuits,129 as has Caijing Maga-
zine, China’s most outspoken ªnancial magazine.130 
Third, plaintiffs bring a signiªcant number of cases against ofªcial Party-
state mouthpiece newspapers, suggesting that many plaintiffs are not intimi-
dated by the media’s ofªcial position. Although the largest category of cases 
in the sample was suits against commercialized papers, more than a third of 
all of the cases were against ofªcial papers.131 These ofªcial papers include na-
 
                                                                                                                      
123. Media reports may also overlook cases in which only individual journalists—and not the media 
for which they work—are sued. Conªdential Interview 21 (2005). 
124. Studies on U.S. defamation litigation in the 1980s found the same trend. See John Soloski, The 
Study and the Libel Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 217, 219 (1985) (ªnding that daily 
papers are much more likely to be sued in the United States than are the broadcast media, despite broad-
casting stations greatly outnumbering the print media). 
125. Conªdential Interview 87 (2003). 
126. See Conªdential Interview 67 (2004); Conªdential Interview 83 (2003).  
127. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 4, 12, 13, 24, 28, 33, 36, 54, 62, 74, 80, 103, 110, 118, 126, 
139, 140, 163, 164, 170, 185, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 202, 213, 217. 
128. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 46 (2003). 
129. See, e.g., Ding Dong, Cong Jizhe Chi Guansi Tanqi [Discussion Stemming from the Phenomenon of Re-
porters Being Sued], Xinhua Wang Hunan Pindao [Xinhua Net Hunan Channel], Apr. 23, 2001, 
http://www.hn.xinhua.org/news/2001-4-23/01423171505.htm (unavailable as of Nov. 5, 2005) (on ªle 
with the Harvard International Law Journal) (discussing how a Southern Weekend report on the misappro-
priation of funds from a state-owned factory by the factory manager resulted in a 240,000 yuan award 
against the paper). 
130. Conªdential Interview 17 (2003). 
131. See infra Appendices A, B. 
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tional Party publications, such as People’s Daily, China Youth Daily, and Legal 
Daily, as well as the ofªcial newspapers of provincial and municipal Party 
committees and newspapers belonging to provincial or local government de-
partments. This ªnding contrasts with claims by some observers in China that 
ofªcial papers, in particular the local Party press, are rarely the targets of 
suits.132 
Still, local and provincial Party papers were more likely to be sued than 
were central Party-state papers.133 Twenty-three of the cases brought against 
ofªcial papers—of the total of seventy-ªve cases for which rank was clear—were 
against local (municipal) Party papers.134 Another thirty-two were against 
provincial papers,135 and twenty were brought against newspapers with a cen-
tral Party-state rank.136 Other factors may explain the distribution of cases: 
There are far more local and provincial papers in China than there are central 
papers, and the media may be more reluctant to report on suits against cen-
tral papers. The number of cases brought against ofªcial central media may 
in fact overstate the willingness of plaintiffs to challenge powerful central media. 
The sample includes one case against People’s Daily, as well as suits against 
relatively inºuential central papers including China Youth Daily, Workers Daily, 
and Legal Daily.137 A number of cases, however, were brought against less 
well-known or powerful central media, including such papers as China Con-
sumer News, which is attached to the National Consumers Association, and 
China Old Age News, attached to the Ministry of Civil Affairs.138 
 
                                                                                                                      
132. See Conªdential Interview 18 (2004) (commenting that local people in a medium-sized town in 
central China “would not think” to sue the local media); Conªdential Interview 76 (2004) (stating that it 
is rare for local papers to be sued); Conªdential Interview 83 (2004) (noting it is rare for ofªcial Party 
papers to be sued). But see Conªdential Interview 32 (2005) (stating that it is not surprising that ordinary 
persons bring and win cases against the ofªcial media, because such cases will only be brought when the 
harm suffered has been serious). Six cases in the sample were suits by ordinary persons against local 
ofªcial Party newspapers (not including suits againt ofªcial Party papers in provincial-ranking cities, 
such as Beijing and Shanghai). See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 11, 18, 39, 41, 52, 204. 
133. See Conªdential Interview 46 (2003). 
134. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 11, 18, 19, 39, 41, 47, 50, 52, 65, 81, 88, 101, 104, 105, 109, 
116, 128, 133, 134, 136, 149, 173, 204. In one additional case both a local ofªcial paper and a television 
station were sued; that case is classiªed according to the defendant television station. See infra Appendices 
A, B, Case 83. 
135. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 6, 9, 22, 25, 27, 29, 37, 38, 43, 56, 60, 68, 70, 82, 90, 94, 95, 
98, 99, 102, 106, 111, 121, 124, 144, 147, 159, 160, 168, 177, 221, 222. Provincial papers include 
ofªcial papers in municipalities with a provincial rank, such as Beijing and Shanghai. 
136. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 5, 16, 30, 46, 61, 72, 84, 115, 127, 129, 130, 135, 138, 141, 
145, 150, 166, 192, 207, 209. 
137. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 5, 61, 127, 150. 
138. See, e.g., infra Appendices A, B, Cases 145, 207. The same phenomenon is apparent at the pro-
vincial and municipal levels. Although some of the lawsuits were brought against the mouthpiece papers 
of provincial or municipal Communist Party committees, see, e.g., infra Appendices A, B, Cases 19, 22, 
47, 222, in other cases, plaintiffs sued newspapers belonging to provincial or municipal trade unions, see, 
e.g., infra Appendices A, B, Cases 81, 105, women’s associations, see, e.g., infra Appendices A, B, Case 11, 
or government departments, see, e.g., infra Appendices A, B, Cases 52, 221. Although such papers are 
ofªcial, they are generally less inºuential than are the papers directly linked to provincial or municipal 
Party committees. 
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Fourth, a signiªcant number of cases were brought against defendants not 
in the traditional print or broadcast media. In the sample, eight lawsuits were 
brought against book publishers,139 three against government entities,140 
eight against individuals,141 six against websites,142 one case against a ªlm pro-
duction company,143 and one against the national soccer association.144 Further, 
some judges report that many defamation cases are brought by individuals 
against individuals145 and thus attract little media attention. The prevalence 
of such cases is a reminder that understanding defamation actions solely in 
terms of their effect on newspapers and magazines is a mistake. 
Fifth, case outcomes suggest that defendant type has an effect on likelihood 
of a plaintiff victory. In particular, cases against central newspapers were less 
likely to succeed than were cases against other defendants. In the sample, plain-
tiffs prevailed in more than half of all cases in each category except for cases 
against ofªcial central and local newspapers.146 Plaintiffs won only nine of 
twenty cases brought against ofªcial newspapers with a central Party-state 
rank.147 This ªnding is consistent with evidence from lawyers, journalists, and 
scholars.148 
These trends reºect the underlying structure and inºuence of China’s me-
dia. Commercialized media more frequently engage in the type of reporting 
that results in defamation lawsuits: critical reports, reports on private or scan-
dalous details of the lives of stars and individuals, and reports on corporations 
and the ªnancial sector. Plaintiffs are apt to perceive the commercialized media 
as lacking the power and inºuence of ofªcial media. In contrast, plaintiffs 
may be conscious of the power and inºuence of—and thus the difªculty of pre-
vailing in cases brought against—central Party-state media and television 
stations. Yet the number of cases brought against the ofªcial media, in par-
ticular against central Party media, demonstrates that the rank and inºuence 
of plaintiffs and defendants cannot alone explain either decisions to sue or out-
comes in defamation litigation. That plaintiffs are challenging—and some-
times winning against—inºuential Party mouthpieces shows that defamation 
 
                                                                                                                      
139. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 49, 53, 66, 91, 113, 180, 211, 215. 
140. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 76, 182, 208.  
141. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 1, 125, 151, 152, 176, 187, 199, 216. These include two cases 
in which the author of a novel, but not the publisher, was sued, and four against journalists in which the 
reporter, but not the publication, was sued. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 125, 151, 166, 176, 199, 
223. 
142. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 15, 48, 73, 117, 205, 210. 
143. See infra Appendices A, B, Case 114. 
144. See infra Appendices A, B, Case 85. 
145. See Conªdential Interview 18 (2004); Conªdential Interview 19 (2003). 
146. See infra Appendices A, B. 
147. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 5, 30, 84, 115, 129, 135, 141, 150, 207. 
148. The small number of cases brought overall against television stations makes evaluating claims 
against television stations difªcult but may also reºect the rarity of such actions. See, e.g., Conªdential 
Interview 67 (2004) (stating that, in many cases, courts are biased in favor of television stations); Conªdential 
Interview 76 (2004) (stating that it is difªcult to prevail against central media); Conªdential Interview 
83 (2003) (noting that it is rare to sue the central media or television stations, because it is difªcult to 
prevail in such cases). 
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litigation is a tool for challenging authority, not merely a tool for restricting 
the newly commercialized Chinese media. 
C. Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs in the 223 cases studied for this Article fell into four categories: 
ofªcials and government entities, businesses and corporations, ordinary per-
sons, and famous persons. These categories are, of course, rough; not all plain-
tiffs in the reviewed cases ªt easily into any category, and some could be classi-
ªed in several categories. Nevertheless, most cases clearly ªt into one of the 
categories. Examining who sues and their reasons for doing so reveals both 
the diversity of reasons for which cases are brought and that the media’s likeli-
hood of success depends on who is bringing suit and the nature of their claims. 
Cases brought by ofªcials and Party-state entities or by corporations high-
light the use of defamation litigation to restrict and retaliate against critical 
coverage. In contrast, the fact that ordinary people bring, and prevail in, a 
signiªcant number of cases against the ofªcial media reveals that defamation 
litigation also reºects increased willingness by those without power to use 
the legal system to advance their own interests. 
1. Ofªcials and Party-State Entities 
Cases brought by ofªcials and Party-state entities most clearly show the use 
of defamation litigation to restrict China’s media. Plaintiffs in sixty-two of 
the cases were either Party-state entities or ofªcials.149 These cases ranged from a 
village Communist Party committee that sued a newspaper after the paper ran 
articles exposing misuse of funds and misappropriation of land by the com-
mittee,150 to hospitals that sued after media reports that they overcharged or 
harmed patients,151 to three ofªcials in Chongqing who sued after a maga-
zine report linked them to a scandal involving the collapse of a bridge in the 
municipality.152 Forty-three of the cases were brought by ofªcials, seventeen 
were brought by government or Party entities, and two were brought by both 
ofªcials and entitites.153 
Most striking, however, are those who were not plaintiffs: high-ranking 
ofªcials. In the sixty-two cases, the highest-ranking ofªcials to sue for defama-
tion were county Party-secretaries and a former mayor of a mid-sized city.154 
 
                                                                                                                      
149. See infra Appendices A, B. Whether a plaintiff should be classiªed as “ofªcial” is not always clear. 
For example, I have grouped one school and two hospitals into this group, due to their direct state links, 
although arguably they could be classiªed also as enterprises or businesses. Likewise managers and 
ofªcials at some corporations and businesses could be classiªed as ofªcials. I categorize state schools as 
government plaintiffs, and private schools as businesses. State enterprises are classiªed as corporate plain-
tiffs. 
150. See infra Appendix B, Case 188. 
151. See, e.g., infra Appendix B, Case 145. 
152. See Xie, infra Appendix B, Case 126, at 2. 
153. See infra Appendices A, B. 
154. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 143, 159, 175. 
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None of the lawsuits involved claims by provincial or national ofªcials. In 
the entire set of 223 cases, the most inºuential or powerful plaintiffs appear 
to have been corporations. Such ªndings reºect norms that govern the me-
dia: The media rarely criticize ofªcials above the county or municipal level 
and have signiªcantly more discretion to criticize corporate misdeeds than 
they have to criticize ofªcial misconduct.155 
Three trends in cases brought by ofªcials and Party-state entities are of par-
ticular note and reveal how defamation litigation is being used to curtail the 
media: (1) the frequent use of defamation litigation to retaliate against criti-
cal reporting, in particular critical reporting by papers from outside the 
plaintiff’s home jurisdiction, (2) the ªling of defamation cases by ofªcials who 
have already been subject to Party, administrative, or criminal sanctions, and 
(3) the use of defamation litigation by courts and judges in response to criti-
cal coverage of their activities. 
a. Litigation as Retribution 
Local ofªcials or entities brought numerous defamation claims against ei-
ther national media or media from outside the local area. As Table Five shows, 
of the sixty-two cases brought by ofªcials or Party-state entities, local plain-
tiffs brought thirty against non-local defendants.156 An additional sixteen 
cases were ªled in courts in the home jurisdiction of both the plaintiff and at 
least one of the defendants.157 Only ªve cases were brought in a defendant’s 
home jurisdiction in cases in which the plaintiff and defendant did not share 
a domicile.158 
 
                                                                                                                      
155. Party regulations also explicitly ban the media from reporting on central leadership without 
permission from the Central Propaganda Department. Guanyu Fabiao He Chuban Youguan Dang He Guojia 
Zhuyao Lingdaoren Gongzuo He Shenghuo Qingkuang Zuopin De Buchong Guiding [Supplementary Rules Regard-
ing Distribution and Publication of Work Concerning the Life Situation of Important Party and National Leaders] 
(promulgated by Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu [Central Propaganda Department], effective Feb. 15, 1993), 
available at http://www.people.com.cn/electric/ºfg/d2/930215.html; Guanyu Chuban Fabiao Mao, Zhou, 
Liu, Zhu, Ren, Deng, Chen He Xianren Zhongyang Changwei Zhuzuo De Jixiang Buchong Guiding [Supplemen-
tary Rules Regarding Publication and Distribution of Works Concerning Mao, Zhou, Liu, Zhu, Ren, Deng, Chen 
and Incumbent Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo] (promulgated by Zhongyang Xuanchuan 
Bu, Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiu Shi, Xinwen Chuban Shu [Central Propaganda Department, Central 
Document Research Center, and State Press and Publications Ofªce], effective Aug. 21, 1990), available 
at http://www.bjpress.cn/zczx/cbwgl/zh/cbzh7.htm. 
156. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 1, 85, 90, 98, 100, 102, 106, 108, 120, 121, 123, 126, 132, 
141, 143, 149, 153, 154, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 170, 175, 180, 191, 192, 222. 
157. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 19, 104, 109, 111, 116, 128, 156, 157, 158, 163, 167, 168, 
171, 173, 174, 177. 
158. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 103, 113, 130, 145, 188. In eleven of the cases brought by 
ofªcials, the jurisdiction or the relationship of the jurisdiction to the parties was not clear. See infra Ap-
pendices A, B, Cases 8, 65, 70, 86, 155, 159, 169, 172, 189, 216, 218. 
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Table Five 






















































































Total Cases 30  5 16 11 62 
Plaintiff First-
Instance Victories 
22  1  6  4 33 
Defendant First-
Instance Victories 
 3  3  7  2 15 
Settled with No 
Clear Victor 
 1  0  0  0  1 
Outcome 
Unknown 
 4  1  3  5 13 
Plaintiff 
Success Rate in 
First-Instance 
Cases159 
88% 25% 46% 67% 69% 
 
Three cases highlight the use of defamation litigation by local ofªcials or 
entities in response to critical reports by external media. In Shaanxi Province, a 
village Party committee and village ofªcials successfully sued the national China 
Youth Daily for defamation after a report in the paper detailed how local ofªcials 
had neglected to investigate an acid attack on a local woman.160 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the article defamed the ofªcials and the village itself; in 
court they contended that, since the article had appeared, the fruit orchards 
had suffered a decline in yield because villagers had lost their motivation to 
tend them.161 A local court awarded plaintiffs 90,000 yuan and ordered an 
 
                                                                                                                      
159. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
160. See Minshi Panjue Shu (1999) Xian Min Er Chu Zi Di 01 Hao [Civil Decision (1999) Xian Civil 
Second No. 1] (Xianyang Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Xianyang Mun. Interm. People’s Ct.], May 25, 
2000), available at http://www.cyol.net/gb/content/2000-08/24/content_63683.htm; Liu Xiaoyan, Jizhe 
De Hefa Quanli Shei Lai Weihu [Who Can Protect Journalist’s Legal Interests], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao 
[China Youth Daily], Nov. 9, 2001, available at Renmin Wang [People’s Net], http://www.people.com. 
cn/GB/shizheng/19/20011109/601476.html. 
161. Shaanxi Province Civil Decision, supra note 160. 
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apology from the defendant; the Shaanxi Province High People’s Court afªrmed 
the decision.162 Although external and international media highlighted the 
case in reports that left little doubt that local protectionism had played a role in 
the outcome,163 such reports appeared to have little effect on the Shaanxi courts. 
In other cases the effort to target external media is more explicit. In He-
nan Province, for example, a member of a local joint defense team164 brought 
suit after three newspapers reported that he had been detained on charges of 
torturing a detainee.165 The article, entitled “These Three Rotten Apples Really 
Have No Ethics,” had run originally in the Dahe News, the leading commer-
cialized paper in Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan. Other papers subsequently 
carried the report. Later, after the local procuratorate dropped the charges, 
the plaintiff brought suit, arguing that the original reports erred in stating 
that he had been detained on suspicion of torture, when in fact he was sus-
pected of illegally detaining a suspect. Yet the plaintiff sued only the Yangcheng 
Evening News, a paper in Guangzhou, and did not sue the local paper that 
had originally carried the report. The court in plaintiff’s hometown ordered 
the non-local paper to pay 35,000 yuan.166 
Similarly, after Southern Weekend carried a report exposing corruption and 
“bloody conºict” at a state-owned factory in Qiqihar, in Heilongjiang Prov-
ince, the head of the factory brought suit.167 A court in Harbin, the provin-
cial capital, ordered the paper, the article’s author, and ªve other papers that 
reprinted the article to pay a combined total of 240,000 yuan in damages to 
the head of the factory. Although the court rejected a claim for one million 
yuan in emotional damages brought by the government department respon-
sible for the factory, the court ordered the seven defendants to apologize to 
the government, noting that the seven defendants had “seriously inºuenced 
social stability as well as the image of the Party and government in Qiqihar.”168 
A journalist for Southern Weekend who was present at the trial reported that 
the judge had told the defendants that the court had no power to decide the 
case on its own; the reporter also claimed that the suit was brought after the 
local Party-secretary gave written orders for a defamation case to be ªled.169 
The results of the sample cases show that plaintiffs are far more likely to 
prevail when they sue in their home jurisdiction. As Table Five shows, plaintiffs 
 
                                                                                                                      
162. See Liu Xiaoyan, supra note 160. 
163. See, e.g., Terry McCarthy, Taking on the System, Timeasia, Oct. 9, 2000, available at http://www.time. 
com/time/asia/magazine/2000/1009/cover1.html; “Wang Baojing Deng Su Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Mingyu 
Qingquan An” Yantao Hui Fa Yan [Collection of Speeches at the “Symposium on the Case of Wang Baojing et al. 
Suing China Youth Daily for Defamation”], Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], June 22, 2004, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2004-06/22/content_1539597.htm. 
164. Joint defense teams are auxiliary police, often with little training. They have been blamed for wide-
spread abuses. 
165. See Zhou Ze, Zhe Qi Xinwen Qinquan An Pan De Dui Ma [Was This News Defamation Case Correctly 
Decided?], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], July 14, 2001, at 7. A local appellate court afªrmed the decision. 
166. See id. 
167. See infra Appendix B, Case 123, at 5. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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prevailed in eighty-eight percent of the thirty cases brought in the plaintiff’s 
home jurisdiction against non-local media, while defendants prevailed in three 
of four cases, or seventy-ªve percent, brought by plaintiffs against media in a 
jurisdiction that was the home of the defendant but not the plaintiff. In cases 
brought in a jurisdiction that was home to both parties, plaintiffs and de-
fendants fared roughly equally, with plaintiffs winning six cases and defen-
dants winning seven.170 
b. Post-Punishment Litigation 
A smaller number of cases involved claims brought by ofªcials who sued 
after having been subject to criminal or administrative punishment or after 
having been removed from ofªce. Such cases show that criminal convictions 
of targets of media coverage do not insulate the media from litigation, in par-
ticular when defamation cases are brought in the plaintiff’s local court. Thus, in 
Hubei Province, for example, the former vice-mayor of Zaoyang Municipal-
ity, Yin Donggui, was sentenced to ªve years in prison for accepting bribes. 
While Yin was in prison her husband brought a defamation suit on her behalf, 
arguing that a report in a Wuhan paper on the case had harmed her reputation 
by overstating the alleged amount she had accepted in bribes.171 The suit also 
alleged that claims in newspaper reports that, for several years, Yin had used 
her position to have sex with numerous men, including her driver, were de-
famatory. A Hubei court awarded Yin 200,000 yuan in damages.172 The court 
stated that the media “should be objective and correct” even if their reports 
cannot be as precise as legal ªndings.173 The court found that the newspaper 
had overstated the amount of bribes, had suggested prior to trial that the 
outcome was ªxed, and had used “incorrect language” to describe the case.174 
Yin Donggui was not the only target of media criticism to sue even after 
having been punished for wrongdoing while in ofªce. A total of seven cases 
involved claims brought by ofªcials who had been convicted of crimes, or 
sanctioned by the Party discipline commission, or had lost their jobs as a 
result of critical media reports.175 Plaintiffs prevailed in three of these cases.176 
Some such cases may be in response to sensational reporting by the media. 
But they also suggest efforts by local ofªcials to contest sanctions already taken 
 
                                                                                                                      
170. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 111, 158, 163, 167, 171, 177 (for plaintiff); Cases 19, 104, 
109, 116, 128, 157, 168 (for defendant). 
171. Reports stated she had accepted 80,000 yuan in bribes; she was convicted of accepting 43,000 
yuan. Zhai, infra Appendix B, Case 175. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. Media coverage and academic discussion of the case questioned how Yin could have prevailed 
given the criminal conviction, apparently believing that the reports could do little to add to the harm to 
her reputation already resulting from the criminal conviction. 
175. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 109, 130, 143, 153, 158, 169, 175. 
176. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 143, 158, 175. That other plaintiffs likewise had been sanc-
tioned is likely; the media may not always report on decisions of the Party discipline commission, in 
particular where cases are sensitive. 
2006 / Innovation Through Intimidation 65 
against them: Bringing a defamation action may be easier for an ofªcial than 
challenging a criminal conviction or ªnding of Party disciplinary authorities. 
c. Courts and Judges as Plaintiffs 
A subset of cases brought by Party-state entities or ofªcials is claims by 
judges or courts. Such cases demonstrate that judges and courts are using 
their own authority to respond to rising criticism in the media. Judges 
brought suit in ten cases.177 Courts brought an additional two cases for repu-
tational harm.178 The twelve cases all arose in response to critical reports—or 
reports that judges or courts perceived to be critical. The Futian District Court, 
for example, in Shenzhen brought suit against the national Democracy and the 
Legal System magazine for harm to the court’s reputation after the magazine 
carried an article in 1994 that was critical of the court.179 The article, enti-
tled “A Case That Is Difªcult to Bear and Causes People to Reºect,” described 
another defamation case involving a Shenzhen company and the national 
Workers Daily. The article stated that there were some “not very difªcult to 
understand behind-the-scenes activities” in the case and quoted the defendant’s 
lawyer as directly questioning the fairness of the decision. The Shenzhen Inter-
mediate Court—the court directly superior to the Futian District Court—
heard the case, and found for the plaintiff.180 The intermediate decision, not-
ing the magazine’s national importance, stated that if the magazine was un-
happy about a court decision, it could “use other routes” to express its views; 
it also opined that the offending article should not have been run without 
having obtained the approval of the district court.181 The intermediate court 
found that the article had caused “severe harm” to the Futian District Court’s 
reputation and ordered the magazine to apologize in print and pay 5,000 yuan 
in economic damages. The Guangdong Province High People’s Court rejected 
an appeal in the case after the magazine-appellant failed to appear in court.182 
The case against Democracy and the Legal System, brought in 1995, was a 
relatively early example of courts and judges suing the media. Subsequent 
cases have continued the trend, although, in most cases, claims have been 
brought by individual judges rather than by courts as institutional plaintiffs. A 
court in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, for example, awarded 10,000 yuan 
to a judge following a series of critical reports in the Xinjiang Business News. 
The articles suggested that a judge on the Urumqi Intermediate Court had 
colluded with one of the parties in a case arising out of a contract dispute to 
transfer 1.72 million yuan in bad debt to a state-owned company.183 
 
                                                                                                                      
177. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 8, 163, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174. 
178. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 164, 165. 
179. See infra Appendix B, Case 164. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id.  
183. See infra Appendix B, Case 171. 
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The judge brought suit in Urumqi’s Tianshan District People’s Court—a 
court directly below his own—which ordered the defendant newspaper to 
apologize and pay 80,000 yuan to the judge.184 On appeal, the Xinjiang High 
People’s Court ordered the case transferred out of Urumqi to an intermediate 
court in another area of Xinjiang, presumably to avoid the plaintiff’s own 
court hearing the appeal. The intermediate court afªrmed the decision. The 
paper’s travails, however, did not end with the verdict; the editor-in-chief of 
the paper was subsequently detained for ªfteen days. Although the charges 
stemmed allegedly from the editor’s failure to repay a debt in an unrelated 
case, online commentators speculated that the detention was directly related to 
the defamation case and to the court’s unhappiness with the paper’s reports.185 
Not surprisingly, judges and courts win most cases brought against the me-
dia. The total number of cases brought by courts or judges is difªcult to assess. 
One Chinese journalist who has studied the phenomenon identiªed fourteen 
such cases brought between 1994 and 2001. All fourteen resulted in defeats 
for the defendant, with the media outlet being ordered either to apologize or 
to pay compensation.186 The cases surveyed for this Article are largely con-
sistent with these ªndings, with plaintiff judges or courts prevailing in six 
of eight cases for which outcomes are available.187 The results of the other 
two cases, rejecting judges’ defamation claims, reveal that judges do not always 
win such cases.188 A district court in Chongqing, for example, rejected a 
defamation claim brought by a judge in another court in the same city against 
China Youth Daily and Southern Metropolitan Daily. The dispute stemmed 
from a report on an economic case, originally carried in China Youth Daily, 
that stated that the sitting judges hearing the case had “repeatedly clearly 
violated adjudication procedures in hearing the case” and that government 
ofªcials involved in the case had fabricated evidence.189 The trial court found 
 
                                                                                                                      
184. Id. One media report stated that the judge who headed the tribunal in the district court was a 
former colleague of the plaintiff. Id.  
185. “Xinjiang Shangbao” Zongbian Weihe Beiju [Why Was “Xinjiang Commercial News” Editor-in-Chief 
Detained], Beijing Qingnian Bao [Beijing Youth Daily], Dec. 2, 1999, at 7. 
186. Xu Xun, Fourth Wave, supra note 51, at 12; Xu Xun, Zhongguo Meiti Yu Sifa Guanxi Xianzhuang 
Pingxi [Analysis on the Current Circumstances of Media-Judicial Relations in China], 2001 Faxue Yanjiu 
[Legal Studies] No. 6, 149, 154 (this journal is alternatively known as Cass L.J.) [hereinafter Xu, 
Faxue Yanjiu]; Xu Xun, Dao Yan: Meijie Ren De Falü Guan Yu Falü Ren De Meijie Guan: Jianlun Xinwen 
Fa De Ruogan Lilun He Shijian Wenti [Introduction: Journalists’ Law Outlook and Lawyers’ Media Outlook: 
Several Theoretical and Practical Problems of China’s Media Law] (unpublished manuscript, on ªle with the 
Harvard International Law Journal) (stating that the media’s defeat rate in cases brought by the courts is 
100%); see also Conªdential Interview 44 (2004) (stating that the media lose 100% of cases brought by 
courts or judges). 
187. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 8, 163, 164, 167, 170, 171. In one of the cases counted as a 
plaintiff victory, the defendant settled with the plaintiff. See infra Appendices A, B, Case 167. 
188. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 166, 168. 
189. For the original article, see Xu Yongheng, Zhengfu Shexian Zaojia, Fayuan Weizhang Ban’an: 
Chongqing Jianke Yuan Mianlin Jieti [Suspected Fabrication of the Government and Violation of Procedures of the 
Court: Chongqing Construction Science Institution Faces Dissolution], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao [China 
Youth Daily], Jan. 4, 2000, at 2. 
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that the papers’ reports were basically correct and did not include “attack-
ing” or libelous language.190 
Cases brought by judges and courts demonstrate that courts are beginning to 
resist media oversight and are using their own authority to do so. Litigation 
is one of a number of tools the courts have to restrict coverage. Others include 
banning reporting on cases or requiring that all reports on court activities be 
pre-screened by judges. Some Chinese commentators have criticized defamation 
actions brought by judges and courts, arguing that courts undermine the legal 
system when they bring such cases and that such cases should not be consid-
ered civil disputes.191 Judges, in response, argue that they have little other 
recourse when media frequently err in the coverage of court proceedings and 
lack basic knowledge of law.192 Given the weak position of courts in the 
Chinese system and the growth of aggressive critical reporting by the media 
on court activities, courts’ use of defamation litigation to curtail critical re-
porting is not surprising. Courts elsewhere have responded to the growth of 
critical reporting with similar sanctions.193 Yet, along with revealing courts’ 
attempts to restrict the media, such cases may also reºect the increasing auton-
omy and authority of the courts. Such factors may make courts attractive to 
ordinary litigants as well as to ofªcials and corporations. 
Not all cases brought by judges or other ofªcials involve plaintiffs seeking 
retribution. Lawyers who represent defamation plaintiffs contend that such suits 
are necessary to curtail erroneous and unfair media coverage, and they note 
that, in many such cases, the media are the powerful party.194 Like judges, these 
lawyers maintain that defamation litigation may be the only route of redress 
available to ofªcials who have been criticized by the media.195 Party-state supe-
riors often view media reports as ªnal determinations of fact, making it difªcult 
for targeted ofªcials to contest critical reports. Moreover, ofªcial plaintiffs 
are not necessarily powerful. Litigation may be used by ofªcials who have al-
ready lost their positions.196 Yet evidence from cases brought by ofªcials and 
Party-state entities demonstrates that defamation litigation has become a 
mechanism for restricting media freedom. Weak legal protections for the 
 
                                                                                                                      
190. See infra Appendix B, Case 166. 
191. See, e.g., Xu, Faxue Yanjiu, supra note 186, at 154 (summarizing arguments); Yang Lixin & 
Yang Fang, Shu Shi Shu Fei Li Ci Cun Zhao [Keep a Record of Who is Right and Who is Wrong], Minzhu Yu 
Fazhi [Democracy and the Legal System], Aug. 6, 2001, at 52. 
192. Xu, Faxue Yanjiu, supra note 186, at 151. Although critical of the practice of courts and judges 
bringing defamation lawsuits, Xu argues that they will sue only in cases in which they have in fact suf-
fered negative effects from press coverage. 
193. See infra Part III.A.  
194. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004). 
195. That ofªcials bring many defamation actions is not surprising. In the United States, where legal 
standards make it much more difªcult for ofªcials or corporations to recover against the media, such 
“public persons” account for the majority of defamation actions. See Bezanson, supra note 24, at 10 
(ªnding that ofªce holders and corporations account for sixty percent of the plaintiffs in defamation 
actions in the United States). 
196. Conªdential Interview 36 (2005) (stating that only relatively weak ofªcials will sue for defama-
tion, because inºuential ofªcials will be able to block negative reporting before it is published or aired). 
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media, legal standards that restrict personal criticism, and local protectionism 
in the courts combine to make the Chinese media easy targets for those seek-
ing redress or retribution. 
2. Business or Corporate Plaintiffs 
Business and corporate plaintiffs likewise use defamation litigation to re-
strict and retaliate against critical media coverage. Such cases may pose a 
greater threat to the media than suits by ofªcials pose, as amounts in contro-
versy are often far larger in cases brought by corporations. Corporate or business 
plaintiffs brought 52 of the 223 cases surveyed in this Article.197 Plaintiffs 
ranged from the owner of a karaoke bar in a small town in Sichuan198 to ma-
jor national corporations,199 and included property developers,200 computer 
manufacturers,201 a mooncake producer,202 and a soccer club.203 In most of 
these cases, plaintiffs were either local or regional enterprises or businesses. In 
some cases, however, the plaintiffs were nationally or internationally recognized 
brands.204 
Most claims resulted from negative coverage of a company’s products or 
business practices. For example, a factory in Nanyang brought suit against the 
local Party mouthpiece paper after the paper had reported that the factory 
had produced leaºets that included explicit sexual content.205 In Shanghai, the 
organizers of the Shanghai International Film Festival brought suit after a 
newspaper alleged “black box” manipulation of awarding prizes at the festi-
val.206 Two of the cases involved apparently accurate reports about other compa-
nies mistakenly attributed to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that the media 
had misled consumers into thinking that the plaintiffs had engaged in ille-
gal conduct or other wrongdoing (in one case due to a typographical error, and 
in another due to a paper’s failing to print the entire name of the company 
alleged to be the wrongdoer).207 
 
                                                                                                                      
197. See infra Appendices A, B. 
198. See infra Appendix B, Case 183. 
199. See infra Appendix B, Case 152. 
200. See, e.g., Zhang Honglei & Guan Jindong, Mingjietai Fangdichan Yu Yunnan Ribao Duibu Gongtang 
[Mingjietai Real Estate and Yunnan Daily Confront Each Other in Court], Yunnan Ribao Dianzi Ban—
Daguan Zhoukan [Electronic Version of Yunnan Daily—Daguan Weekly], June 15, 2000, 
available at http://www.yndaily.com/zl/daguan/0615/dg06152.htm. (unavailable as of Nov. 9, 2005) (on 
ªle with the Harvard International Law Journal). 
201. See infra Appendix B, Case 182. 
202. See infra Appendix B, Case 138. 
203. Zuqiu Bao Xiang Shenzhen Pingan Daoqian [Soccer News Apologizes to Shenzhen Pingan Soccer Club], 
Hebei Ribao Wang [Hebei Daily Net], Apr. 26, 2001, available at http://www.hebnet.net/mag1/ 
20180426/colart14411.htm. 
204. See, e.g., infra Appendix B, Case 131. 
205. Hong Jun & Lin Juan, Xinxi Fuwu Bianwei Fayuan Panjue Meiti Puguang Zhengdang [Stink Over 
Information Service, Court Vindicates Media’s Right to Expose], Henan Sheng Nanyang Shi Wanchengqu Renmin 
Fayuan [Henan Province Nanyang City Wancheng District People’s Court], Aug. 29, 2002, http://www.nhshs. 
edu.sh.cn/xinxizhenghe/zhengzhi/contents/main/lm06/lm0608/Myweb/anli/24.htm. 
206. See infra Appendix B, Case 122. 
207. See infra Appendix B, Case 117 (suit alleging that website changed one character in the name of 
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Two examples highlight the use of such cases to retaliate against negative 
coverage or to prevent further critical reporting. In March 2002, Shenzhen 
Fountain Corporation, a real estate and ªnancial data services company listed 
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, brought suit against Beijing-based Caijing 
Magazine, widely regarded as China’s most outspoken ªnancial publication. 
The suit was in response to an article in Caijing that questioned the ªrm’s ac-
counting practices. Fountain demanded more than three million yuan, argu-
ing that the article had severely harmed its reputation.208 
Fountain brought suit in the Luohu district court in its hometown of Shen-
zhen. In a lengthy opinion, the court found that, although most of the arti-
cle was correct, certain facts were untrue. In its opinion, the court recognized 
Caijing’s “right to supervise,” “right to report,” and “right to criticize,”209 and 
also determined that the article was neither insulting nor libelous. As a re-
sult, the court found that no “news tort” had been established.210 Stating that 
“truth is the life of news,” however, the court did ªnd that certain facts in the 
article were not correct, that the magazine had failed to make a sufªcient effort 
to conªrm such facts, and thus that the defendants were liable for defama-
tion.211 The court awarded Fountain 300,000 yuan and ordered Caijing to 
apologize. The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court afªrmed the decision.212 
There were widespread allegations that local government involvement in the 
case was responsible for the outcome.213 The court, however, contended that 
its handling of the case was not affected by any external pressure.214 
Also in 2002, the Haier Group, China’s leading producer of household appli-
ances, sued freelance commentator Chen Yicong.215 The case arose after Chen 
speculated in an online commentary that some of Haier’s new product lines 
would not succeed and also questioned Haier’s ªnances. After the report was 
picked up by foreign media,216 Haier sued Chen in Haier’s hometown of Qing-
 
                                                                                                                      
a company alleged to have engaged in criminal conduct, thus leading readers to believe that plaintiff was 
the wrongdoer). 
208. The company originally demanded 1,080,000 yuan, but increased its demand to 3,080,000 yuan 
after Hu Shuli, the magazine’s editor-in-chief, published an editorial criticizing the lawsuit. See infra 
Appendix B, Case 140. 
209. Minshi Panjue Shu Shen Luo Fa Minyi Chu Zi Di 1120 Hao [Civil Case Court Opinion Shen 
Luo Civil First No. 1120], Yangguang Xia De Caipan: Luohu Fayuan Falü Wenshu Xuanping 
[Judgments under Sunshine: Selected Documents and Judgments of the Luohu Court] 153, 
154–55 (Jiang Hongyan ed., 2004) (Shenzhen Shi Luohu Qu Renmin Fayuan [Shenzhen Municipality 
Luohu District People’s Court], 2002). 
210. Id. at 170–71. 
211. Id. at 173; Conªdential Interview 64 (2004). 
212. ST Xingyuan (000005): Shengsu “Caijing” Mingyu Qinquan An [ST Xingyuan (000005): Wins the 
Defamation Case Against “Caijing”], Sept. 30, 2003, http://ªnance.sina.com.cn/s/20030930/0824462006. 
shtml. 
213. Chen, supra note 79, at 51. 
214. Conªdential Interview 61 (2004). 
215. See Chen Yicong Yu Haier An Hejie, Chen Yicong Fabiao Dujia Shengming [Chen Yicong v. Haier Case is 
Settled, Chen Yicong Publishes Exclusive Announcement], Guigu Dongli [eNet.com.cn], Aug. 19, 2002, 
available at http://tech.tom.com/Archive/1121/1015/2002/8/19-39939.html [hereinafter Chen Yicong]. 
216. See, e.g., Susan Lawrence, Gagged by Big Business, Far E. Econ. Rev., Aug. 1, 2002, at 24; Dexter 
Roberts, Baby Steps for a Chinese Giant, Bus. Wk. Online, July 17, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
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dao. Haier demanded 300,000 yuan, an amount Chen stated was equivalent 
to more than ten times his annual salary.217 Overseas media covered the case 
in detail, noting in particular how the dispute pitted the giant Haier against 
Chen, who eked out a living writing online while living at home with his par-
ents.218 Domestic media, on the other hand, were largely silent. Scattered re-
ports noted the dispute, but most avoided any coverage, apparently due to 
explicit instructions from the Central Propaganda Department not to cover the 
matter and to concerns that Haier would sue any domestic media that repeated 
the allegations. 
Haier and Chen eventually settled the case, with Chen issuing an online 
apology stating that his allegations had been false and that he had failed to 
investigate the facts prior to publishing his analysis.219 Domestic online me-
dia reported Chen’s apology.220 Although some observers questioned why Haier 
would bother to sue a relatively obscure online commentator, the case appeared 
to serve twin goals: publication of Chen’s allegations in the domestic media 
ceased, and Haier made clear that it would aggressively pursue future critics. 
It is hardly unusual for corporations or businesses to bring suit for harm to 
their reputations. Yet examination of the outcomes in China demonstrates the 
degree to which corporate defamation claims in China appear to be part of the 
larger phenomenon of local protectionism. Although both the Shenzhen Foun-
tain and Haier cases involved high-proªle corporations, most corporate libel 
suits involve less well-known plaintiffs, often local businesses. As Table Six 
shows, corporate plaintiffs overwhelmingly bring defamation claims in their 
home jurisdiction—with twenty-seven of the claims being brought by local 
corporate plaintiffs against non-local media221 and only four being brought 
in a jurisdiction that was home to the defendant but not the plaintiff.222 
 
                                                                                                                      
bwdaily/dnºash/jul2002/nf20020717_8966.htm. 
217. Roberts, supra note 216. 
218. See, e.g., id. 
219. Chen Yicong, supra note 215. 
220. See, e.g., “Pojie Zhang Ruimin De Haier Faze” [Decoding Zhang Ruimin’s Haier Conduct], Beihai 
Luyou zhi Chuang [Beihai Travel Window], Oct. 13, 2003, available at http://0779.cn/bzhlm/ 
printpage.asp?id=6750. 
221. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 83, 84, 91, 97, 101, 107, 117, 122, 124, 125, 127, 131, 135, 
137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 152, 178, 179, 183, 185, 186, 187, 190, 202. 
222. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 87, 115, 148, 219. 
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Table Six 




























































































Total Cases 27  4 17  4 52 
Plaintiff First-
Instance Victories 
19  3  9  3 34 
Defendant First-
Instance Victories 
 5  0  6  1 12 
Outcome 
Unknown 




79% 100% 60% 75% 74% 
 
Plaintiffs prevailed in all of the cases with known outcomes brought in 
the home jurisdiction of defendants, as well as in seventy-nine percent of those 
brought in the plaintiffs’ home jurisdictions, results suggesting caution in 
assuming that local protectionism alone explains outcomes.224 High success 
rates also reºect legal standards that favor plaintiffs. As with suits by ofªcials 
and Party-state entities, however, evidence from journalists and lawyers sup-
ports the conclusion that corporate defamation cases are often attempts by 
plaintiffs to use local courts as a means to retaliate against the media. 
Not all business and corporate plaintiffs are equally powerful. In one case, 
for example, the owner of a karaoke bar in Sichuan’s Emei County sued after 
being criticized by a provincial media outlet for charging ªve yuan for a 
glass of plain boiled water.225 That karaoke bar owner clearly was not as power-
ful as a company helping develop the giant Three Gorges Dam, a company 
whose general manager sued both a Hong Kong paper and a Guangzhou paper 
for harm to its reputation and that of the entire project following a report 
that suggested the company had used shoddy materials in its construction 
 
                                                                                                                      
223. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
224. See infra Appendices A, B. The small number of defendant victories overall in this category—just 
twelve of the forty-six cases with results, or twenty-six percent—also impedes drawing ªrm conclusions. 
225. See infra Appendix B, Case 183, at 8a. 
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work on another dam.226 Given the degree to which local Party-state interests 
so often overlap with local business and corporate interests in China, many 
corporate or business plaintiffs likely have strong ties to the local Party-state, 
and thus inºuence over the local courts. Corporate plaintiffs’ seventy-nine per-
cent success rate in cases brought in their home jurisdictions against exter-
nal media supports the conclusion that corporations are attempting to use 
the local courts to silence critical media reports.227 
3. Ordinary Persons 
Much recent discussion of defamation litigation in China centers on suits 
brought by ofªcial plaintiffs or corporations. Despite the media’s tradition-
ally powerful position as an arm of the Party-state, in many such suits, the me-
dia are the weaker party. Yet cases brought by plaintiffs without clear ties to, 
or inºuence with, the Party-state suggest that defamation litigation is not 
merely a manifestation of local protectionism or of efforts to restrict media 
autonomy. Defamation litigation is also a mechanism for contesting ofªcial 
decisions and challenging state authority. 
Cases brought by those without Party-state ties divide into two groups: 
those brought by ordinary persons and those brought by famous persons (in-
cluding artists, academic commentators, authors, singers, athletes, and ac-
tors). This Part discusses cases brought by ordinary persons; the following 
Part examines those brought by famous persons. Given the traditional inºuence 
of the media, the power dynamics of such cases would appear to favor the me-
dia. The media do fare better in suits brought by non-powerful plaintiffs but 
nevertheless lose the majority of the time. 
Fifty-seven of the cases surveyed were brought by ordinary persons.228 
These cases fell into four categories: (1) claims by persons wrongly accused of 
criminal conduct, (2) claims by persons convicted of crimes, (3) claims re-
sulting from reports alleging non-criminal misconduct, and (4) claims re-
sulting from the publication of private details regarding the plaintiff. Although 
most cases arose from media reports about a speciªc plaintiff, some cases in 
 
                                                                                                                      
226. See infra Appendix B, Case 101. 
227. See infra Appendices A, B. 
228. See infra Appendices A, B. I classiªed plaintiffs as “ordinary” when they had no obvious ofªcial 
status and did not appear to have signiªcant public notoriety prior to the alleged defamatory incident. 
Classiªcations of plaintiffs as “ordinary” are particularly difªcult to verify. Some Chinese commentators 
and lawyers have questioned whether any ordinary persons bring suit, arguing that, in many such cases, 
plaintiffs have connections that allow their cases to be brought and to be noticed by the media. See, e.g., 
Conªdential Interview 36 (2005). Although it is possible that some of the cases I classify as “ordinary” 
involve parties with connections to the media or the courts, the large number of such cases without any 
such apparent ties suggests that persons without connections also bring a signiªcant volume of cases.  
A few cases classiªed as being brought by ordinary plaintiffs did not strictly ªt into the category, but 
were classiªed as such because plaintiffs did not appear to be weaker than defendants. Such cases included 
a single case brought by a foreigner, see infra Appendices A, B, Case 80, and a suit brought by a minor 
magazine against a clearly more inºuential ofªcial Party newspaper, see infra Appendices A, B, Case 110. 
I classiªed these as “ordinary plaintiffs” because such plaintiffs appeared to be weak when compared to 
their adversaries and because they had no particular notoriety prior to the cases. 
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each of the four categories involved claims that a report had caused harm by 
referring to a person other than the plaintiff who had the same or similar name 
as the plaintiff. 
First, plaintiffs prevailed in all eleven cases brought by individuals who 
claimed to have been harmed by inaccurate reports suggesting that they or a 
family member had been involved in criminal conduct or had been detained 
on suspicion of wrongdoing.229 Plaintiffs in such cases contended that the re-
ports were erroneous, either because they had not been detained or were not 
in fact suspects, or because they had subsequently been cleared of any wrongdo-
ing.230 For example, an individual named Duan Xuanliang in Hunan Prov-
ince brought suit against a local paper claiming that he had been defamed by an 
article suggesting that he was a chicken thief. An article had referred to a 
thief from his village with a similar name; in fact, however, there was no such 
person. Duan alleged that the article led his fellow villagers to believe that 
he was in fact the thief. A local court awarded him 2,000 yuan and ordered 
the paper to apologize. On appeal, however, the intermediate court found 
that the article had in fact referred to a person other than Duan.231 
Second, ten cases were brought by ordinary persons or the family members or 
persons who were actually convicted of crimes or sentenced to administrative 
punishment, or where the allegedly defamatory report lead to criminal or ad-
ministrative charges against the plaintiff.232 Plaintiffs in such cases included 
a doctor convicted of faking medical records;233 the owner of a private coal mine 
who had been convicted of leading a criminal organization and causing in-
tentional injury;234 and a peasant who had been exposed (and was subsequently 
jailed) for making fake rat poison.235 In Qinghai Province, a doctor sued after a 
newspaper erroneously reported that he had been sentenced to reeducation 
through labor for killing a patient.236 In fact, while the doctor had been found 
to be at fault, he had not been subject to administrative detention. The court 
rejected the doctor’s claim after the paper ran a correction, and the local pro-
curatorate subsequently brought criminal charges against the doctor.237 In most 
of these cases plaintiffs’ claims failed: Plaintiffs prevailed in only two such 
cases,238 while defendants won seven.239 
 
                                                                                                                      
229. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 5, 11, 30, 34, 35, 45, 67, 68, 76, 77, 78. 
230. See, e.g., infra Appendix B, Case 45 (plaintiff prevailed after article stated that he had been de-
tained for carrying a knife). 
231. See infra Appendix B, Case 11. 
232. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 6, 13, 33, 43, 46, 54, 63, 75, 95, 200. 
233. Lü Lifeng & Wu Yincai, “Mingyu Quan” Jiuchan Yulun Jiandu [Public Opinion Supervision Entangled 
with “Right of Reputation”], Jiancha Ribao [Procuratorate Daily], Jan. 15, 2003, available at http:// 
review.jcrb.com.cn/ournews/asp/readNews.asp?id=135446. 
234. See infra Appendix B, Case 13. 
235. See infra Appendix B, Case 54. 
236. See infra Appendix B, Case 46, at 3. 
237. See infra Appendix B, Case 46, at 3. 
238. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 33, 54. 
239. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 6, 13, 43, 46, 65, 75, 95, 200. 
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Third, twenty-one cases involved claims by individuals who were the tar-
get of reports that criticized or exposed wrongdoing, but where the individuals 
do not appear to have been subject to criminal prosecution.240 Such claims 
included a suit brought by a monk who a newspaper had alleged was a “fake 
monk,”241 a claim by an English teacher who a paper reported could not speak 
English,242 and a claim by a woman who a report suggested was a prostitute.243 
Also included in this group were two successful suits by journalists against 
persons who publicly disparaged the journalists after being criticized in print, 
suggesting that, in some cases, journalists are able to use defamation litigation 
as a defensive weapon.244 Plaintiffs prevailed in twelve of the cases in this 
category;245 defendants won nine.246 
Fourth, ªfteen plaintiffs brought suit alleging that they had been harmed 
by reports that had a stigmatizing effect on or that exposed unºattering de-
tails of their private lives.247 These included a husband and wife who sued 
after a newspaper incorrectly stated that their son was mentally disabled;248 a 
lawyer who sued after a newspaper reported details of an affair;249 a woman 
who sued after a newspaper report accused her of not looking after her eld-
erly father;250 a man who sued after a book identiªed him as being gay;251 and 
persons who sued following reports that stated or suggested that they had 
sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS.252 For example, one case arose 
from a newspaper’s report on an individual who contracted a sexually trans-
mitted disease from an unlicensed doctor.253 The paper used a fake name to 
conceal the patient’s identity, but another person with the same name brought 
suit against the paper and the local health and anti-epidemic station, claim-
ing that the article had led many people to believe he was the person identiªed. 
A local court awarded the plaintiff 10,000 yuan; the decision was reversed 
on appeal.254 At the trial level, plaintiffs prevailed in nine such cases;255 courts 
ruled for defendants in four cases.256 
 
                                                                                                                      
240. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 7, 10, 18, 29, 39, 42, 44, 52, 60, 71, 79, 80, 93, 110, 150, 
198, 201, 206, 207, 209, 211. 
241. See infra Appendix B, Case 198. 
242. See infra Appendix B, Case 206. 
243. See infra Appendix B, Case 205. 
244. See infra Appendix B, Cases 79, 211. 
245. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 10, 18, 42, 60, 71, 79, 80, 93, 150, 198, 207, 211. 
246. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 7, 29, 39, 44, 52, 110, 201, 206, 209. 
247. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 22, 26, 38, 41, 49, 62, 64, 96, 195, 199, 204, 205, 212, 213, 
215. 
248. See infra Appendix B, Case 41. 
249. See infra Appendix B, Case 52. The affair became public knowledge after the lawyer lost his li-
cense and subsequently ªled suit against the local justice bureau. Id. 
250. See infra Appendix B, Case 60. 
251. See infra Appendix B, Case 49.  
252. See infra Appendix B, Case 62. 
253. See infra Appendix B, Case 64, at 4–6. 
254. Id. 
255. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 26, 49, 64, 195, 199, 204, 205, 212, 215. 
256. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 22, 38, 62, 96. 
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The four categories of cases, summarized in Table Seven, suggest that or-
dinary persons are using defamation litigation to pursue multiple goals. In 
cases challenging erroneous reports, plaintiffs appear to be seeking to restore 
their reputation in the local community and, in some cases, to challenge errone-
ous determinations by Party-state entities. In cases involving reports con-
cerning criminal and non-criminal misconduct, suing the media may be the 
only vehicle available for contesting the charges against plaintiffs. In cases in 
the fourth category, plaintiffs are seeking to enforce their privacy rights. 
Ordinary plaintiffs were most likely to prevail in cases involving errone-
ous reports about criminal conduct and those involving reports that revealed 
stigmatizing or private information. Such ªndings are consistent with com-
ments by observers in China, who note that ordinary persons actually involved 
in wrongdoing often lose their cases, as they are unlikely to be sympathetic 
plaintiffs.257 
Table Seven 















































































































Total Cases 11 10 21 15 57 
Plaintiff First-
Instance Victories 
11  2 12  9 34 
Defendant First-
Instance Victories 
 0  7  9  4 20 
Outcome Not 
Available 




100% 22% 57% 69% 63% 
 
Regional dynamics also play a role in cases brought by ordinary persons, 
despite the lack of obvious links between plaintiffs and the Party-state. As 
 
                                                                                                                      
257. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 69 (2004). 
258. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
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Table Eight shows, plaintiffs prevailed in ªfteen cases brought in a plaintiff’s 
home jurisdiction against non-local defendants,259 while defendants prevailed in 
only three such cases.260 In contrast, defendants prevailed in seven of thir-
teen cases brought by non-local plaintiffs in the defendant’s locale.261 Defen-
dants also fared better in cases brought in jurisdictions that were common to 
both plaintiffs and defendants, with defendants winning six cases and losing 
seven.262 
The importance of jurisdiction in cases brought by ordinary persons sug-
gests that local protectionism may not be exclusive to cases involving power-
ful plaintiffs: Courts may be acting to protect even local plaintiffs who lack ties 
to the local Party-state. To be sure, some of the plaintiffs classiªed as “ordi-
nary” may actually have such ties or develop them in the course of litigation. 
Also, legal standards that strongly favor plaintiffs may facilitate decisions in 
favor of local persons. Nevertheless, the data suggest the possibility that courts 
are acting to protect local parties against external media, even when plain-
tiffs do not appear to have strong connections to local authorities. 
 
                                                                                                                      
259. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 5, 11, 18, 33, 35, 49, 54, 64, 68, 79, 93, 198, 205, 207, 211. 
260. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 38, 46, 201. 
261. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 6, 13, 22, 29, 42, 43, 45, 76, 80, 150, 195, 206, 209. 
262. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 26, 30, 34, 39, 44, 52, 60, 62, 71, 110, 200, 204, 212. 
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Table eight 





























































































Total 18 14 13 12 57 
Plaintiff First-
Instance Victories 
15  6  7  6 34 
Defendant First-
Instance Victories 
 3  7  6  4 20 
Outcome not 
available 




83% 46% 54% 60% 63% 
 
Lawyers who handle defamation cases comment that the media often do 
not report on actions brought by ordinary persons.264 A more comprehensive 
survey of defamation cases brought by ordinary individuals might show a 
higher success rate for the media. But the ªndings that ordinary plaintiffs pre-
vailed in more than half of the cases in the sample, and that they did particu-
larly well in cases brought against non-local media,265 are consistent with over-
all trends in defamation litigation. 
Given the traditional position of China’s media as an arm of the Party-
state, what is most striking is that cases are brought by ordinary persons at 
all. Lawyers and journalists contend that ordinary persons are the weak party 
when they sue the media and that it is rare for ordinary persons to win defama-
tion cases, in particular against local media.266 Yet evidence from actual cases 
suggests that, in a signiªcant number of cases, plaintiffs win, including when 
they are suing ofªcial Party papers. Ordinary persons brought twenty cases 
 
                                                                                                                      
263. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
264. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 82 (2004). 
265. See infra Appendices A, B. 
266. Conªdential Interview 68 (2004); see also Conªdential Interview 154 (2003) (explaining the suc-
cess of ordinary plaintiffs by noting that only seriously aggrieved people will dare to sue). 
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against ofªcial Party papers; plaintiffs won nine cases, defendants won ten, and 
information on the outcome was unavailable in one case.267 
Such outcomes suggest that power dynamics alone cannot explain results 
in defamation cases. For in most such cases the media appear to be the pow-
erful party. Defamation litigation by ordinary plaintiffs reveals willingness 
by individuals to assert their rights and challenge authority and to use the 
legal system to do so.268 That courts have proven to be receptive to such claims 
suggests that courts are also increasingly able and willing to adjudicate rights-
based claims. 
4. Famous Persons 
Fifty-two cases involved claims brought by famous plaintiffs or persons 
related to famous persons.269 As with the other categories, determining pre-
cisely who ªts into this category poses difªculties, as plaintiffs ranged from 
relatively minor authors to nationally famous actresses and sports ªgures. In 
general, however, this category includes authors, musicians, sports ªgures, and 
other non-ofªcials who were (or were seeking to be) in the local or national 
spotlight or who were responding to critical evaluations of their work. 
As with ordinary plaintiffs, famous plaintiffs’ claims were divided into four 
categories. First, plaintiffs brought twelve cases in response to direct criti-
cism of their work.270 For example, prominent author Han Shaogong won a 
judgment against an author and paper that referred to a work of his as being 
a “complete copy.”271 In another case, a well-known singer brought suit after 
a website listed him as a candidate for a competition to choose China’s ten 
ugliest singers.272 Not all such claims result from criticism published in the 
media. In a case in Shandong Province, a television host won a suit against a 
local government. The dispute arose after the local government responded to 
a critical report on the provincial television station by writing to the provin-
cial propaganda department and the head of the television station alleging 
that the host had violated ethical standards of journalism.273 
Second, eleven cases resulted from media reports that revealed incorrect, 
private, or scandalous details of a person’s life.274 For example, the farmer who 
discovered the terracotta warriors outside Xi’an won a defamation lawsuit 
 
                                                                                                                      
267. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 5, 6, 11, 18, 22, 29, 30, 38, 39, 41, 43, 46, 52, 60, 68, 95, 
150, 204, 207, 209. In addition, ordinary persons brought two cases against television stations; plaintiffs 
won one and lost one. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 34, 200. 
268. Many persons who have grievances against the media will air their complaints via other channels 
before resorting to litigation. For example, a person who is unhappy with a particular media report may 
ªrst raise the complaint informally with the media. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004). Litigation thus 
may also reºect lack of success through less formal channels. 
269. See infra Appendices A, B. 
270. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 3, 15, 21, 37, 47, 48, 51, 72, 81, 193, 208, 210. 
271. See infra Appendix B, Case 81, at 1.  
272. See infra Appendix B, Case 15. 
273. See infra Appendix B, Case 208. 
274. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 2, 24, 25, 40, 50, 57, 176, 196, 197, 203, 214. 
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against a magazine that reported that he was illiterate and thus unable to do 
more than draw a few circles when Bill Clinton visited and asked for his auto-
graph.275 Other claims in this category included a suit brought by a famous 
person after a newspaper incorrectly reported that he had died276 and a suit 
following reports that blamed a prominent singer for the suicide of another 
singer who, according to the media, had been in love with the plaintiff.277 
Third, twenty cases resulted from reports that suggested that the plaintiff 
was involved in misconduct.278 A well-known national television presenter 
prevailed in a defamation action against a newspaper and journalist follow-
ing a report that fans seeking an autographed copy of his book were required 
to buy an expensive pair of shoes in order to obtain his signature.279 Other cases 
included a claim by a well-known consumer advocate whom a paper had ac-
cused of bringing complaints regarding fake products in order to make money 
and ªnd a wife280 and a suit by an actor over newspaper reports that claimed 
he had fought a taxi driver.281 Five cases in this category were brought by soccer 
players or referees whom media reports implicated in corruption scandals.282 
Fourth, nine cases were brought by family members of deceased well-known 
persons.283 Although a few “defamation of the dead” cases are brought on behalf 
of ofªcials or ordinary persons, most such cases appear to be brought on behalf 
of famous persons. Claims in the sample included a suit against the author of 
a biography of a plaintiff’s uncle that contained unºattering details regard-
ing the plaintiff’s deceased father.284 Likewise, the daughter of a famous re-
searcher brought suit against a magazine that had suggested that her father had 
engaged in political struggles against his colleagues during the Cultural Revo-
lution.285 
As Table Nine shows, famous persons prevailed in a majority of cases in each 
of the four categories, except for cases involving defamation of deceased fam-
ily members. Plaintiffs fared particularly well—winning ten of eleven cases—in 
cases involving claims that the media had exposed inaccurate, private, or 
scandalous information.286 
 
                                                                                                                      
275. See infra Appendix B, Case 57. 
276. See infra Appendix B, Case 203. 
277. See infra Appendix B, Case 214. 
278. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 23, 31, 32, 36, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 69, 73, 82, 
89, 92, 181, 194. 
279. See infra Appendix B, Case 51. 
280. See infra Appendix B, Case 89. 
281. See infra Appendix B, Case 17. 
282. See infra Appendices A and B, Cases 23, 31, 32, 69, 137. 
283. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 4, 9, 12, 27, 53, 66, 74, 114, 217. 
284. See infra Appendix B, Case 53. 
285. See infra Appendix B, Case 12. 
286. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 2, 24, 25, 40, 50, 57, 176, 196, 197, 203, 214. 
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Table Nine 






































































Total Cases 12 11 20  9 52 
Plaintiff First-
Instance Victories 
 8 10 10  4 32 
Defendant First-
Instance Victories 
 4  1  7  5 17 
Neither/ 
No Result 




67% 91% 59% 44% 65% 
 
Jurisdiction again was important, with plaintiffs and defendants doing 
better in cases brought in their own jurisdictions, although not to the same 
degree as in cases involving the other categories of plaintiffs. Famous plain-
tiffs prevailed in thirty-two of the forty-nine decided cases, or sixty-ªve per-
cent.288 Of these victories, eighteen were in the home jurisdiction of the plain-
tiff,289 eight cases were brought in the home jurisdiction of the defendant,290 
and four were brought in a jurisdiction that was home to both parties.291 De-
fendants prevailed in seven cases brought in their home jurisdiction,292 ªve 
brought in the plaintiffs’ jurisdiction,293 and two cases brought in a common 
jurisdiction.294 The lesser impact of jurisdiction in cases involving famous 
persons may reºect a large number of cases brought in Beijing and Shanghai, 
where courts may be less subject to local pressures, as well as the fact that many 
 
                                                                                                                      
287. Success rates were calculated as percentages of cases with reported outcomes. 
288. See infra Appendices A, B. 
289. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 2, 3, 4, 20, 24, 25, 27, 32, 37, 48, 51, 57, 59, 69, 81, 193, 
197, 208. 
290. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 9, 15, 36, 47, 50, 73, 181, 203. 
291. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 12, 40, 89, 214. In two additional plaintiff victories the rela-
tionship of the parties to the jurisdiction was unclear. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 194, 196. 
292. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 14, 21, 23, 31, 53, 61, 176. 
293. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 16, 55, 66, 72, 92. 
294. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 74, 114. In three defendant victories, the relationship of the 
parties to the jurisdiction was unclear. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 82, 210, 217. 
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such cases are brought against commercial papers, which lack the inºuence 
of their non-commercial ofªcial parents.295 
Famous persons generally lack the power and inºuence of government or 
corporate plaintiffs, but likely have greater inºuence—or at least resources—
than ordinary persons. The willingness of famous persons to sue is thus not 
as striking as that of ordinary persons. Yet the number of cases brought by 
famous plaintiffs supports the argument that defamation litigation can be an 
effective tool for those without obvious Party-state links. Such cases also show 
that courts are playing increasing roles in determining whether reputation 
rights have been violated, and that courts, in so doing, may be further deªning 
their own roles as legitimate fora for resolving a broadening range of claims. 
D. Appeals and Rehearings 
Data on appeals supports the conclusion that local protectionism is a signiª-
cant factor in ªrst-instance cases. Information on appeals was available for 86 
of the 223 cases.296 As Table Ten shows, a majority of these, 51 cases, were 
afªrmed without change on appeal. Yet when appellate courts changed or re-
versed the ªrst-instance decision, the appellate courts’ actions overwhelm-
ingly favored defendants. Eight of the 12 cases in which appellate courts 
afªrmed but altered the damage award resulted in reduced damages to the 
plaintiff;297 in only 4 cases did an appellate court order an increase in the award 
to the plaintiff.298 Likewise, 11 of the 14 cases that appellate courts reversed 
were cases in which the ªrst-instance court had ruled for the plaintiff.299 
This suggests that defendants fare better in higher-level courts, where local 
protectionism is less acute than in many ªrst-instance courts. Of the 11 plaintiff 
verdicts that were reversed, 4 were decisions in ªrst-instance courts that were 
local only to the plaintiff,300 3 were from courts that were in jurisdictions home 
to both parties,301 and 2 were from courts in the defendant’s jurisdiction.302 
 
                                                                                                                      
295. Twenty-two cases were brought against commercialized newspapers, eight against magazines, 
and twelve against ofªcial newspapers. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 2, 3, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 31, 32, 
40, 51, 55, 58, 59, 69, 89, 92, 181, 194, 196, 203, 214 (against commercialized papers); infra Appendi-
ces A, B, Cases 4, 12, 24, 36, 74, 193, 197, 217 (against magazines); infra Appendices A, B, Cases 9, 16, 
25, 27, 37, 47, 50, 56, 61, 72, 81, 82 (against ofªcial newspapers). Similarly, any pro-plaintiff bias in 
cases brought in plaintiffs’ home jurisdictions may be weak given the fact that many famous persons lack 
inºuence with local authorities. Although most observers in China state that famous people generally are 
not particularly powerful and lack inºuence in the courts, others maintain that, in some cases, in particu-
lar those involving sports stars, famous persons may have strong local ties. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 
77 (2004). 
296. See infra Appendices A, B. The total number appealed was almost certainly higher than 86, as it 
is likely that in some cases the media did not carry follow-up reports on appeals. 
297. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 4, 60, 66, 97, 100, 105, 118, 144. 
298. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 69, 81, 83, 139. 
299. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 11, 36, 55, 64, 87, 102, 146, 158, 199, 212, 215. 
300. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 11, 55, 64, 102. 
301. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 146, 158, 212.  
302. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 36, 87. In two cases the relationship of the court to the parties 
was unclear. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 199, 215. 
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No 
information 
 0  0  0  0  2 2 
 
Eight cases were subject to rehearing, or zaishen, procedures.305 All of the 
cases involved ªrst-instance judgments for plaintiffs, six of which were sub-
sequently afªrmed on appeal.306 Of the cases that were reheard, two were 
 
                                                                                                                      
303. “Other” includes one case in which defendants appealed but subsequently had their case dis-
missed when they failed to appear in court, see infra Appendices A, B, Case 98; one case in which the 
parties settled but in which the terms of the settlement were not reported, see infra Appendices A, B, 
Case 85; two cases in which information of the appellate, but not ªrst, outcome was available, see infra 
Appendices A, B, Cases 28, 41; and ªve cases where reports stated that the case had been appealed but 
provided no additional information, see infra Appendices A, B, Cases 119, 160, 161, 162, 210. 
304. Cases afªrmed but with reduced damage awards include one case where the parties settled for a 
reduced amount under court-supervised mediation. See infra Appendices A, B, Case 202. 
305. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 1, 55, 84, 124, 141, 143, 163, 221. Chinese law permits parties 
to civil cases to request that courts rehear a case for up to two years after a ªnal decision is issued. Procu-
ratorates may also request that courts rehear cases; in such cases courts must rehear the case. Such re-
quests are issued by the procuratorate’s ªling an objection to the original court decision. Courts also have 
the power to decide to rehear a case absent a request from a Party or the procuratorate. No time limita-
tion applies to procuratorate requests or court-initiated rehearings. Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa [Or-
ganization Law of the People’s Courts] arts. 12, 14, 15 (promulgated by the Fifth Nat’l People’s 
Cong., amended Sept. 2, 1983, effective Jan. 1, 1980). 
306. The two cases that were not afªrmed on appeal included one in which the appellate court issued a 
verdict for the defendant. See infra Appendices A, B, Case 55. In the other case the defendant initiated rehear-
ing procedures through the procuratorate without ªrst appealing the case. See infra Appendices A, B, Case 84. 
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afªrmed,307 one was reversed in favor of the plaintiff,308 and three were reversed 
in favor of the defendant.309 
The results of cases on appeal support claims by journalists that appellate 
courts are more likely than ªrst-instance courts to rule in favor of the media.310 
Although most cases were afªrmed, when decisions were changed, they were 
more often than not altered in favor of defendants. According to one judge, 
defamation cases are more likely than other civil cases to be appealed and are 
more likely to have the judgments reversed or altered on appeal.311 Although 
this may be due in part to the vagueness of the governing legal standards,312 
this trend also suggests that appellate courts are less prone to local protec-
tionism than are ªrst-instance courts.313 
E. Goals: Honor, Power, and Money? 
The range of goals mirrors the diversity of plaintiffs. Most defamation plain-
tiffs seek monetary damages, cessation of tortious activity, and an apology. Yet 
their goals also include stopping critical media coverage, retaliating against 
the media, restoring personal honor, and seeking an ofªcial decision different 
from one already rendered. Additionally, the reputation of the media itself is 
also often at stake—a fact that explains the media’s strong reluctance to apolo-
gize even when ordered to do so. 
Chinese and Western scholars and observers have linked China’s strong pro-
tection of reputation rights to Chinese culture and to Chinese history.314 In par-
ticular, the inclusion of provisions in the General Principles of the Civil Code 
protecting reputation rights has been attributed in part to the desire to avoid a 
return to the personal attacks of the Cultural Revolution, when media criti-
cism was often tantamount to a criminal conviction.315 The media’s contin-
ued authoritative position, and the fact that the media often speak with an ofª-
cial voice, increases such concerns: There is heightened sensitivity to the possi-
 
                                                                                                                      
307. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 84, 124. 
308. See infra Appendices A, B, Case 55. 
309. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 1, 163, 221. Information was not available on the outcome in 
two of the cases that were reheard. See infra Appendices A, B, Cases 141, 143. In one of the cases that was 
afªrmed on rehearing, the court reduced the damages payable to the plaintiff. See infra Appendices A, B, 
Case 124. 
310. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 22 (2003). 
311. See Conªdential Interview 19 (2003). 
312. Id. 
313. Local protectionism may also be a problem on appeal: In some cases newspapers have paid ªrst-
instance judgments rather than appealing the case, believing that local protectionism meant that appeal-
ing would be useless. Conªdential Interview 46 (2003). But local protectionism is generally less pro-
nounced in intermediate and provincial high courts than in basic-level courts. Relative to their lower-
level counterparts, judges in higher-level courts tend to be better trained and better positioned to resist 
external pressure. 
314. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 72 (2004) (noting that China’s history of political attacks on in-
dividuals explains its heightened concern with the protection of reputation rights). 
315. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 38 (2005) (arguing that the legacy of the Cultural Revolution 
was a primary concern in 1986, when the General Principles were drafted). 
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bility that criticism may unfairly tarnish individuals. Personal honor also plays 
a signiªcant role in defamation litigation. In some cases, plaintiffs appear to 
sue primarily in order to improve their reputation in their communities.316 
Yet concern with reputation and recent history alone do not explain cur-
rent trends in defamation litigation. This Part discusses four goals pursued by 
litigants in defamation litigation: (1) stopping critical coverage and retaliat-
ing against the media, (2) obtaining an alternative judgment to one already 
rendered, (3) obtaining money, and (4) receiving an apology. None of these 
goals is unique to Chinese defamation plaintiffs. In China, however, these goals 
highlight the twin tracks on which defamation litigation is developing. Power-
ful plaintiffs use the threat of defamation litigation and of potentially large 
damage awards to intimidate the media. But defamation litigation also serves 
other goals: Both persons in positions of power and the general populace use 
defamation litigation to contest media verdicts on wrongdoing—sometimes 
as a substitute for challenging other state actors. In addition, newspapers are 
ªercely sensitive to their own reputations when they are sued, reºecting the 
media’s continued position as an arm of the Party-state. 
1. Retaliation and Resistance 
Defamation litigation resulting from critical coverage often serves to block 
additional coverage and to retaliate against the media.317 Journalists and lawyers 
state that once an individual ªles suit for defamation, the media are more care-
ful in reporting on the matter and will avoid reprinting the original article 
that gave rise to the lawsuit.318 Although some media, most notably Caijing 
Magazine and Southern Weekend, have responded to adverse rulings in defama-
tion cases with aggressive criticism of such cases and have used coverage of 
pending cases to highlight perceived injustices, others shy away from cover-
ing cases in which they are defendants.319 
 
                                                                                                                      
316. Conªdential Interview 74 (2004); see also Conªdential Interview 35 (2005) (arguing that one rea-
son for strong defamation standards is that the ability of individuals in China to accept criticism is gen-
erally weak). 
317. See, e.g., Zhang Sizhi, Meijie Zai Shenpan Xi Qian De Kangbian—Dai Huang Yu “Nanfang 
Zhoumo” Deng Meiti Beisu Mingyu Qinquan An Lu (Xia) [Defending the Media when Sued for Defa-
mation—A Record of the Case of Dai Huang Suing “Southern Weekend” and other Media for Defama-
tion (Part II)], 1 Zhongguo Lüshi [Chinese Lawyer], Jan. 2001, at 37 (arguing that lawsuits are a 
major obstruction to media “popular opinion supervision”); Zhang Sizhi, Meijie Zai Shenpan Xi Qian De 
Kangbian—Dai Huang Yu “Nanfang Zhoumo” Deng Meiti Beisu Mingyu Qinquan An Lu (Shang) [The Defense 
of Media at the Court—A Record of the Case of Where Dai Huang, “Southern Weekend” and Other Media Were 
Sued for Defamation (Part I)], Zhongguo Lüshi [Chinese Lawyer], Dec. 2000, at 30; Fang Yuan, Rujin 
Shixing Gao Meiti [Suing the Media Becomes Fashionable], China News Agency, Nov. 23, 2001, available 
at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2001-11-23/26/141309.html (unavailable as of Nov. 9, 2005) (on ªle 
with the Harvard International Law Journal) (stating that targets of critical reports use defamation litiga-
tion to block further reporting). 
318. See Conªdential Interview 36 (2005); Conªdential Interview 69 (2004); Conªdential Interview 
71 (2004); Conªdential Interview 72 (2004) (stating that once a suit is ªled other media will be reluctant 
to run follow-up articles). 
319. There is widespread coverage of defamation litigation in the Chinese media, but some of China’s 
leading newspapers ªnd it difªcult to cover pending cases when the plaintiff is well connected. See Conªdential 
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Commentators likewise argue that targets of critical reports use defama-
tion suits to retaliate against the media.320 As one commentator noted, defama-
tion lawsuits have “become a measure of power,” as those whom the media 
have portrayed negatively bring suit to punish the media.321 The time, money, 
and reputation costs to the media can be signiªcant; litigants know that, even if 
they are unsuccessful, they may be able to cause their adversaries signiªcant 
problems. 
The use of defamation litigation to silence critical reports is not unique to 
China. Commentators on defamation litigation elsewhere, including the United 
States, have noted the use of defamation litigation to silence criticism.322 
But such strategic use of litigation is particularly noteworthy in China, where 
the media have only recently begun to commercialize and enjoy signiªcant 
autonomy over content, and where the most signiªcant critical reporting is 
done by non-local media. The fact that defamation cases in China are largely 
brought by local interests suggests that such cases are not only attempts to re-
strict the media, but also are a manifestation of center-local tensions. 
2. Alternative Judgments 
Plaintiffs in defamation cases, in particular those plaintiffs who have been 
criticized or sanctioned for wrongdoing, also use litigation to seek an alter-
native judgment to that already issued by the media or other authorities. Both 
ofªcials and ordinary persons may sue in order to obtain an alternative evalua-
tion of their conduct from the courts.323 The goal in such cases appears to be 
 
                                                                                                                      
Interview 46 (2003). Additionally, widespread coverage of defamation cases may be encouraging further 
litigation. One journalist complains that plaintiffs sue after reading reports that suggest that prevailing 
in such cases is easy. See Conªdential Interview 17 (2003). Thus, although some journalists say they will 
report on defamation cases against their publication in an attempt to inºuence the outcome, Conªdential 
Interview 22 (2003), others avoid covering their own cases so as not to encourage additional litigation. 
Conªdential Interview 17 (2003); Conªdential Interview 93 (2003). The media elsewhere have similarly 
confronted the possibility that reporting on defamation cases may encourage further litigation. See Kyu 
Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: U.S. and South Korea Compared, 13 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 231, 263 & 
n.9 (1995) [hereinafter Youm, Libel Law and the Press] (quoting Timothy W. Gleason, The Libel Climate of 
the Late Nineteenth Century: A Survey of Libel Litigation, 1884–1899, 70 Journalism Q. 893, 894 (1993) 
(noting that growing coverage of cases in Korea may encourage others to sue and drawing a parallel to 
similar developments in England in the late nineteenth century, when media agreed to a “conspiracy of 
silence” on pending cases to discourage such suits)). 
320. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 145 (2003); Tao Guofeng, Shilun Xinwen Mingyuquan Anjian 
Shenpan Zhong De Qige Wuqu [On Seven Mistakes in Judging News Defamation Cases], Xinhua Wang [Xin-
hua Net], May 27, 2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2003-05/27/content_888725.htm. 
321. Ding, supra note 129. 
322. See, e.g., Donald M. Gillmor, Power, Publicity, and the Abuse of Libel Law ix (1992) 
(stating that “[l]ibel litigation has become a devastatingly effective weapon for silencing those who dare 
to challenge the morality of power, privilege, and prestige”); Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, 
Slapp/Slappback: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & Pol. 417, 
423–24 (1991) (criticizing “strategic lawsuits against political participation” in the United States as 
being “legally meritless suits [that are] designed . . . to intimidate and harass political critics into silence 
and not to achieve the purposes for which libel law exists”); see also infra note 384 (discussing defamation 
litigation in Singapore and Malaysia). 
323. Conªdential Interview 5 (2003) (stating that targets of critical reports use defamation litigation 
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to obtain a court opinion that can be used to argue, formally or informally, 
for a reduction in the sanctions already assessed against the plaintiff,324 or to 
use the lawsuit to attempt to prove one’s innocence in the eyes of the local 
community. As with attempts to silence or retaliate against the media, the 
use of defamation litigation to obtain an alternative judgment is not unique 
to Chinese plaintiffs.325 But this is a function particularly important in China, 
where directly contesting such sanctions is often difªcult. 
For ofªcials who have already been sanctioned for misconduct, lawsuits are a 
mechanism for resisting such sanctions. Litigation may also represent the 
only means available to continue to protest one’s innocence.326 Suits are often 
brought by ofªcials trying to protect their political future. Obtaining a fa-
vorable defamation verdict may be the sole mechanism available for maintain-
ing one’s standing in the local community and in the Party-state hierarchy. 
Bringing suit may allow a plaintiff to highlight inaccuracies in the media’s 
reports that would otherwise be taken as fact by superiors, and also demon-
strates to superiors that the plaintiff contests the charges against him or her.327 
A plaintiff’s goal may not be actually to win a judgment against the media, 
but only to demonstrate publicly that he or she contests the allegations.328 
There is, however, a risk in doing so: Bringing suit also may highlight al-
leged misconduct and give a bad impression to superiors.329 Given the risks 
involved, defamation litigation appears most likely to serve as a defense against 
rising pressure, not as a strategic tool for career advancement. 
Non-powerful plaintiffs also use defamation litigation to protest their in-
nocence and seek alternative judgments. Defamation litigation may serve as 
a proxy for an ordinary person’s struggle against local authorities.330 The goal of 
plaintiffs in such cases may be the symbolic value of a favorable court opin-
ion rather than money.331 Litigation may help to combat a perceived injus-
tice against the plaintiff. For example, for an ordinary person wrongly detained 
and then released, suing the police may not be possible; suing the media for 
reporting on the detention, however, offers a measure of redress. Strong tra-
 
                                                                                                                      
to clear their names). 
324. Conªdential Interview 72 (2004). 
325. Cf. Bezanson, supra note 24, at 162 (stating that, in the United States the “act of suing, itself, 
represents a public and ofªcial form of response and denial, legitimating the plaintiff’s claim of falsity”); 
James J. Nelson, Culture, Commerce and the Constitution, Legal and Extra-Legal Restraints on Freedom of Ex-
pression in the Japanese Publishing Industry, 15 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 45, 54 (1996) (noting an emphasis in 
Japan on restoring an individual’s reputation). 
326. Conªdential Interview 77 (2004). 
327. Conªdential Interview 155 (2003). 
328. Conªdential Interview 71 (2004); see also Chi Tian & Xue An, Tanguan De “Mianzi Guan” [Cor-
rupt Ofªcial’s “Outlook Based on Face”] (on ªle with the Harvard International Law Journal) (stating that 
the point of such suits is often to reduce pressure from the media). 
329. Cf. Conªdential Interview 69 (2004) (stating that ofªcials who bring suit are careful to make 
sure that doing so will be beneªcial to them). 
330. Conªdential Interview 55 (2005); Conªdential Interview 71 (2004). 
331. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 71 (2004) (discussing a case in Guizhou against Legal Daily in 
which the plaintiff demanded one yuan in compensation). 
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ditional emphasis on maintaining one’s reputation may also play a role in the 
degree to which plaintiffs persevere in bringing defamation cases.332 Challeng-
ing the media in court allows individuals to maintain their claim to inno-
cence in the eyes of the local community—and may permit plaintiffs to blame 
the courts if they do not prevail. The choice to pursue such grievances through 
the formal legal system also suggests that ordinary persons see the courts as 
legitimate and credible fora for pursuing such claims. 
3. Money 
Obtaining money damages is also a goal of both powerful plaintiffs and 
ordinary persons, and it supports the joint goals of retaliating and resisting the 
media. For the powerful, in particular for corporate plaintiffs, the threat of 
large damage awards is an important tool for silencing and punishing the me-
dia. For ordinary persons, damage awards serve ªnancial interests and also to 
vindicate plaintiffs’ claims. 
Journalists, judges, and lawyers argue that many litigants act primarily in 
the pursuit of monetary damages.333 Although most awards are small, the risk 
of large awards can be signiªcant, particularly in cases brought by corpora-
tions. As a result, some in the media are beginning to alter how they oper-
ate, placing greater emphasis on accuracy and on preserving evidence. The 
threat of large damage awards may be the most signiªcant factor leading the 
media to change how they cover the news.334 
Virtually all of the plaintiffs in the 223 cases reviewed sought monetary 
damages.335 The median plaintiff demand was 190,000 yuan.336 Actual awards 
were signiªcantly lower. The median ªrst-instance award in cases resulting 
in plaintiff victories was 15,000 yuan, or about eight percent of the median 
amount demanded.337 
 
                                                                                                                      
332. Chinese commentators equate protecting reputation with saving “face.” See, e.g., Tao Hui, 
Mianzi, Mingyu, Mingyu Quan [Face, Reputation, and the Right to Reputation], ChinaLawInfo, Nov. 24, 
2002, http://chinalawinfo.com/weekly/pastpub/ºzk42-academic.htm (unavailable as of Nov. 9, 2005) (on 
ªle with the Harvard International Law Journal). Traditional concern with reputation in Chinese society 
does not, however, appear to have played a signiªcant role in the debate leading up to the adoption of 
legal provisions regarding defamation.  
333. Conªdential Interview 65 (2004); Conªdential Interview 76 (2004); Conªdential Interview 77 
(2004). 
334. At least some publications now require potentially controversial articles to be reviewed by law-
yers. Conªdential Interview 14 (2003). Most major papers have also established legal departments to deal 
with the wide range of legal issues they now confront. Conªdential Interview 46 (2003). Journalists say 
that experience in defamation litigation has made them more attentive to factual reporting and to avoid-
ing biased or overly emotional reporting. Conªdential Interview 19 (2003); Conªdential Interview 23 
(2003). Journalists have also united—in conferences and on websites—to discuss the rising threat of 
defamation litigation and to discuss strategies for combating such cases. 
Chinese lawyers who represent or work for media outlets state that insurance against defamation 
claims is not available in China. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004). 
335. See infra Appendices A, B. 
336. See infra Appendices A, B. Information on the amounts that plaintiffs demanded was available in 
146 cases. See infra Appendices A, B. 
337. See infra Appendices A, B. Information regarding the size of ªrst-instance awards was available in 
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There have, however, been some large awards, including a ªrst-instance 
judgment of 5.8 million yuan to a company that sued after reports incorrectly 
stated that one of the company’s key patents was invalid. Nearly the entire 
award was levied against the rival company that had supplied the informa-
tion to the media rather than against the media. The case was afªrmed on 
appeal, but the SPC subsequently reheard the case and reduced the judgment to 
900,000 yuan.338 Two other cases that resulted in ªrst-instance judgments of 
one million yuan or more were likewise brought by corporate plaintiffs claim-
ing harm to their businesses.339 
The largest ªrst-instance award to an individual plaintiff was a judgment 
of 639,563 yuan to the wife of a reporter against a newspaper in Hainan Prov-
ince. A court in the plaintiff’s home province of Hunan found that the newspa-
per had falsely reported that the plaintiff’s husband was a “fake reporter.”340 
As a result of the report, the husband had been severely beaten while carry-
ing out an investigation in Hainan.341 The largest ªrst-instance award to an 
ofªcial plaintiff was a ªrst-instance judgment of 420,000 yuan to a prison that 
sued following a report regarding a prison sex scandal that the prison argued 
had harmed its reputation.342 
Courts have extensive discretion in awarding damages, particularly emo-
tional damages, in defamation cases.343 Such discretion facilitates granting 
large damage awards in some cases. In awarding emotional damages in tort 
cases, courts generally look to a range of factors, including the seriousness of 
the harm; whether the harmed person was a “weak” or vulnerable person (and 
thus deserving of additional compensation); the ability of the defendant to 
pay an award; the degree to which the defendant proªted from his or her ac-
tions; how similar cases have been handled; and the amount of emotional dam-
ages given for other tort claims in the same jurisdiction or region.344 For exam-
ple, the award of 300,000 yuan in favor of real-estate and ªnancial-data-
services company Fountain in its action against Caijing Magazine was justiªed 
 
                                                                                                                      
120 cases. Total amounts awarded include economic and emotional damages and also, where speciªed by 
a court decision, lawyer fees. Court fees are not included in damage calculations. Id.  
Even when plaintiffs do not obtain large awards, there may be economic value in bringing suit. In 
some cases, ordinary people may bring suit in order to make themselves famous. Conªdential Interview 
69 (2004). Likewise, lawsuits brought by businesses may be designed to raise the proªle of the plaintiff 
and its products. Conªdential Interview 22 (2003); Conªdential Interview 101 (2003). In some cases, 
reporters or publications attempt to use defamation litigation to increase their own proªles. Fang, supra 
note 317; Conªdential Interview 98 (2003).  
338. See infra Appendix B, Case 124. The ªrst-instance court had ordered the two defendant newspa-
pers to pay 100,000 yuan each and the defendant company to pay 5.8 million yuan. On appeal, the SPC 
increased the amount to be paid by the papers to 330,000 yuan each but reduced the award against the 
defendant company to 240,000 yuan. Id. 
339. See infra Appendix B, Case 105; infra Appendix B, Case 147. 
340. See infra Appendix B, Case 79. 
341. Id. 
342. See infra Appendix B, Case 100. The award was reduced to 11,858 yuan on appeal. Id. 
343. Conªdential Interview 64 (2004). 
344. Id.; Conªdential Interview 67 (2004). 
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by Caijing’s widespread distribution, the magazine’s ability to pay the award, 
and the magazine’s proªt.345 
Some in the media say that the risk of large damage awards now has a signiª-
cant impact on decisions whether to carry certain stories, especially for ag-
gressive media outlets such as Southern Weekend and Caijing Magazine.346 De-
mands by corporate plaintiffs often run into the millions of yuan.347 Journal-
ists likewise comment that the threat of defamation litigation has altered their 
reporting.348 In the past, journalists were primarily concerned with political 
risks associated with publishing articles, in particular critical reports; in recent 
years, economic concerns have come to be nearly as signiªcant.349 Yet although 
the economic consequences of an adverse defamation judgment can be signiª-
cant,350 these economic risks are rarely “life-threatening” to publications, as 
political mistakes can be.351 
Others in the media, however, contend that economic disincentives are 
not as important for defendants as they are for plaintiffs. Media defendants 
will be more concerned with their reputation than with the ªnancial risk of los-
ing a case.352 Lawyers for the media state that awards against the media are 
generally modest and are only a fraction of the amount demanded.353 In Shang-
hai, for example, judgments rarely exceed 50,000 yuan,354 and lawyers state 
that the ªnancial risk of defamation judgments is minor.355 Lawyers else-
where comment that, even in cases where courts act unfairly to protect local 
plaintiffs, the amounts awarded will generally be only a fraction of the amount 
demanded by the plaintiff.356 In most cases, courts are careful not to grant 
awards that are excessively large, in part to avoid encouraging additional litiga-
tion.357 
Even if awards are modest, the cost and time associated with defamation cases 
can be signiªcant. One journalist for a national magazine commented that 
the magazine spent 40,000 yuan on legal fees in a case it eventually won.358 
 
                                                                                                                      
345. Conªdential Interview 65 (2004). The court did not explicitly mention these factors in its deci-
sion; instead, it said that the award was justiªed by the speciªc circumstances of the case. Luohu District 
Court Opinion, supra note 209, at 173. 
346. Conªdential Interview 77 (2004). 
347. See id. (stating that, when claims are brought by corporations for reports about misconduct, there 
is a signiªcant potential for a large award against the media). 
348. Conªdential Interview 10 (2003). 
349. Conªdential Interview 14 (2003). 
350. Conªdential Interview 93 (2003). 
351. Conªdential Interview 14 (2003). 
352. See Conªdential Interview 76 (2004). 
353. See Conªdential Interview 74 (2004). 
354. Id. 
355. See Conªdential Interview 75 (2004). 
356. See Conªdential Interview 71 (2004); Conªdential Interview 101 (2003) (stating that, in many 
cases the amount in dispute is only a few thousand yuan). 
357. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004). 
358. See Conªdential Interview 10 (2003); see also Conªdential Interview 17 (2003) (discussing the 
high cost of legal fees in defamation cases); Conªdential Interview 39 (2003). Lawyers in some defama-
tion cases operate on contingency fees; in others, lawyers may seek to have their fees covered by the op-
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In many cases, the costs of litigation exceed the size of the award against the 
media.359 As a result, in some cases—in particular where the media believe that 
local protectionism means they have little chance of success—defendants do 
not bother to attend the trial, choosing instead to rely on written submissions 
to the court.360 
Defamation judgments have a signiªcant effect on individual journalists 
as well. In addition to any personal liability that journalists may face, inter-
nal rules at newspapers generally require journalists to pay a percentage of 
defamation judgments against the paper resulting from their articles, rang-
ing from ten percent at Workers Daily, to twenty or thirty percent at some mu-
nicipal papers, to ªfty percent at the Beijing Youth Daily.361 Journalists who 
lose defamation cases may also face difªculties ªnding work as a journalist in 
the future.362 Some reporters have been convicted of criminal slander, including 
in cases where they have refused to settle a civil defamation claim.363 
4. Apology 
Plaintiffs are not the only parties whose reputations are at stake. Most plain-
tiffs in defamation cases demand an apology from the defendant, and courts 
that rule in favor of plaintiffs generally order defendants to apologize. The me-
dia’s strong aversion to complying with such orders demonstrates that the me-
dia too have strong reputational interests at stake in defamation litigation. 
In a system in which the media remain accountable to higher level ofªcials, 
 
                                                                                                                      
posing party. Conªdential Interview 111 (2003); see also Conªdential Interview 69 (2004) (stating that 
lawyers representing plaintiffs in defamation cases generally do so on a contingent basis). Others, how-
ever, handle cases for free in order either to boost their own proªle or to ensure good relations with the 
media. Conªdential Interview 72 (2004) (stating that, in some cases, lawyers represent defamation plain-
tiffs for free in the hope that the case will enable the lawyer to become famous); Conªdential Interview 
76 (2004); Conªdential Interview 67 (2004) (stating that lawyers sometimes undertake defamation cases 
pro bono to obtain positive media coverage of their own work, or out of a sense of social responsibility); 
Conªdential Interview 69 (2004) (stating that one lawyer undertakes defamation cases in exchange for 
free advertising from the media); Conªdential Interview 36 (2005) (arguing that it is impossible for 
lawyers to make money in defamation cases). 
359. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004); Conªdential Interview 69 (2004). 
360. Conªdential Interview 71 (2004). U.S. literature on the ªnancial risk to the media of defamation 
litigation presents a mixed picture. Compare Logan, supra note 64, at 517, 523 (stating that “media de-
fendants end up paying out only a tiny fraction of the damages claimed by aggrieved plaintiffs, and only 
a small portion of that awarded by juries” and that “the chance that a libel plaintiff [in the United States] 
will bring a broadcaster or publisher to its knees approaches zero”), with Brian C. Murchison et al., Sulli-
van’s Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 7, 11 & n.9 (1994) (argu-
ing that, “[w]hile the incidence of judgments against the press [in the United States] is very low . . . the 
cost to the press of obtaining favorable judgments is crushing”). 
361. Conªdential Interview 75 (2004); Conªdential Interview 22 (2003); Conªdential Interview 23 
(2003); Conªdential Interview 101 (2003).  
362. Wei Yongzheng, Shixian Yulun Jiandu He Baohu Mingyu Quan De Pingheng [Balancing Protection of 
Freedom of Speech and Protection of Reputation Rights], Zhongguo Xinwen Chuanbo Xue Pinglun 
[China Journalism Review], http://www.cjr.com.cn/node2/node26108/node30205/node30212/ 
node30213/userobject7ai1689.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).  
363. See, e.g., Wang Rujin & Zeng Zepei, Xinwen Gongzuo Zhe Yu Xinwen Jiufen [Journalists and News 
Disputes], 9 Xinwen Zhanxian [News Frontline] (2001), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/ 
paper79/4307/493946.html. 
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apologies carry political costs: Adverse judgments may undermine both popular 
and Party-state conªdence in the media. 
In cases in which plaintiffs prevail, courts generally order defendants to 
publish a court-approved apology in the same position in the paper as the of-
fending article.364 Yet in many cases, the media ignore court instructions 
that they apologize,365 complying only if plaintiffs request that the court com-
pel enforcement.366 Judges comment that the media will pay defamation judg-
ments, but rarely apologize.367 
The media take a variety of steps to avoid apologizing. Newspapers some-
times publish corrections that do not include an apology.368 Doing so allows 
the paper to downplay its errors. For example, after a court in Hubei ordered 
the media to apologize for a report that detailed a student’s affair with an older 
man, the defendant ran a short correction instead of an apology.369 Editors 
and journalists also try to persuade plaintiffs to drop demands that they apolo-
gize. Journalists state that, at times issuing a correction is sufªcient to per-
suade a plaintiff to drop a demand for an apology. In other cases, media defen-
dants will agree to pay a plaintiff a greater sum than that speciªed in the judg-
ment in return for agreement that the plaintiff will not require an apology370 
or will issue a written apology to the plaintiff but will refuse to print the apol-
ogy in the paper.371 In cases brought by corporations, the media may offer, in 
 
                                                                                                                      
364. Conªdential Interview 64 (2004). 
365. In contrast, the media generally do pay monetary awards against them. Conªdential Interview 
60 (2004); Conªdential Interview 75 (2004) (stating the media will pay rather than apologize). This 
appears to be partially due to the fact that most awards are not large and partially because the media have 
a more difªcult time hiding their ªnancial resources and bank accounts than do other defendants. Id. 
This ªnding contrasts with other areas of civil litigation, where enforcement of judgments remains a 
major problem. See, e.g., Qu Xuezhi, Xiao Yang: Jiejue Zhixing Nan Yi Kao Zhidu Er Kao Lifa [Xiao Yang: 
Resolving Problems in Enforcing Judgments Requires Consideration of the System and of Legislation], Renmin 
Wang [People’s Net], Mar. 13, 2005, http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/42735/3239650.html; Zhixing 
Nan (Benqi Huati) [The Difªculty of Enforcement (Topic of This Edition)], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 
Dec. 3, 2003, at 13, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/10785/979733.html (discuss-
ing the difªculty of enforcing judgments). 
366. Conªdential Interview 67 (2004); Conªdential Interview 76 (2004); see also Conªdential Inter-
view 69 (2004) (stating that media will apologize only if they are compelled to do so); Conªdential In-
terview 74 (2004). 
367. Conªdential Interview 65 (2004). One judge estimated that only ten to twenty percent of media 
defendants ordered to apologize actually do so. Conªdential Interview 62 (2004). 
368. Conªdential Interview 62 (2004); Conªdential Interview 68 (2004); Conªdential Interview 69 
(2004). Although regulations governing the media explicitly authorize a right of reply for the plaintiff, 
see supra Part I.A, in practice, such a right has rarely, if ever, been enforced. Conªdential Interview 72 
(2004); Conªdential Interview 76 (2004). 
369. Conªdential Interview 68 (2004). 
370. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004); see also Conªdential Interview 74 (2004) (commenting that the 
media will attempt to ªnd a way to negotiate a settlement rather than apologize). 
371. Conªdential Interview 66 (2004). The media may also have interests other than reputation and 
money that encourage them to resolve cases amicably. The media may be concerned that defamation 
cases, in particular those resulting from criticism of ofªcial action, may harm their relationships with 
ofªcial actors and institutions—on whom they rely on for news—more generally. Conªdential Interview 
76 (2004). 
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lieu of an apology, to run a positive article about the plaintiff, or to publish a 
free advertisement for the plaintiff.372 
Even when the media do issue an apology, they often take steps to lessen 
its impact. In some cases the media will apologize but make clear that they are 
being forced to do so.373 In cases in which they do apologize, the apology will 
be terse374 or located in an obscure position in the paper.375 
Courts have the power to publish an announcement or the full court deci-
sion in a prominent newspaper and to force the defendant to pay related costs, 
but they rarely do so.376 The lack of enforcement of orders to apologize is in 
part explained by plaintiffs’ reluctance to pursue such enforcement. As one 
judge explained, plaintiffs generally will not seek to compel enforcement of 
a judgment if the defendant pays the monetary judgment; many plaintiffs 
are more interested in money damages than in a printed apology.377 
The media’s reluctance to apologize reºects its continued dependence on 
the Party-state. Observers say that newspapers’ concern with their own image 
explains their reluctance to apologize.378 Such concern may be due in part to 
worries that apologizing will harm the newspapers’ market position, as read-
ers will not trust a media outlet that seems to make mistakes.379 Yet even 
more important are concerns that apologizing will result in problems for the 
media with those in the higher part of the Party-state hierarchy. As one journal-
ist explained, the media are concerned that admitting errors will “give a bad 
impression” to ofªcials who oversee them.380 If the media pay damage awards to 
plaintiffs, such actions are likely to go unnoticed. But media that are perceived 
frequently to commit errors risk harming relations with the Party-state, and 
such relationships are more important than money to the media’s long-term 
interests.381 
The observation that more than money is at stake in defamation actions is 
not unique to China.382 In China, however, the goals of both plaintiffs and de-
fendants reºect the institutional backdrop against which such cases arise. Media 
concerns reºect their ofªcial status; likewise judgments in favor of individu-
 
                                                                                                                      
372. Conªdential Interview 83 (2004). 
373. Conªdential Interview 60 (2004). 
374. Conªdential Interview 65 (2004). 
375. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 68 (2004); Conªdential Interview 75 (2004); Conªdential Inter-
view 76 (2004). 
376. Conªdential Interview 65 (2004). 
377. Conªdential Interview 62 (2004). 
378. See Conªdential Interview 60 (2004).  
379. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004). 
380. Conªdential Interview 74 (2004); see also Conªdential Interview 76 (2004) (stating that, if the 
media are frequently sued, Party-state leaders will criticize the media for having “problems”).  
381. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004) (stating that the “economic incentive is not important [in 
defamation cases]; it is the relationship”). Concern with the media’s own reputation also explains why the 
media often refuse to settle frivolous cases, even when doing so would be far cheaper than litigating. See 
Conªdential Interview 69 (2004); Conªdential Interview 74 (2004). 
382. Cf. Bezanson, supra note 24, at 80, 93 (stating that most U.S. libel plaintiffs sue for “reputa-
tion-related reasons” or to obtain an apology, not money). 
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als may serve to vindicate personal struggles against authority in ways that 
distinguish defamation actions in China from defamation litigation in the 
West. The fact that plaintiffs are able to win defamation cases in China—and 
that the odds of winning appear high—may give incentives to those with griev-
ances against the media to pursue such actions in court. As a result, courts 
may play roles in addressing such grievances that other ofªcial actors—be they 
prosecutors, propaganda departments, or local governments—either will not 
or cannot undertake. 
III. Intimidation and Innovation 
Comparative discussions suggest two dominant perspectives for under-
standing the role of defamation law and litigation. In Western legal history 
(most notably in the doctrine of seditious libel), as in many single-party states 
today, defamation litigation served as a tool for maintaining the authority of 
the state. In modern democratic societies, in contrast, defamation litigation 
is most often understood as reºecting a legal system’s attempt to balance the 
interests of a free press and vigorous criticism of government with individuals’ 
reputational rights.383 
The data in Part II reveal similarities between the recent evolution of defa-
mation litigation in China and experience elsewhere. But such evidence also 
suggests that defamation litigation is playing additional roles in China. In 
China, defamation litigation serves also as a manifestation of the instrumen-
tal use of law in local-center conºicts, as a reºection of the increased willingness 
and ability of individuals to use the legal system to pursue rights-based griev-
ances, and as a mechanism for enhancing the authority and importance of 
the courts. 
A. Imposing Control and Respect 
Part II shows that defamation litigation is a tool for restraining critical media 
coverage, in particular of ofªcials, Party-state entities, and businesses. So under-
stood, defamation litigation serves to counterbalance the expansion of edito-
rial autonomy that has followed from rapid commercialization of the Chinese 
media. The development of defamation litigation into a tool to restrict the me-
dia suggests parallels between China and other single-party states in which 
defamation litigation is used to target dissident voices and political opponents. 
For example, parallels can be drawn between defamation litigation in China and 
in Singapore.384 
 
                                                                                                                      
383. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis, 1 J. 
Media L. & Prac. 3, 3 (1980) (“[T]he law of defamation in a society reºects . . . the assumptions of that 
society respecting the relative importance of an untarnished reputation . . . and an uninhibited press.”). 
384. Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual and the Collective, A Comparison, 
12 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 739, 775 (1998) (discussing the use of defamation law to curtail the media in 
Singapore); see also Scott L. Goodroad, The Challenge of Free Speech: Asian Values v. Unfettered Free Speech, an 
Analysis of Singapore and Malaysia in the New Global Order, 9 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 259, 278, 287 
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Recent trends in China also resemble the historical development of libel 
law in England as a tool for maintaining state control, as well as the devel-
opment of the “seditious libel” doctrine in the United States.385 The growth 
of defamation cases in China following the development of commercialized 
media in the 1990s appears akin to the aggressive use of libel laws in seven-
teenth-century America in response to the development of the printing press.386 
The use of litigation by judges to respond to criticism also parallels the de-
velopment of the “scandalizing the court” doctrine in English law387 and the 
use of contempt powers by U.S. judges prior to the 1940s.388 
Defamation litigation in China reºects concern that critical reporting may 
undermine the authority of, and popular conªdence in, the Party-state. These 
concerns resonate with concerns in early English libel law with preventing a 
decline in public respect for authority, as well as with maintaining the “good 
names of England’s commercial elite.”389 Faced with criticism that risks un-
 
                                                                                                                      
(1998) (discussing the use of contempt-of-court provisions to limit criticism of the state in Singapore and 
Malaysia). 
385. See Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of 
Law and Libel 4 (1986) (discussing the development of libel law in England as a tool for targeting 
political enemies and for blocking risks to the King’s peace); Michael Newcity, Libel Law Then and Now: 
A Review Essay, 1989 Wisc. L. Rev. 359, 389 (1989) (noting the early nineteenth-century consensus 
view among U.S. leaders “that restrictive libel laws encouraged virtuous men to seek public ofªce and 
protected public opinion from corruption by licentious publications”); see also David Riesman, Democracy 
and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 727, 735–37 (1942) (noting the use of defa-
mation law in England to limit “criticism of the reigning powers,” as well as nineteenth-century French 
laws concerning “contempt against the government”). 
Similar arguments have been made regarding the importance of provisions in China’s imperial codes 
regarding insult and false accusation in maintaining social order. See Zhang Xinbao, Mingyu Quan De 
Falü Baohu [Legal Protection of Reputation Rights], 52–53 (1997) (stating that one purpose of 
ancient Chinese “defamation law” was to maintain the “feudal hierarchy and governing order”). 
386. See Rosenberg, supra note 385, at 17 (discussing seventeenth-century defamation litigation in 
the American colonies). 
387. Although the doctrine has been unused in England for most of the past century, it continues to 
play a role in other common law jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Patrick Anthony Chinamasa, 2000 (2) ZLR 
322 (Zimbabwe Supreme Court) (holding that the offence of scandalizing the court is still justiªable 
because “unlike other public ªgures, judges have no other proper forum in which to reply to criticisms”); 
Attorney-General v. Lingle, [1995] 1 SLR 696 (Sing.) (ªnding author, editor, publisher, printer, and distributor 
of a newspaper guilty of contempt for publishing an article imputing bias to the judiciary); Chokolingo 
v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1980) 1 All E.R. 244, 248 (UKPC) (stating that the doc-
trine of “scandalizing the court” is used against publications that are “calculated to undermine the au-
thority of the courts and public conªdence in the administration of justice”); see also Geoffrey Robert-
son & Andrew Nicol, Media Law 389–91 (2002) (describing the doctrine as “anachronistic” and 
nearly obsolete in English law but noting that the doctrine “has been invoked as an instrument of oppres-
sion to silence honest criticism of biased judges” in other Commonwealth countries); Barfod v. Denmark, 
149 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (1989) (stating that restrictions on criticism of judges were “necessary in a democ-
ratic society,” and that the state had a “legitimate interest in protecting” judges from “a defamatory 
accusation against the lay judges personally, which was likely to lower them in the public esteem and was 
put forward without any supporting evidence”). 
388. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263–68 (1941) (tracing the history of contempt by pub-
lication in the United States); see also Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by Publication in the 
United States—To the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 401, 406 (1928) (tracing the history of 
contempt by publication in the United States and noting that “[c]ontempt by publication often comes 
very close to seditious libel”). 
389. Rosenberg, supra note 385, at 5. 
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dermining popular conªdence, China’s local elite have likewise turned to defa-
mation litigation as a mechanism for curtailing threats to their authority. De-
spite the central Party-state’s concern with curbing local malfeasance, defa-
mation litigation is consistent with a policy of not permitting excessive me-
dia criticism. 
Yet defamation litigation in China cannot be explained simply as an attempt 
by an authoritarian regime to restrict press freedom. For four principal rea-
sons, parallels with the use of defamation litigation to constrain the media 
elsewhere may not be as deep as ªrst impressions indicate. First, although defa-
mation law may comport with other state controls imposed on the media in 
China, defamation litigation is not a necessary tool for doing so. As Haier’s case 
against Chen Yicong shows, many in the Chinese media are wary of criticiz-
ing even prominent corporations. The central Chinese Party-state does not 
use defamation litigation to constrain the media; it has other mechanisms for 
doing so, including a strict licensing system that limits new media entrants 
and a system of severe sanctions for publications and journalists who over-
step the bounds of permissible content.390 The dearth of reports critical of 
high-ranking ofªcials and government entities does not stem from the threat 
of defamation litigation. Instead, it reºects a system in which editors, journal-
ists, and media outlets risk closure or jail if they engage in such reporting.391 
Thus, although defamation litigation has grown in response to the commer-
cialization of the media, it does not reºect a loosening of direct state controls 
on the media.392 
The possibility that the General Principles’ provisions on defamation law 
were adopted in part because of their usefulness in controlling speech cannot 
be completely discounted. Proposals considered at the same time to protect the 
media explicitly through a media law were not adopted. The enactment of 
the General Principles coincided with ofªcial steps to reign in media that had 
become increasingly open in the 1980s, in particular by cracking down on those 
 
                                                                                                                      
390. See, e.g., Conªdential Interview 69 (2004) (commenting that high-ranking ofªcials rely on other 
mechanisms to block unfavorable coverage—and do not need to rely on defamation litigation to do so); 
Conªdential Interview 72 (2004) (stating that any decrease in critical reports in the Chinese media in 
recent years is unlikely to be the result of defamation litigation, because there are other more-important 
factors at work, and that the primary concern of journalists and editors with publishing critical reports 
about high-ranking ofªcials is not that they will be sued as a result, but instead that they will be pun-
ished in other ways); see also Overseas Press Club of America, Journalists in Jail—and How to Help Them 
(2003) (listing journalists in jail in China); cf. Dennis L. Wilcox, Black African States, in Press Control 
Around the World 209, 226 (Jane Lefwich Curry & Joan R. Dassin eds., 1982) (noting that libel laws 
are used to constrain the media in many African nations but that “nations with a wholly owned govern-
ment press saw no relevance” of libel laws being used in that manner). 
391. Some in China discount the degree to which defamation litigation is an impediment to effective 
media oversight, noting that high-ranking ofªcials do not rely on defamation litigation to stop critical 
reporting by the media. Wei, supra note 362. 
392. That defamation law in China has developed despite a lack of weakening of other forms of state 
control suggests an important difference from the evolution of defamation law in Anglo-American law. 
Cf. Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 Stan. L. 
Rev. 661, 665 (1985) (arguing that seditious libel developed in English law only after other means of 
restraining the press, such as licensing and treason, became unusable). 
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publishing without authorization. Nevertheless, these concerns do not ap-
pear to have been prominent. Most discussions of the rationales behind the 
inclusion of reputation rights in the General Principles focus on the need, as 
noted, to avoid a return to the personal attacks of the Cultural Revolution393 
as well as on concern with bringing China into line with international prac-
tice.394 There was little reason for drafters to be concerned with aggressive me-
dia coverage undermining state authority. China’s media had yet to commer-
cialize, and controlling local ofªcials was likely of greater concern than was 
controlling the media. 
Second, defamation litigation in China has emerged as an important weapon 
for powerful local interests to resist either external or higher-ranking over-
sight. In China, the media, in particular central Party-state media, are a cru-
cial tool for state oversight of local ofªcials. Defamation litigation by local 
ofªcials and state entities is a manifestation of tension between the media, 
which, in the process of commercialization, have also become more aggres-
sive, and local targets of such criticism.395 The drafters of the General Prin-
ciples almost certainly did not envision that defamation litigation would de-
velop so quickly into a tool for local interests to resist oversight; neither ag-
gressive criticism of local authorities nor the use of formal law to resist cen-
tral oversight was common in 1987. 
Third, the use of defamation law in Western legal history and in contempo-
rary single-party states to constrain the media has in general reºected efforts 
to prevent nonstate actors from challenging state authority. Despite com-
mercialization, the Chinese media remain an arm of the Party-state. Hence, 
defamation litigation in China reºects rival claims to authority rather than at-
tempts to constrain nonstate media (or to balance the interests of competing 
nonstate actors). The Chinese media cannot be understood as representing the 
speech rights of society against the state. In China, the growth of the com-
mercialized media has presented local ofªcials with direct challenges to their 
authority—which were previously rare. But the willingness of targets of critical 
reports to sue is also a challenge to the media, and thus to their traditional 
authoritative position. 
Fourth, Chinese defamation litigation is also a manifestation of attempts 
to increase the authority of China’s courts—both by restraining criticism of the 
courts and by encouraging a greater range of disputes in the courts. Such actions 
contrast with the efforts of their earlier counterparts in the United States, 
 
                                                                                                                      
393. Wang Liming et al., Renge Quan Yu Xinwen Qinquan [Personal Rights and News 
Torts] 82 (2000), Xu, Fourth Wave, supra note 51, at 34. 
394. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 385, at 84–85, 227–30 (discussing Soviet inºuence on the General 
Principles of Civil Law). Defamation law was not an entirely imported concept: Chinese scholars have 
argued that China’s imperial codes included provisions analogous to modern defamation law. Provisions 
on defamation were also included in a draft civil code prepared in the ªnal years of the Qing Dynasty; the 
provisions were not adopted, but they were used as a basis for similar provisions in the Republican-era 
code. Id. at 227; Wang, supra note 393, at 82. 
395. Xu, Fourth Wave, supra note 51, at 19–33. 
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England, and the Commonwealth countries that adopted the “scandalizing 
the court” doctrine. In such countries, court actions were justiªed by the need 
to preserve authority; in China, courts are attempting to construct authority. 
To be sure, the distinction between constructing and preserving authority is 
a rough one. It is no coincidence that the “scandalizing the court” doctrine 
appears most important in countries or periods in which judicial authority is 
or has been weak. But the doctrine developed in systems in which courts were 
recognized as having important historical claims to authority. In China, in 
contrast, judges have only recently begun to assert claims to authority and re-
spect; historically they have been weak actors. Defamation litigation, like re-
strictions on media coverage of the courts, can thus be understood as part of 
an effort to construct popular (and media) respect for the courts. Such actions 
may be one of the few routes available to courts to exert their own authority 
and to express displeasure with their low status and with external criticism.396 
Chinese judges argue that such cases must be understood in light of what 
they perceive to be widespread disrespect for their work. According to judges, 
critical media reports encourage such disrespect, and articles that fan such 
disrespect are often inaccurate.397 Judges complain that they have limited 
contempt powers because their ability to take action against those who fail 
to respect the court is restricted to those persons who actually disrupt court 
procedures.398 In addition, judges note that existing law clearly permits both 
individuals and legal persons, including ofªcials, to bring defamation suits.399 
The use of defamation litigation to restrict oversight of local misconduct 
suggests a signiªcant diversion from the original goals that defamation law 
was designed to address—in particular, protecting the reputations of indi-
viduals. Viewed in comparative context, however, such a development is not 
surprising: Defamation litigation elsewhere has likewise often served the 
interests of the powerful. Moreover, although defamation litigation is a tool 
for local elites to resist scrutiny, it is also consistent with state concerns that 
an increasingly critical media will undermine conªdence in the Party-state. 
 
                                                                                                                      
396. Id.  
397. Conªdential Interview 64 (2004); Conªdential Interview 13 (2003); see also Xiaoshuo “Songli 
Guaizhao” Yinlai Guansi: Ruhe Lijie Faguan De Mingyu Quan [Litigation Caused by the Novel “An Odd Trick 
of Gift”: Understanding Judges’ Right of Reputation], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily], May 15, 2002, at 6, 
available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-05/15/content_36679.htm. 
398. Conªdential Interview 61 (2004); Conªdential Interview 65 (2004). China currently lacks provi-
sions regarding contempt of court, Xu, Youth Daily, supra note 51, although some judges have been 
arguing for such powers, Conªdential Interview 5 (2003). The Civil Procedure Law permits courts to sanction 
persons who violate court rules or disrupt court procedures, including those who do so by insulting or 
slandering judges or court ofªcers. Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law], arts. 101–02 (promul-
gated by the Seventh Nat’l Nat’l People’s Cong., Fourth Session, Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), 
2000 Laws 669. In practice, however, judges rarely take such actions. See Conªdential Interview 16 
(2003). 
399. See Conªdential Interview 65 (2004). The reputation of both courts and individual judges is of 
particular importance in a system in which judges do not enjoy tenure and in which career advancement 
is determined by how superiors inside the court system and in the Party-state more generally perceive 
one’s actions. 
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Courts’ own concerns with constructing authority and mandating respect, as 
well as their links to local authorities, have made courts receptive fora for such 
claims. 
B. Overprotecting Individual Rights? 
Defamation litigation in China cannot, however, be understood solely in 
terms of efforts to restrict or respond to critical coverage of ofªcial actors. As 
Part II shows, ordinary persons and celebrities bring a signiªcant portion of 
defamation litigation, including numerous cases in which they directly chal-
lenge ofªcial Party media outlets. The use of defamation litigation to challenge 
authority suggests an additional difference from experiences elsewhere, where 
defamation litigation developed as a tool to protect state authority. The lack 
of concern with balancing speech rights and reputation rights facilitates courts’ 
receptiveness to claims by individuals. But the growth of defamation litiga-
tion also demonstrates individuals’ increased willingness to use the formal legal 
system to pursue grievances against the state. 
The willingness of ordinary persons to challenge the ofªcial media sug-
gests the need to broaden existing understandings of litigation as a tool for 
challenging authority. Much recent literature on administrative litigation in 
China, for example, has noted the modest volume of administrative cases ªled 
each year, suggesting that the Administrative Litigation Law is not a pri-
mary tool for individuals seeking redress against the state.400 Although the total 
number of administrative cases brought in China rose throughout the 1990s, 
reaching a high of 100,921 cases in 2001, the number of new cases brought 
dropped by twenty percent in 2002.401 New cases appear to have increased 
modestly since then,402 but the volume of administrative cases remains small 
when viewed alongside the number of complaints raised through the “letters 
and visits” system for citizen complaints.403 Although many complaints raised 
through the letters and visits system likely would not be justiciable, the large 
number of complaints handled through that system suggests that it never-
theless remains far more important than administrative litigation as a chan-
nel for popular grievances. 
The prevalence of defamation cases by individuals against the ofªcial me-
dia shows that cases pitting individuals or groups of individuals against the 
 
                                                                                                                      
400. The 1989 Administrative Procedure Law permits ordinary persons to bring suit challenging 
concrete administrative actions. Xingzheng Susong Fa [Administrative Litigation Law] art. 2 
(promulgated by the Seventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Second Session, Apr. 4, 1989, effective on Oct. 1, 
1990), 2002 Administrative Litigation Law 7. At the time of enactment, the law was hailed as a 
major development. 
401. 2002 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 156. There were 80,728 new cases ªled 
in 2002. 2003 Zhongguo Fa Lü Nian Jian [Law Y.B. China] 149. 
402. Statistics on the number of administrative cases concluded—which includes data on appeals as 
well as ªrst-instance cases—show an increase of 4.7% in 2004 as compared to 2003. Xiao, supra note 71. 
403. “Letters and visits” ofªces exist at each level of the Party-state, and at most Party-state depart-
ments, to accept and handle popular grievances. For a detailed discussion of the system, see Carl Minzner, 
Xinfang: An Alternative to the Formal Chinese Legal System, 42 Stan. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2006). 
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state may exist outside the parameters of administrative litigation. Given 
the continued status of ofªcial newspapers as both the mouthpieces and the 
eyes and ears of the Party-state, the willingness of individuals to challenge 
the ofªcial media may be a signiªcant indicator of increased willingness to 
challenge local authority.404 Such cases also suggest the ability to circumvent 
the barriers to effective use of administrative litigation. Defamation cases may 
be more feasible than administrative cases because the media—in contrast to 
many defendants in administrative cases—lack the ability to take direct ac-
tion against plaintiffs. In cases brought by individuals in response to inaccu-
rate reports of personal wrongdoing, including mistaken determinations of 
guilt by the police, procuratorates, or courts, defamation litigation may pro-
vide the only available avenue of redress. In some cases the media are sued for 
accurately reporting on actions by courts or other actors—apparently be-
cause suing the media is more feasible than directly challenging such ofªcial 
actions.405 
The willingness of individuals in China to sue the media has engendered 
signiªcant criticism. Much of this is to be expected given the media’s self-
interest in reducing litigation. Journalists argue that existing law is unfair 
and encourages frivolous cases and that many such cases involve individuals 
“abusing the right to bring lawsuits.”406 Some such criticism, however, ex-
plicitly argues that, in the context of defamation law, Chinese law has become 
overprotective of individual rights at the expense of collective interests.407 
The argument that defamation law is, in cases brought by ordinary per-
sons, overprotective of individual rights contrasts with arguments that defama-
tion law serves as a tool to protect powerful local interests. This dichotomy 
may, however, be illusory. Both phenomena reºect a system in which there are 
few protections for speech. Overprotection of reputation rights does not suggest 
excessive concern with individual rights, but rather a lack of concern with bal-
ancing rights to reputation against speech interests of the media and the public’s 
right to information. Similarly, courts’ willingness to use defamation litigation 
to curb critical reporting reºects a system in which media autonomy is toler-
ated only up to a point, and only so long as it serves state interests. 
Chinese commentators explain the judicial preference for protecting repu-
tation rights over media interests by noting that constitutional protections 
 
                                                                                                                      
404. See Conªdential Interview 69 (2003) (stating that the willingness of individuals to sue is a 
signiªcant development given the traditional force of the media and popular knowledge of “who is be-
hind the media”). 
405. Conªdential Interview 77 (2004). 
406. Conªdential Interview 71 (2004); see also Conªdential Interview 69 (2004) (commenting that 
ordinary people have a “casual attitude” toward lawsuits, and thus are more and more willing to sue the 
media than in the past). The willingness of Chinese litigants to sue the media also reºects increased 
willingness of ordinary persons to ªle lawsuits more generally—suggesting that claims that litigation is 
viewed unfavorably in Chinese society are overstated. Cf. Youm, Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press, supra 
note 65, at 78 (contending that Confucian values mitigate against bringing defamation litigation in 
Korea). 
407. Conªdential Interview 77 (2004). 
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of the right to reputation have been elaborated through the General Princi-
ples.408 In contrast, no similar legislation exists implementing either the 
Constitution’s protection of freedom of speech or the right to criticize ofªcial 
actors.409 A more robust explanation may be that favoring reputation rights 
is in the state’s interest. Protection of reputation rights of ordinary persons, 
or of ofªcials, reºects a system in which the Party-state has encouraged greater 
media autonomy to increase proªt and ªght corruption in order to preserve 
the current political order. Liberalization of the media is not a goal in itself. 
The development of the media is a tool for reafªrming Party-state oversight, 
not for encouraging alternative visions of governance. 
The use of defamation litigation by ordinary persons in China contrasts 
with developments in the American system, at least in recent decades.410 Given 
the limited alternative routes of redress, the relatively low cost of bringing suit, 
the strong concerns with personal reputation, as well as a strong tradition of 
pursuing grievances, individuals in China may have greater incentives to bring 
such cases than their counterparts elsewhere.411 Such incentives are ampliªed 
by the fact that defamation law is an area in which existing law offers signiª-
cant protection of rights, something not always available to litigants challeng-
ing authority. In contrast to the West, defamation litigation in China often 
is itself a challenge to state authority. The examples set forth in Part II suggest 
that rather than representing attempts to establish and maintain community 
norms, as was the case in the early development of libel litigation involving 
individuals in the Anglo-American tradition, cases brought by individuals 
in China often represent efforts by aggrieved individuals battling against a 
range of ofªcial and quasi-ofªcial entities. 
Cases brought by individuals are also a manifestation of the increased range 
and volume of grievances in China, as well as of the expanding array of vehi-
cles for raising such complaints. Although some in China say that most per-
sons who bring such suits are relatively well educated,412 the numerous cases 
involving farmers and those not residing in major cities suggest that defamation 
litigation can also be understood as a reºection of increasing rights conscious-
 
                                                                                                                      
408. See, e.g., Huang Jixin, “Toupai”: Meiti De Quanli Xianjin He Daode Beilun [“Secret Video-Taping”: 
The Pitfalls and Moral Dilemma of the Media’s Rights], Jingji Guancha Bao [Economic Observer], Apr. 
5, 2002, available at http://home.donews.com/donews/article/2/24257.html. 
409. Conªdential Interview 72 (2004). 
410. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 385, at 15 (arguing that the “sheer complexity of mid-twentieth 
century defamation law has discouraged most ordinary citizens in England from ªling libel suits”). In 
contrast, much early defamation litigation in the American colonies involved disputes brought by and 
against individuals. Id. at 16. 
411. Low ªling fees for defamation cases in China combined with a relatively high probability of suc-
cess contrast with the situation in the United States, where plaintiffs sue despite “overwhelming, if not 
insurmountable, odds against [them].” Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Set-
ting the Record Straight, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 226, 226 (1985) [hereinafter Bezanson, Setting the Record Straight]. 
Likewise, the possibility of signiªcant awards in China contrasts with the situation in other Asian coun-
tries. Cf. Youm, Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press, supra note 54, at 80 (suggesting that small damage 
awards in Japan partly explain the scarcity of litigation). 
412. Conªdential Interview 76 (2004). 
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ness413—a trend also reºected in the rise in complaints through the letters 
and visits system and in popular protests.414 Just as the willingness of indi-
viduals to bring administrative litigation against state entities may be as impor-
tant a development as the outcomes of such cases, the willingness of individuals 
to use law to challenge the state media is a signiªcant development. Ordi-
nary persons pursuing defamation litigation may receive both ofªcial acknowl-
edgment of their claims and money damages. Yet the most important conse-
quence of such cases may be to legitimize both individuals’ ability to bring 
rights-based grievances and the role of the courts in resolving such claims. 
C. Litigation as Institutional Evolution 
Outcomes in the cases analyzed in Part II show that protectionism plays a 
signiªcant role in determining outcomes in defamation cases. The evidence also 
suggests, however, that defamation litigation is not merely a manifestation 
of the long-standing problem of local protectionism. While local interests use 
litigation as a tool for resisting central oversight, they are also legitimizing 
the role of courts as arbiters of a widening range of rights-based disputes and 
are encouraging individuals to challenge powerful institutions. The increased 
number and range of defamation cases may be encouraging the courts to inno-
vate, and, as a direct consequence, to increase their own authority. 
Local protectionism is a problem that permeates the Chinese legal system. 
Protectionism is particularly acute in defamation litigation, where the SPC’s 
Interpretation explicitly authorizes cases to be brought in the plaintiff’s domi-
cile, and where vague legal standards permit extensive court discretion. Courts 
acting on behalf of local plaintiffs in defamation cases do not merely protect 
local interests; they also facilitate retribution by targets of critical reports.415 
Lawyers who defend the media say that, in some cases, defamation disputes be-
come questions of Party-state policy, not of law, as local courts cannot avoid 
ruling without at the same time issuing a decision on the merits of the underly-
ing report. In such cases, it is extremely difªcult for the media to prevail.416 
Outside the defamation context, court action to protect local interests against 
external interests may also represent a political challenge to central author-
ity.417 In the context of defamation litigation, such challenges may have greater 
signiªcance. Such decisions are issued both against other Party-state institu-
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414. See, e.g., Lang Jinsong, Qiantan Yulun Jianduquan Jiqi Falü Baohu [A Brief Discussion of Legal Pro-
tection for Popular Opinion Supervision], Xinwen Zhanxian [News Frontline], Nov. 2000, available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper79/1980/318188.html; Wang & Zeng, supra note 363; Conªdential 
Interview 74 (2004); Conªdential Interview 22 (2003); see also Conªdential Interview 77 (2004) (stating 
that defamation litigation reºects a society in which ordinary persons are increasingly willing to chal-
lenge state authorities). 
415. See Ding, supra note 129 (arguing that targets of critical reports clearly use their inºuence over 
local courts to retaliate against the media).  
416. Conªdential Interview 77 (2004). 
417. Given Chinese courts’ weak institutional position, it is not surprising that courts act to protect 
local interests.  
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tions—the media—as opposed to against non-state actors. Moreover, such 
decisions are also at times against ofªcial central mouthpiece media, as well 
as media from other regions. The willingness of local authorities and courts to 
issue such decisions, in particular in response to critical reports from major 
Party papers, reºects the degree to which local authorities view the external 
media as a threat. Yet the willingness to act, in some cases blatantly, to resist 
and retaliate against external oversight also reºects the degree to which local 
authorities are able effectively to resist control by the center. 
The growth of defamation litigation thus shows how local authorities and 
powerful persons are using newly developed legal institutions to entrench 
their authority. Much of the literature on problems in China’s courts highlights 
the use of courts to protect local economic interests. Defamation cases—in 
particular those brought by corporations and businesses—are consistent with 
such arguments. But cases brought by local ofªcials also demonstrate the in-
strumental use of the courts to protect local political interests. Moreover, litera-
ture on local protectionism in the legal system has generally focused on the 
difªculty ordinary persons and other weak plaintiffs face when trying to use law 
to challenge local interests. Defamation litigation shows that locally power-
ful individuals and entities are also using the courts as an offensive—not just 
a defensive—tool. 
Instrumental use of law and litigation is neither new nor necessarily perni-
cious. Local authorities’ instrumental use of law may also encourage and permit 
experimentation and innovation, just as economic protectionism may have 
played an important role in China’s recent economic development.418 Observers 
of China have noted how local protectionism serves both economic and po-
litical interests; the use of defamation litigation by local authorities is a reºec-
tion of such trends. But the instrumental use of law and litigation by local 
authorities to combat external, and even central, oversight suggests a new di-
mension to local-state relations.419 Defamation litigation in Western legal his-
tory has likewise at times served instrumental goals—but generally as a tool 
for authorities (and in particular central authorities) to maintain control, not 
as a mechanism for local authorities to resist central oversight. 
One aspect of defamation litigation that distinguishes it from other examples 
of local protectionism in China is that such cases are both argued in courts 
and often reported on by the media. Such actions thus are exposed to an un-
 
                                                                                                                      
418. See Andrew H. Wedeman, From Mao to Market 21 (2003) (arguing that “rent seeking and 
local protectionism” in China have been “critically important forces for change”). 
419. The instrumental use of defamation litigation also suggests that, to the degree local protection-
ism in defamation litigation is a problem, any solution cannot be separated from larger questions of court 
reform—and in particular from questions of how to separate courts from direct oversight by local au-
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of which may assist efforts by central authorities to combat local protectionism. 
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usual level of scrutiny. Additionally, defamation litigation may permit re-
sponses by defendants that might not be possible in other cases involving 
local interests.420 That courts have become signiªcant fora for local-center and 
local-external disputes does not necessarily mean that the courts themselves 
are more authoritative. But the role courts are playing suggests that conºicts 
that formerly would have been resolved elsewhere, or not raised at all, are 
now being resolved through the courts, and as a result may be more open to 
challenge than in the past. 
The data presented in Part II, moreover, show that defamation litigation may 
empower individuals at the same time as it serves local interests in control. The 
development of defamation litigation cannot be understood only in terms of 
local protectionism, or only as evidence of how those with power resist and 
retaliate against external scrutiny. Cases brought by both famous persons and 
ordinary individuals demonstrate that persons without obvious inºuence are 
using libel suits to advance a range of interests. Local protectionism may assist 
ordinary plaintiffs, but that does not explain the apparent increasing willingness 
of individuals to bring such cases, or the apparent receptiveness of courts to 
such claims. 
The greater use of law and the courts as a tool to assert local interests and 
resolve local-center conºicts may be opening opportunities for greater use of 
law by others. Although defamation litigation by individuals developed soon 
after the General Principles of the Civil Code became effective in 1987, in-
creased use of defamation litigation by powerful parties in recent years may 
also be encouraging more ordinary individuals to assert their rights.421 The data 
in Part II do not permit detailed analysis of the development of each type of 
claim over time, and any spillover effect cannot be clearly established. But it 
appears likely that widespread coverage of defamation litigation is encourag-
ing more such cases. 
The use of courts to entrench local interests—by reference to legally pro-
tected individual rights—therefore may also be encouraging rights-based litiga-
tion by others. Using litigation to constrain the media may signal that liti-
gation is a tool for combating other powerful actors, be they corporations or 
governments. Permitting such cases to be used to entrench local interests may 
be a necessary corollary or prerequisite to the effective use of litigation by 
ordinary people. 
 
                                                                                                                      
420. In some cases, reporters who are sued for defamation have also countersued, arguing that their 
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Even within the context of actions designed primarily to deºect criticism 
of locally inºuential plaintiffs, the fact that courts are now battlegrounds for 
power interactions may be encouraging judicial innovation as well. In three 
recent cases, local courts have issued rulings that either explicitly or implic-
itly recognized the importance of media supervision and the need for persons 
in the public spotlight to withstand a heightened level of criticism. In the ªrst 
such case, Chinese soccer star Fan Zhiyi sued the Shanghai-based Wenhui 
Xinmin United Publishing group after its Oriental Sports Daily reported on ru-
mors stating that Fan had gambled on games. The paper contended that its 
article, which was one of a series reporting on the alleged scandal, had been 
intended to refute rumors that were widely circulating at the time and to clear 
Fan of any wrongdoing.422 In rejecting Fan’s claim, the court noted that Fan 
“naturally was a public person” and that the defendant had “the responsibil-
ity to carry out its right to public opinion supervision” and report on the 
rumors.423 The court added that the paper should be protected because it 
was acting in the public interest and satisfying the public’s “right to know” 
regarding a public person.424 As a result, the plaintiff’s reputation “was not 
just an ordinary matter of one person’s affairs, but rather was a matter of public 
interest” and thus “certainly” could be a subject of news reporting.425 
In the second case, Yu Qiuyu, a famous writer, brought a libel suit against 
a rival commentator, Xiao Xialin. Xiao had alleged that Yu received a villa from 
the Shenzhen government as a gift in return for serving as a “cultural con-
sultant” to Shenzhen and for praising Shenzhen. Yu argued that he had never 
received any real estate as compensation from anyone in Shenzhen. The defen-
dant made explicit reference to the Fan Zhiyi case in arguing that the concept of 
“public ªgure” had been accepted in China, and that Yu should likewise be 
found to be a public ªgure deserving of a lower standard of protection than 
that accorded an ordinary person.426 
The Beijing Dongcheng District People’s court rejected the reference to 
the Fan Zhiyi decision, noting that China is a civil law country and thus cita-
tions to case precedent are “not suitable.”427 The court also stated that the ques-
tion of whether a public ªgure’s reputation deserves a lower standard of pro-
tection was still “under academic discussion” in China.428 Nevertheless, the 
court found for the defendant. The panel stated that rumors regarding Yu did in 
fact exist at the time of publication and that the defendant had believed them to 
be true when he wrote his commentary. The court found that the defendant 
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425. Id.; see also Xin Yi, Cong “Fan Zhiyi Mingyu Quan” An Baisu Shuoqi [Discussing the Defeat in the 
“Fan Zhiyi Defamation” Case], Renmin Luntan [People’s Forum], Aug. 2004, available at http://www. 
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428. Id. 
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had not created the story, but had merely reported on rumors that were al-
ready circulating.429 
Although the court rejected direct citation to the Fan Zhiyi case and said 
that resolving the public ªgure issue was not necessary, some commentators 
saw the explicit discussion of the standard and the reliance of defendant’s coun-
sel on the Fan case as important breakthroughs.430 Despite the court’s state-
ments to the contrary, commentators argued that the public person standard 
had played an important role in the outcome.431 Indeed, even China’s ofªcial 
English-language newspaper, China Daily, stated in its report on the case that 
the court found that “[a]s a public ªgure, Yu should show some tolerance to 
a certain amount of criticism in the media as long as it was not malicious or 
in direct violation of the law.”432 
In a third case, brought by Hong Kong Director Stanley Tong, also known as 
Tang Jili, lawyers for the defendant media contended that Tong’s celebrity 
status meant that he should enjoy a lower level of protection for reputation 
and be exposed to a higher degree of public scrutiny.433 The court found for 
plaintiff Tong, but, in an online discussion of the case posted to the court’s web-
site, one of the judges involved in the case accepted the Fan Zhiyi public person 
standard. The judge explained, however, that accepting the public person stan-
dard did not necessitate a ªnding for defendants, as even public persons have 
reputation rights.434 In this case, the media had violated such rights when they 
reported that Tong had broken up with his girlfriend while she was pregnant 
with his child.435 
The cases demonstrate the courts’ willingness to contemplate expanded pro-
tection for the media even absent explicit guidance to such effect from either 
the National People’s Congress or the SPC. Such judicial innovation is particu-
larly striking given that neither the General Principles nor the SPC’s Expla-
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In the case, a state-owned real estate company, Guangzhou Huaqiao Real Estate Development Co., had 
sued the magazine following reports discussing the misallocation of state assets and the laying off of state 
workers. The court noted that the articles in question had addressed important issues—the preservation 
of the value of state assets and treatment of workers—and had not been incorrect. See Pu, infra Appendix 
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nation or Interpretation provide a basis for distinguishing between “public 
persons” and others, and the issue remains a sensitive point in ongoing dis-
cussions regarding draft provisions on defamation for China’s Civil Code. Yet 
courts have relied on such a distinction in response to arguments by lawyers, 
some of whom have explicitly argued with reference to defamation law in other 
countries. The three principal “public person” decisions have not relied on the 
right to criticize the government, but some scholars and journalists have justi-
ªed the decisions by noting that the Constitution does protect the right of 
citizens to criticize the state. 
Whether other courts will follow the lead of the Shanghai court and adopt 
a public person standard remains to be seen. Whether the SPC or the National 
People’s Congress will look kindly on such actions is similarly unclear. But 
the willingness of courts to rule in favor of defendants in such cases does suggest 
that courts are, in certain circumstances, willing to act innovatively to enhance 
protections for the media. Whether the defamation cases are unique or reºect a 
broader trend toward innovation by China’s courts is an intriguing topic for 
future study. At the very least, however, the rise in the range and number of 
cases in China’s courts is presenting widening opportunities for such ex-
perimentation. 
Expanded protection for the media’s right to criticize would facilitate the 
media’s ability to engage in critical reporting, and might help insulate the me-
dia from some defamation litigation. But it would be wrong to view such provi-
sions as likely to effect fundamental changes to the role of the media in China. 
Direct Party oversight of the media remains more important than defama-
tion litigation as a tool for constraining critical reporting. In most cases, 
Propaganda Department sanctions are more feared than are adverse defama-
tion standards. Increasing protection for the media from defamation litiga-
tion might reduce the ability of local ofªcials to retaliate against the media, 
but it would not alter the media’s inability to criticize higher-ranking ofªcials. 
The Chinese media’s ofªcial role also suggests caution in assuming that 
strengthening protections for the media will further transparency and ac-
countability. The media already plays an important ofªcial oversight role: Criti-
cal reporting serves central Party-state interests in curbing malfeasance by 
local ofªcials and in combating local protectionism. Such criticism is tolerated, 
and at times encouraged, only because it serves central interests and not be-
cause of recognition of the value of independent media criticism of govern-
ment. Thus, in contrast to the United States, where the public person standard 
serves to protect the media from the state, in China such provisions would 
serve to protect one arm of the state (the media) from other state institutions. 
As this Article has shown, the media’s ofªcial role in China means that defa-
mation litigation is a mechanism for resisting state authority and for in-
creasing state accountability. High defeat rates for the media are forcing the 
media to adjust their practices and may be contributing to increased profes-
sionalism within the media. Given the media’s inºuence, and the Party-state’s 
reliance on the media as a source of information, increasing media account-
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ability is a worthy goal. Indeed, Chinese observers argue that the Chinese me-
dia’s ofªcial status is itself a powerful argument in favor of stringent defama-
tion standards: In a system in which courts, Party ofªcials, and ordinary per-
sons often view media reports as fact, holding the media accountable for 
even small errors may be more desirable than would be the case in a system 
in which the media reºect a diversity of perspectives.436 Defamation litiga-
tion is one of the few mechanisms that exist for challenging the authority of 
the media.437 Likewise, in a society in which criticism has traditionally been 
muted, critical reports have particular potency, thus perhaps justifying greater 
constraints on the media than might be found in a democratic society.438 To 
be sure, these claims overstate the case for restrictions on the media, but they 
highlight tension between the media’s new and traditional roles. 
Such arguments neither undercut the value of recent judicial innovations 
regarding public persons, nor weaken claims that the media’s role in expos-
ing wrongdoing is being hampered by repressive use of defamation litigation. 
These arguments do, however, demonstrate that simply transplanting defa-
mation standards from abroad is unlikely to have immediate effect. Expanded 
protections for the media, and an expanded role for courts in developing and 
enforcing such provisions, would serve important goals. Over time, facilitat-
ing greater media criticism of ofªcial actors and other public persons may 
increase the state’s comfort level with direct media criticism. Likewise, permit-
ting courts to continue to develop legal standards for defamation law may 
encourage the courts to expand their role in adjudicating rights-based claims 
more generally, and may strengthen courts’ ability to resist external interfer-
ence. Ensuring that courts continue to play roles in adjudicating such disputes 
is likely more important than the substantive legal standards they apply. 
IV. Conclusion 
It would be tempting to explain the growth of defamation litigation in 
China as an example of a repressive regime using litigation to intimidate the 
newly vibrant media. Such trends exist in China, and many in the Chinese me-
dia do view defamation litigation primarily in terms of its implications for 
media freedom. The evidence presented in this Article, however, suggests that 
conceptualizing defamation litigation in such terms overlooks much of the 
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signiªcance of these cases. Defamation litigation in China reºects friction 
between strong concerns for the reputations of individuals and an increasingly 
commercialized, and difªcult to control, media. But such litigation also reveals 
tension between state interests in increasing media oversight and state con-
cerns with cabining criticism, as well as concerns with granting the media 
greater protections in a society in which the media continue to speak with 
the imprimatur of state authority. 
This Article demonstrates that defamation litigation, originally designed 
to protect individuals, has been co-opted by those with power into a tool for 
resisting media scrutiny. Yet such use of defamation litigation may also serve 
to encourage greater use of litigation by ordinary individuals. This model of 
litigation by the powerful serving to encourage similar action by those without 
power carries at least three implications for our understanding of the process 
of legalization in China. 
First, these developments highlight the degree to which China’s legalization 
process is occurring in ways that are difªcult for the central Party-state to con-
trol and that may not be easily perceived or categorized. The Chinese legal 
system is pulling in multiple directions, with courts and the media attempt-
ing to carve out signiªcant autonomy within a framework of state oversight 
and interference. Defamation litigation by local ofªcials may have developed 
because such actions are consistent with central Party-state concerns over 
excessive media autonomy. Yet despite the widespread media coverage of indi-
vidual defamation cases, the evolution of defamation litigation into a vehicle 
for resisting central oversight and asserting local interests appears to have oc-
curred largely unnoticed. Given the difªculty of imposing central authority 
on local courts and the likely diversity of views about the roles of the media 
and the courts within the Party-state, efforts to better delineate the bounda-
ries of permissible and impermissible conduct by the media or local authori-
ties may be difªcult. 
Second, this model demonstrates that efforts to use law in ways that appear to 
undermine legality may also be fostering greater use of law by others. Corporate 
and ofªcial lawsuits designed to retaliate against or repress the media through 
local courts may undermine conªdence in the courts as fair or neutral deci-
sionmakers. But such litigation may also be encouraging greater use of the 
formal legal system by ordinary persons, by suggesting the possibility both 
that the law offers strong protection for the reputations of individuals and 
that the media can be sued. By bringing such suits, corporate and ofªcial plain-
tiffs may also be indicating that the courts are legitimate fora for resolving 
such disputes. 
Third, the growth of defamation litigation suggests the important space 
available for innovation by a range of actors in the legal system. Such cases 
demonstrate the increased ability of litigants—be they ofªcials or ordinary 
persons—to use the legal system strategically to advance their own interests 
in new directions. At the same time, however, these cases also indicate that 
courts are also increasingly able to innovate, in some cases going out of their 
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way to fashion new legal doctrines. Likewise, although courts in many cases 
may have little choice but to rule for local powerful interests, they often is-
sue only modest damages. The development of defamation litigation may 
indicate a threat to courts’ efforts to increase their authority, but there are also 
indications that courts are increasingly assertive of their own powers and inter-
ests, as reºected by cases brought by judges and courts. 
Defamation litigation is a mechanism for constraining China’s media. High 
defeat rates in defamation cases suggest a threat to the media’s expanded auton-
omy. The empirical analysis in Part II, however, demonstrates that understand-
ing the development of defamation law only in those terms would be a mistake. 
The signiªcance of defamation litigation in China transcends individual cases, 
just as it goes beyond questions of whether defamation law is being used to con-
strict speech. The impact for understanding the legalization of Chinese society 
runs deeper. The combination of defamation law and rapidly evolving media 
and legal institutions is fostering litigation; it is also fostering expectations. 
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